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Abstract 
There is an interest in how people coordinate multiple activities with multiple 
partners, and in particular, how people deal with interruptions. Interruptions happen 
unexpectedly. They can cause errors and loss of productivity. Effects of interruptions have 
been studied in individual tasks, but not in collaborative tasks. When pairs deal with an 
interruption, they have to jointly suspend their activity, address the matter, and later jointly 
reinstate their activity. 
The main goal of the dissertation was to define a model of suspensions and to 
measure constrains on the suspension and the reinstatement steps. Pairs suspend 
momentarily without taking leave of each other. This requires the coordination of two 
important processes: Politeness and common ground. First, politeness is often involved in 
suspensions, because asking one's partner to wait while one does something else is face-
threatening. Two factors affect politeness: The degree of personal responsibility of 
participants proposing suspensions and durations of suspensions. Second, continuing tasks 
requires reconstructing joint representations of the tasks (common ground). Several factors 
affect the reconstruction of common ground: The persons interrupted the timing of 
suspension and the availability of cues about the state of the task. 
Five studies were conducted. Study 1 used naturally-occurring suspensions in 
telephone conversations from a corpus data. Study 2 & 3 used suspensions triggered with a 
cover story in laboratory. Study 2 & 3 manipulated participants’ roles in conversations and 
durations of interruptions. Results revealed that participants were more polite when 
suspension lasted longer, and it took more collaborative effort to reinstate conversations. 
Also, initiators of suspensions were more polite when they were listening than speaking. 
Study 4 & 5 manipulated the duration and the timing of interruptions during a goal-oriented 
task. Additionally, Study 4 manipulated the participants’ role during interruptions, and Study 
5 manipulated the visibility of workspace between participants. Results showed that 
participants took more time to reinstate tasks when interruptions lasted longer and when it 
happened in the middle of sub-tasks, compared to when interruptions were brief and 
happened between sub-tasks. Also, they took more time to reinstate when both participants 
were distracted during interruptions, rather than when just one was distracted, and when 
participants did not share their workspace, rather than when they did share a workspace.
xviii 
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Introduction 
In this project, I try to answer an empirical question: How do people suspend their 
mutual activities when they are interrupted by a third party? 
What are suspensions? Let’s look at the following example: Marc, a car dealer, and 
Lydia, a customer, are sitting in Marc’s office. They are negotiating options on the car, when 
Marc’s telephone rings. Marc answers the call. In the meantime, Lydia waits. When he is 
done, Marc and Lydia return to their negotiation. In this example, two people are involved in 
a conversation. A third party solicits one person’s attention and as a result, it interrupts the 
conversation. This constrains both persons to momentarily suspend their activity. 
Interruptions take place anywhere and happen to anybody: at home, a child needs a 
mother’s attention while she is talking on the telephone; at work, a boss calls an employee 
while that person is working on a project with a colleague; in a restaurant, the waiter comes 
to take the order from a couple involved in a romantic discussion. All these examples have 
something in common. People are involved in an interaction, and they are interrupted. 
Therefore, they need to coordinate each others’ actions to accommodate to the unexpected 
situation. 
Interruptions stem from the need of several individuals to interact to coordinate a 
mutual problem. This can be looked at macro and micro levels. At a macro level, people live 
together, they organize common activities, or they trade goods and services. People go 
about their personal business, but they are also interdependent of one another. So at times, 
they interrupt each other. At a micro level, people use language to coordinate mutual 
actions. People negotiate interactions one at a time. So when people solicit attention of 
other people who already involved in an interaction, it creates an interruption. We will have 
a closer look at these levels as we address coordination of suspensions. 
The dissertation is organized in the following way: In the chapter 1, I address issues 
related to fragmented activities in organizations. I propose a view of interruptions as 
coordination of situated and distributed cognition. In the chapter 2, I present issues related 
to interruptions of individual activities. In the chapter 3, I present conversational analysis 
and a collaborative activities framework as conceptual tools to understand suspensions of 
interactions. In the chapter 4, I develop research questions and propose a research plan. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are three original manuscripts reporting the results of 5 studies. Then, in 
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chapter 8, I summarize results, discuss their implications, address limitations and propose 
further avenues for research. 
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Chapter 1 – Interruptions in organizations 
Research suggests that the more organized activities are, the more 
interdependencies will be created, the more coordination needs will occur, and the more 
likely interruptions will happen. Such an environment is typical of organizations. 
1.1 Coordination and interdependencies in organizations 
When many people work for the same purpose, they need to coordinate activities. 
Coordination is a central problem in management theories (e.g., Taylor, 1911). When 
organizations grow, they differentiate labor and activities (Mintzberg, 1983). The division of 
tasks then requires coordination among tasks. Mintzberg (1983) proposes 5 types of 
coordinating mechanisms: mutual adjustment; direct supervision; standardization of work 
processes, standardization of work output, and standardization of work skills. These 
mechanisms hold organizations together. The simplest coordination mechanism is mutual 
adjustment. It is the simplest in terms of structure and means that need to be organized. 
Mutual adjustment is an informal communication process. It is usually what coworkers use 
to get their work done. It is the most flexible mechanism and it depends very much on the 
participants’ ability to adapt to each other. It is also that way that people interrupt each 
other. Beyond formal structure, it is the main mechanism people use to deal with 
unexpected needs. Then as the organization outgrows a handful of people working together, 
more formal coordinating mechanisms emerge, such as the need to supervise and take 
responsibility for the division of labor. Then, still later, mechanisms emerge that involve 
standardization of work processes, outputs and skills. Organizations can specify how tasks 
need to be achieved (e.g., assembly lines). They can specify the output of the work (e.g., 
products or services). They can also specify skills or knowledge employees need to master to 
perform work (specialized training). These organizations are structured. Such structures 
create work constellations and flows of communication. Communication can be both vertical 
and horizontal, and both formal and informal. 
The fragmentation of tasks and responsibilities creates interdependent activities, and 
thus, the need for coordination and communication (Malone & Crowston, 1994). Each 
interdependent activity consists of actors, resources and goals that need to be managed. The 
coordination problem for each actor depends on task and resources availabilities. There are 
processes to achieve activities and processes to manage dependencies. But there is also a 
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process of integrating fragmented activities (Heath & Staudenmayer, 2000). The most 
common way to manage these coordination needs is on-going communication. This has long 
since been described in managerial activities. Managers deal with a series of fragmented 
actions and have frequent interactions (Mintzberg, 1973; Sproull, 1984). But what was once 
particular to top management has become more generalized in flattened structures. There, 
employees work more in teams, with numerous partners and on varied activities (DiMaggio, 
2001; Perlow, 1999; Sproull, 1984). Such (ad hoc and decentralized) structures have 
emerged with new communication technologies (Malone & Crowston, 1994). These 
technologies reduce costs of coordination among dependencies. As a result, these structures 
can sustain more flows of communication, but at the same time, they also increase the cost 
of unplanned coordination and communication (e.g., Perlow, 1999, Gonzales & Mark, 2004). 
This is because people can interact freely and more closely, and thus more interruptions 
occur (McFarlane & Latorella, 2002).  
The balance between spontaneous communication and productivity of fragmented 
activities can be problematic. In an ethnographic study, Perlow (1999) coined the term “time 
famine” to describe engineers complaining about the lack of time to accomplish too much 
work. In this company, engineers were interacting frequently and they had trouble keeping 
up with their individual assignments. Their interactions helped them coordinate their 
projects, but they were taking place too often. Ninety-six percent of interactions were 
helpful, but only 10% were urgent. So, 86% of interactions could have happened later. Also, 
95% of interactions were spontaneous and not controlled by the engineers. Perlow proposed 
that the engineers allocate specific periods of time for working alone (quiet time) and for 
interacting (interaction time). This resulted in minimal interruptions during quiet time and 
maximal coordination during interaction time. She proposed a model for an effective use of 
time. She suggests balancing spontaneous and synchronized times of interactions as a 
function of how frequent interactions are. The more frequent they are, the more 
synchronized they should be. In other words, interactions can be spontaneous, when they 
are infrequent, but when they become more frequent, interactions are more effective when 
they are synchronized. 
1.2 Concepts of interactive and individual activities 
Further studies (Fussell et al., 2004; Gonzalez & Mark, 2004, 2005) describe 
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interactive activities and individual activities. These activities are interdependent but need to 
be coordinated. 
In Fussell et al. (2004), workers follow trajectories. Trajectories are sequences of 
activities where entities (person, team) move through time. Both participants and tasks have 
trajectories. Participant trajectories are related to a given person assigned to an activity in a 
project, and task trajectories are the evolution of given projects. The two trajectories are 
dependent and don’t progress at the same pace. Usually trajectories will happen parallel to 
each other. But they need to be coordinated periodically. Because of the need to coordinate, 
workers prefer working with collocated partners. Collocated activities require less effort to 
coordinate than remote activities.  
Similarly to trajectories, workers’ activities can be considered as working spheres 
(Gonzalez & Mark, 2004). These are composed of units of tasks that serve the purpose of 
specific assignments. Workers principally collaborate to coordinate working spheres. 
Gonzalez and Mark (2004) found that workers spend on average 3 minutes on a task, before 
switching tasks. When these tasks are looked at the sphere level, workers spend on average 
12 minutes before switching spheres. In another analysis, Gonzalez and Mark (2005) found 
that workers constantly maintain an overview of their activities, depending on their own 
activities and their colleagues. They monitor each other to figure out mutual progress and 
status of activities. These strategies help anticipating priorities and changing activities, both 
for local tasks and for global project. That way, workers filter incoming and outgoing 
information. 
As these studies indicate, individuals and their environment can’t be separated. They 
interact with each other. This view is shared in activity theory (Leont’ev, 1978, in Kuutti, 
1995) and in distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1991). In activity theory, activities are 
composed of people, actions and motivating objects. They form a unit of analysis (spheres in 
Gonzalez and Mark (2005)). The environment provides objects that people use to coordinate 
and support activities (e.g., Kirsh, 2001; Kuutti, 1995). People can affect objects and form 
them according to their needs. But objects can also influence people’s representations. This 
interaction with the environment was described by Vygotsky (1978) in his concept of zone of 
proximal development. He showed how children learn from their environment and from the 
interactions with their environment. He underlined the importance of integrating the 
environment to understand how individuals behave in given contexts. 
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We have seen that in an organizational setting, activities are fragmented and are 
therefore interdependent. People coordinate individual activities by communicating with 
each other. People are in constant interaction with their environment, whether it be another 
person or objects. The problem for people is to find ways to coordinate multiple interactions 
and activities. This is a problem, because individuals can’t perform multiple activities at a 
given moment. We will see now how individuals perform activities and how they deal with 
interruptions. 
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Chapter 2 – Individual activities and interruptions 
In this chapter, we will first look at what activities are, so we can better understand 
the implications for interruptions. Then, we will describe types of interruptions and look at 
their effects on individuals1. 
2.1 Performing activities 
What do individuals do when they perform activities? According to action theory, 
individuals are motivated to attain goals (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960). They control 
their actions until goals are met. This process is described in the TOTE (Test, Operate, Test, 
Exit) process (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960). In action regulation theory (Frese & Zapf, 
1994), actions are accomplished in two phases. In a pre-phase, individuals set goals and plan 
them, and in an action phase, individuals try to attain the goal. Then, they get feedback from 
the outcome of their actions. They can change their plan and the course of their actions to 
attain the set goals. These approaches assume individuals are goal-directed and can plan 
their actions in a hierarchical way. 
Miyata and Norman (1986) describe a typology of activities (See Table 1). First, 
activities can be active or suspended. Then, current activities are either under control 
(foregrounded) or not (backgrounded). Foregrounded activities are in fact commonly named 
primary activities. They are activities individuals consciously focus their attention on. 
Backgrounded activities are used for on-going routine tasks, and usually receive little or no 
conscious attention (e.g., changing gears while driving a car). Backgrounded activities can 
also be external, and carried out by a system (e.g., a computer) or another person. Then 
there are suspended activities. In suspended activities, individuals’ intentions remain active, 
but the activities remain on hold until an appropriate time to resume their execution.  
                                                 
1
 The term “individuals” refers to the ensemble of single persons who perform actions. They are not performing 
actions together, but individually. 
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Table 1. Types of activities. 
Suspended Current  
 Foregrounded (primary) Backgrounded  
  Internal External 
 
Let’s now turn to the process of interruptions and resumptions of primary activities. 
A generic process is proposed by Altmann and Trafton (2004). See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Punctuation of the transitions in an interruption, adapted from Altmann and 
Trafton (2004). 
This model shows the transition from a primary activity to a secondary activity and 
later on, the transition back from the secondary activity to the primary activity. The time 
intervals used to move from an activity to another are called interruptions and resumption 
lags. Both primary and secondary activities can share the same properties. In Miyata and 
Norman’s (1986) typology, every time individuals switch tasks, background activities become 
foreground activities and foregrounded activities are put in the background. This is because 
individuals can only focus their attention with full consciousness on one task at a time. This 
allows them to plan, control and assess their actions. 
Individuals have a limited focus of attention. This limit challenges them when they 
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deal with interrupting events. Conflicts of attention arise when individuals need to 
concentrate on one task and they need to be alert for unexpected external events. 
According to Miyata and Norman (1986), individuals can be task-driven or interrupt-driven. 
The first state features a concentration process attending to a single purpose and ignoring 
other events (task-driven process) – e.g., a person reading a book. The second state features 
a response process to the environment. It involves changes of activities and thoughts 
(interrupt-driven process) – e.g., police officers monitoring car traffic. In the latter case, 
people are more easily distracted. Similarly, Hall (1983) distinguished monochronic and 
polychronic preference styles. People preferring the first style favor uninterrupted activities. 
People preferring the second style favor multiple activities and are more flexible regarding 
interruptions. 
2.2 Types of interruptions 
Let us now turn to types of interruptions. How do they take place? Jett and George 
(2003) describe four types of interruptions: breaks, intrusions, discrepancies and distractions 
(see Table 2).  
Table 2. Four types of interruptions from Jett and George (2003). 
Type  Internal /  
External 
Planned /  
Unplanned 
Forced on 
individual 
Break Internal Planned No 
Intrusion External Unplanned Yes 
Discrepancies Internal Unplanned No 
Distractions External Unplanned No 
 
The first type of interruption is a break. Breaks are planned and originate from 
individuals (internal and foregrounded in Miyata and Norman's (1986) terminology). These 
are also called scheduled interruptions (McFarlane & Latorella, 2002), and natural transitions 
(Gonzalez & Mark, 2005). Natural transitions happen when tasks require no further action, 
and individuals move on to other activities.  
The second type of interruption is an intrusion. Jett and George (2003) describe an 
intrusion as “an unexpected encounter initiated by another person that interrupts the flow 
and continuity of an individual’s work and brings that work to a temporary halt” (p. 495). 
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Intrusions are not planned and originate from the environment (external, also backgrounded 
in Miyata and Norman's (1986) terminology). They are often immediate (McFarlane & 
Latorella, 2002), their transitions are forced and disruptive (Gonzalez & Mark, 2005). Forced 
transitions typically happen when individuals have to leave activities they are focusing on. 
For instance, individuals are solicited by other people’s presence or phone calls and require 
individuals to spend time with them on another activity. Intrusions are the type of 
interruption referred as interruptions in the literature on task interruptions. Intrusions are 
also the type of interruption we are interested in this research project.  
The third type of interruption is a discrepancy. Discrepancies are unplanned and 
internal (foregrounded) in Miyata and Norman's (1986) terminology. There are 
inconsistencies between what individuals expect and what is relevant for tasks at hand. 
Discrepancies redirect individuals’ attention to the inconsistencies, and prevent them to 
continue their tasks.  
The fourth type of interruption is a distraction. Distractions are unplanned and 
external (background) in Miyata and Norman's (1986) terminology. They draw individuals’ 
attention away from tasks. They are not aimed at individuals but nevertheless divert 
attention onto unrelated activities.  
2.3 Effects of interruptions on individuals  
In organizational settings, interruptions are perceived negatively. They happen too 
often or at a bad time (e.g., Perlow, 1999; Tucker & Spear, 2006; Coeira & Tombs, 1998). 
They affect individuals’ productivity (Perlow, 1999), accuracy (e.g., Bainbridge, 1984; Flynn et 
al., 1999), and mood (Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004). For instance, Jackson, Dawson and Wilson 
(2003) showed that people opened new emails as fast as they would answer the telephone 
(less than 6 seconds). Then, they needed more time to resume their primary activities (2 
minutes). Most advice is aimed at controlling the initiation and the timing of intrusions (Jett 
& George, 2003; Perlow, 1999; Jackson et al., 2003). But, as we have seen, exchanging 
information is critical to coordinate collaborations (Perlow, 1999, Fussell et al., 2004; Mark & 
Gonzalez, 2005). In fact, people often self-initiate interruptions (Gonzalez & Mark, 2004; 
Sproull, 1984), for instance, when putting their activities on hold to coordinate them with 
other people, or when using signals to remind themselves to do something else. 
Few experimental studies show positive outcomes of interruption in activities. In fact, 
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the first experimental study on interruptions by Zeigarnik (1927) showed that people could 
recall interrupted tasks better than uninterrupted tasks. More recently, studies showed 
individuals increasing their performance when they were interrupted (Zijlstra, Roe, Leonora 
& Krediet, 1999; Speier, Valacich & Vessey, 1997; Eyrolle & Cellier, 2000). Secretaries took 
the same amount of time to complete interrupted tasks than those who were not 
interrupted, but their level of stress increased (Zijlstra, Roe, Leonora & Krediet, 1999). In 
other experiments (Speier, Valacich & Vessey, 1997, 1999, 2003; Burmistrov & Leonova, 
2003), individuals were more accurate and faster after interruptions in simple tasks 
(retrieving information), but not in complex tasks (problem-solving). This task effect was 
stronger when interruptions were more frequent (Speier, Valacich & Vessey, 1999). These 
studies consider the outcome of interruptions on the overall performance of the primary 
tasks, but they don’t study the actual processes of suspending and resuming activities. 
In the task interruption literature, the focus is on cognitive costs for resuming 
suspended activities. Resuming activities is a cognitive process. It involves actions, attention 
and memory (Miyata & Norman, 1986). Those three facets are separate but intertwined 
processes. We treat them together and discuss the issues of resuming activities. 
A basic finding is that intentions of suspended activities remain active, and await an 
appropriate time to resume their execution (Miyata & Norman, 1986). In a hierarchical 
analysis view (Miller, Galanter, & Pribham, 1960) and a means-end analysis view (Newell & 
Simon, 1972), individuals remember the suspended actions that remain to be done. In 
theory, incomplete tasks can be resumed, because unfulfilled goals remain on top of the 
stack. Structures of the tasks allow individuals to retrieve pending goals in a last-in first-out 
manner. But it is also assumed that goals can be actively inhibited and activated for the 
purpose of the intentions. During the accomplishment of tasks, goals can be suspended in 
order to accomplish sub-goals. Sub-goals can be part of one main goal or can be part of 
another goal. Overall, the activation of an internal representation is critical for task 
resumption (Altmann & Trafton, 2002). 
This approach supposes an accurate memory of the last actions, so individuals can 
perform future actions. This memory for future actions is also known as prospective 
memory. Research shows that this memory decreases over time and when it faces 
interferences during interruptions (Altmann & Trafton, 2002; Hodgetts & Jones, 2005, 
2006a, 2006b; Edwards, McDaniels, Williford, Pagan & Dismukes, 2003). In fact, it’s the 
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activation of goals in memory that seem to decay over time (Hodgetts & Jones, 2005, 2006a, 
2006b, Altmann & Trafton, 2002, 2007). According to Altman & Trafton’s (2002, 2007) goal 
activation model, the ability to retrieve goals depends on the level of activation at the onset 
of interruptions and on the level of interference in the meantime (Figure 2). Interferences 
such as complex tasks increase time to resume suspended goals. Complex tasks are more 
interfering because they involved numerous sub-tasks. These tasks have more effect on 
suppressing active goals in memory (Hodgetts & Jones 2006a). 
 
Figure 2. Level of activation of new goals as a function of time in seconds, and level of 
interference due to old goals.  indicates the activation advantage of new goals over the 
interference of old goals (taken from Altmann & Trafton, 2002, p. 46). 
Cues help reactivate goals and counter their decay in memory. But they need to be 
present in the environment before goals are suspended (Altmann & Trafton, 2002). They 
play a role during the interruption lag (recall the transition phases in figure 1). They allow for 
preparing for the resumption (Trafton, Altmann, Brock & Mintz, 2003; Altmann & Trafton, 
2004; Clifford & Altmann, 2004; Hodgetts & Jones, 2006b). Otherwise, without external cues, 
activation of goals decays rapidly. Goals need to have a high level of activation to be recalled 
promptly, even for short interruptions (5 seconds) (Edwards, McDaniels, Williford, Pagan & 
Dismukes, 2003). 
Memory loss is also sensitive to conflict of attention between primary tasks and 
secondary tasks. These conflicts interfere with activation of goals. Similarities between the 
two tasks are detrimental. Individuals have more difficulty resuming primary tasks when 
tasks overlap in terms of components (Gillie & Broadbent, 1989; Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004, 
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Edwards & Gronlund, 1998). These types of interference cancel out the advantage of short 
interruptions over long interruptions. For instance, in Gillie and Broadbent (1989), 
individuals completing complex arithmetic tasks during interruptions didn’t resume any 
faster after 30-second interruptions then after 2-minute interruptions.  
The resumption can also be affected by the timing of interruptions in the course of 
actions. Interruptions are less detrimental, or more tolerable, when actions are completed 
than when they are not. The completion of actions corresponds to natural breakpoints in the 
task structure (Miyata & Norman, 1986; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). These are when individuals 
change goals. Completed tasks go into the background and new tasks can be pushed into the 
foreground (Miyata & Norman, 1986). These points in the task are also called task 
boundaries (Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004; Bailey & Iqbal, 2008; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). 
Individuals are better at identifying task boundaries at task completion, than at mid-task 
(Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). At task boundaries, there should be more 
prominent and fewer goals in memory, because most goals in the current task are 
completed. Reactivation of goals at these points is easier. In contrast, reactivation of 
uncompleted tasks requires more sub-goals to be reactivated (Altmann & Trafton, 2002). 
Both field studies and experiments report decreased performances at resumption of 
uncompleted actions in comparison to resumptions of completed actions. Workers had 
more trouble switching tasks during tasks than between tasks (Czerwinski, Horvitz & Wilhite, 
2004; Cutrell, Czerwinski, & Horvitz, 2001; Czerwinski, Cutrell, & Horvitz, 2000; Adamczyk & 
Bailey, 2004). Individuals remembered better what they did in the primary activity after 
completed actions than uncompleted actions, except when tasks were similar (Edwards & 
Gronlund, 1998). Also, participants resumed faster when they were interrupted at the 
beginning of new tasks (Monk, Boehm-Davis, & Trafton, 2002, 2004) or at task boundaries 
(Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004; Iqbal, Adamczyk, Zheng & Bailey, 2005; Iqbal & Bailey, 2006). 
2.4 Interruptions in language productions 
Cognitive costs of resuming activities have also been studied in psycholinguistics 
(e.g., Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Levelt, 1989). Individuals’ activities are uttering speech, or 
producing discourse. When individuals resuming their discourse, they resume interrupted 
utterances to fulfill their intentions (Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Levelt, 1989; Swets, 2006). Grosz 
and Sidner (1986) present a theory on structures of dialogue that is similar to action 
14 
 
theories. Discourse is a task-oriented activity. It implies intentions (goals) of actions and 
attention. Goals and sub-goals refer respectively to discourse purpose and discourse 
segments purpose. Then, to achieve a discourse purpose, discourse segments purpose must 
be satisfied. Shifts of attention are possible between discourse segments, because the 
structure is emergent. In the case of interruption, a new discourse segment is unrelated to 
the purpose of the discourse, and it cannot fulfill the current goal. Individual shift their 
attention on another topic. Later, individuals shift their attentions and goals back to previous 
discourse. Individuals reactivate the stack, discourse is resumed, and the focus returns to the 
interrupted discourse segment (Grosz & Sidner, 1986). 
Similarly, Levelt (1989) described discourse as a representation of a goal plan with 
executed and remaining intentions. He called this representation “bookkeeping”. This 
structure of intentions allows individuals to keep track of what has been done and of what 
still needs to be done. It‘s nothing less than a memory of an action plan. Levelt (1989) also 
considers discourse in a hierarchical perspective. He argues that individuals can move up and 
down in a conversational structure. Similarly to the task literature, it is implied that 
interruptions at lower-level (sub-goals) might be more disruptive (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). 
This was tested by Swets (2006). He found that interruptions were more disruptive at the 
beginning of sentence productions than near the end. Resumptions took longer because 
more syntax plans needed to be reactivated. 
These studies of interruptions in discourse production represent a special case of task 
interruptions. They did not consider interruptions from an interactional perspective. In these 
accounts, when individuals are interrupted, they switch their attention onto other actions. 
And then, when they return to the suspended activity, they reactivate goals and resume 
their actions. But, as we will see in the next chapter, when people interact, they have to 
coordinate each other’s view of the current activity. Can they really merely resume their 
own suspended intentions to continue their interactions? 
We will now present literature about language use in social interactions. This will give 
us the conceptual tools to study how people suspend joint activities. 
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Chapter 3 – Coordinating activities with language 
As introduced earlier, people need to interact to coordinate their common activities. 
But so far, the theories we have seen distinguish actions and language as separate activities. 
We will see now that when people interact, their language is not free of context, nor are 
their actions free of language.  
In the second half of the twentieth century, new theories emerged (e.g., Austin, 
1962; Goffman, 1967, 1981, 1983; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1973, 1974; Grice, 1975, 
Clark, 1996) that view human actions within context, as opposed to actions viewed outside 
of context (for instance studies of language following Chomsky or Saussure; Goodwin & 
Heritage, 1990). In this chapter, we review major scientific contributions that will be used as 
a conceptual framework to study interruptions in joint activities. 
3.1 Joint activities 
Joint actions happen in joint activities or social activities. Similarly to Goffman’s 
(1981) notion of framework of situations, Clark (1996) proposes that joint activities have 
participants who have roles and goals (public and private), in which interactions take place, 
and where actions are bound in time and within context. Joint activities imply numerous 
aspects. First, people’s actions are situated in a given context. They have a “here and now” 
quality. This means that people’s actions are emerging in their environment and are a 
construct of the interactions between people and the environment at a given time (Goodwin 
& Heritage, 1990). Individuals’ actions are autonomous, but they are also related to the joint 
actions taking place. So they need to be coordinated. Second, joint activities require use of 
language as a medium to coordinate individual actions. In particular, the face-to-face setting 
is considered as the most basic and best medium to coordinate people’s actions (Goffman, 
1981; Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Clark 1996). The critical part of language use, of course, is 
that people understand each other. Third, joint activities require people’s participation and 
agenda. When people interact, they also coordinate each other’s face and roles (Goffman, 
1967, 1981). So, joint activities require, at least, the coordination of people’s actions and 
people’s involvement. The two are interdependent. But for the purpose of clarity, we will 
first address the coordination of people’s actions, and then later, the coordination of 
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people’s involvement.  
3.2. Speech act theories 
Austin and Grice were pioneers in viewing language as social action (Holtgraves, 
2001). For Austin (1962), each speech act has a propositional meaning (locutionary act), a 
conventional force of saying (illocutionary act), and an effect on the hearer (perlocutionary 
act). For Grice (1975), speakers are trying to do things with their words (illocutionary force). 
They have meanings in the sense of intentions (Clark, 1996). For Grice, intentions are only 
fulfilled when hearers recognize the speakers’ intentions (illocutionary force). This defines 
communicative acts: When a person signals something and another person recognizes what 
is meant (Clark, 1996). Recognition is crucial, because utterances can have various effects 
besides what the speakers initially intended. In other words, perlocutionary and illocutionary 
force can be distinct, since perlocutionary effects depend on how hearers interpret those 
(Holtgraves, 2001). This is true for non-verbal acts as well, like extending a hand to shake 
hands. This joint action cannot be fulfilled if it is not recognized by the other participant.  
For the purpose of recognizing each other’s intentions, Grice argued that both 
interlocutors expect to follow a cooperative principle: “Make your conversational 
contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged in.” (Clark, 1996, p. 140). He 
suggested that conversational participants assume their partners follow four maxims, as part 
of the cooperative principle (Clark, 1996, p. 142):  
A maxim of quantity: Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current 
purpose of the exchange), not more or less informative than required.  
A maxim of quality:  Do not say what you believe to be false, or what you lack evidence 
for.  
A maxim of relation:  Be relevant.  
A maxim of manner:  Be clear. Avoid ambiguity and obscurity. Be brief and orderly. 
So to make sure people understand what someone is saying, they should utter as 
much as is needed, in a true, relevant and clear fashion. But, it turns out that people rarely 
follow these maxims. Rather, people assume that their partners do. People interpret 
utterances as if they were intended to be informative, true, relevant and clear. There are 
several reasons people deviate from these maxims, one of them is avoiding confrontation by 
using indirect speech (see, Clark, 1996; Brown & Levinson, 1987). 
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In the case of indirect speech, the intended force doesn’t match the literal force, e.g., 
“It’s getting cold in here”. In this example, the speaker means more than just saying that it's 
getting cold. The implied meaning, or the intention, is to enlist some help in getting the 
speaker warmer, for example by closing a window. For Grice, implications are calculable. He 
proposed that people distinguish the literal and implicating forces and that they are thus 
able to determine the intended illocutionary act (Clark, 1996). 
3.3 Turn-taking 
In parallel to philosophers, like Austin and Grice, Goffman’s interaction order (1983) 
and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological (1967) views led to the development of conversational 
analysis, by H. Sacks and his colleagues E. Schegloff and G. Jefferson (Goodwin & Heritage, 
1990). Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) proposed an account of analysis of conversation 
by describing how turns are organized in social activities. They developed a systematic 
description of how people negotiate each other’s moves in social activities. These moves are 
turns participants take to organize their activities. Taking turns are systems that constrain 
activities. Turns have two fundamental properties. First, usually, only one person can talk at 
a time. Speakers change. Turns can vary in length, but they are allocated to one person at a 
given time. Second, turns are both context-free and context-sensitive. It means that turn-
taking is an invariant form found in all conversations, but it can be adapted to all sorts of 
situations. 
Turn-taking systems have two components: construction and allocation of turns. 
Constructions of turns are utterances and can take any semantic forms. The constructions 
allow interlocutors to project completion of turns, which allows for a transition relevance 
place. This place, or moment, is when a change of turn can first occur (e.g., at the end of a 
sentence). Then allocations of turns follow a series of rules. These rules are normative. They 
coordinate participants’ next turn and, normally, prevent gap or overlap. Specifically, they 
also are techniques of selection a speaker can use to keep or leave the floor in a 
conversation. Turns can be constructed in such way that: 1) they select the other party to 
take the floor; 2) they leave the floor open for another speaker; 3) or they let the current 
speaker continue, unless another participant self-selects. These rules apply for each 
subsequent turns and can only apply at the first possible transition-relevance place. They are 
also ordered by constraint. Rule number 1 is constrained by rule number 2 and 3, and rule 
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number 2 is constrained by rule number 3. These rules have several important implications. 
Among them, only one person talks at the same time. People’s utterances can overlap, but 
briefly. People use techniques to change turns by the way they utter their contributions. 
People are able to project end of turns and change turns. This leads to a first property of the 
turn-taking system: turns happen sequentially (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). Because 
each participant performs autonomous joint actions, they need to sequence them in order 
to figure out each other’s intentions. 
The second property is that turns form adjacency pairs (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). 
Adjacency pairs are defined like this: When an action is produced (a first pair part), it 
requires a reciprocal action (the second pair part). Of course, these actions are turns. They 
can even be single-word utterances like acknowledgment tokens (Goodwin & Heritage, 
1990). For Clark (1996), these actions don’t need to be verbal. They can also be moves, nods, 
gestures. Adjacency pairs rely on the principle of conditional relevance. A given turn 
constrains a subsequent turn, and that next turn is constrained by a prior turn. A 
participant’s first part constrains, or implicates, what the other participant can say. If the 
first participant used a technique that left the floor to the other participant, the latter will be 
expected to take the floor and to utter something in return that is relevant for the previous 
turn. If it doesn’t happen its absence will be noticed. The order of the pair parts depends on 
understanding of the first pair parts. The occurrence of a second pair parts depends on the 
recognition of the completion of the first parts. But the occurrence of a second part also 
depends on what is expected from the first part. So typically, because of conditional 
relevance, second pair parts indicate understanding and acceptance of first pair parts. 
Second pair parts give sense to the first pair parts (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Adjacency pairs 
hold participants accountable to produce coherent courses of action (Goodwin & Heritage, 
1990). They solve problems of construing intentions, and at the same time, they accomplish 
joint actions (Clark, 1996). 
Prototypical examples of adjacency pairs are greetings and closing of exchanges 
(Schegloff & Sacks, 1973, Clark, 1996). When a person greets another person, most often, 
the other person will greet back. Other typical examples are questions and answers, or 
complaints and apologies. In the case of closings, adjacency pairs fulfill common intentions 
of closing an exchange at a given moment.  
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3.4 Joint projects 
According to Clark (1996), speakers and hearers understand each other by 
coordinating joint projects. In joint projects, speakers propose a joint action, and 
addressees2 take it up. Clark gives the simple example of a speaker inviting an addressee to 
sit down on a chair, and the addressee agreeing to sit on the chair. Each joint project can be 
decomposed into an action ladder, both for speakers’ (S) and addressees’ (A) actions (Clark, 
1996, p. 152): 
Level 1:  S executes behavior (utters words “sit down”) for A 
 A attends to behavior (listens to produced words “sit down”) from S 
Level 2:  S presents signal “sit down” (locutionary act of saying it) to A 
 A identifies signal “sit down” from Speakers 
Level 3:  S signals that he is asking to sit down (illocutionary act of meaning) for A 
 A recognizes that S asked to sit down (understands) 
Level 4:  S proposes joint project to get to sit down (perlocutionary act) to A 
 A considers S’s proposal to sit down 
Speakers must succeed in accomplishing all 4 levels of action, and addressees must 
identify all 4 levels of speakers’ action, in order that addressees take up speakers’ proposals, 
and that speakers’ proposal is construed as intended. This depends on the understanding of 
the intended meaning, but also how each participant takes up proposals. 
In joint projects, participants can share a joint purpose (Clark, 1996). For that, the 
following requirements are needed. Participants must first identify a common purpose. They 
must be able and willing to do what they are supposed to do for that purpose. And they 
must believe that the purpose, the ability and the willingness are shared between 
participants. But all of these requirements are not given. They are established or negotiated 
throughout the joint project, step-by-step. People are also free to take up or decline 
proposals. So, joint projects extend and unfold in a local and in an opportune way, one 
adjacency pairs after another.  
The progress of joint projects depends on how addressees construe proposals (Clark, 
1996). The way they react reflects their construal of speakers’ proposals. But it’s their up-
take that defines the proposition, not the opposite (Clark, 1996). Construal is critical for 
                                                 
2
 We opt now for the term “addressees” over “hearers”, because addressees are the persons utterances are 
designed for, where as hearers are any persons listening to utterances. The first term encompasses better the 
cooperative roles of the participants. 
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people to understand each other. Clark proposes the notion of joint construal. Joint 
construal is the attempt from both the speaker and the addressee to construe what the 
speaker is taken to be meant. For instance, a same offer (sit down on a chair) can be 
followed by several responses, which show the offer was construed differently (e.g., as an 
order or as a advise). Then speakers can accept or correct the proposed construal to ensure 
that their earlier proposal was construed as it was meant to be (if they wish so). Displays of 
construal are crucial, because they give the participants the opportunity to validate or 
correct proposals, or joint actions (Clark, 1996). This is part of the grounding process. 
3.5 Grounding 
Grounding is the process of establishing common ground (Clark & Schaefer, 1989; 
Clark, 1996). To coordinate their joint projects, people need a coordination device so they 
believe they are achieving joint goals. Clark (1996) proposes that participants share common 
ground as a coordination device. Two people have common ground about a fact, if (Clark, 
1996, p. 97): 
1 Both participants believe (or have information) that some situation holds; 
2 That situation indicates to both that both believe (or have the information) that the 
situation holds; 
3 That situation indicates to both that the fact exists.  
People try to ground what they do, at least well enough for current purposes (Clark, 
1996). People need evidence of intended actions. Clark (1996) referred to Norman’s notion 
of closure (1988), defined as “agents performing an action require evidence, sufficient for 
the current purposes, that they have succeeded in performing it.” (p. 222). They need 
evidence of closure. For that, evidence must be valid, as easy to get as possible, timely and 
sufficient for the current purpose. So Clark proposes that participants minimize their effort 
and follow the principle of least collaborative effort. When participants perform joint 
actions, then the principle of joint closure applies: “The participants in a joint action try to 
establish the mutual belief that they have succeeded well enough for current purposes.” (p. 
226). Both participants need to share evidence so they can believe they are succeeding.  
To reach common ground, people make contributions. A contribution consists of a 
presentation and an acceptance phase. In the first phase, a person A presents an utterance 
(an action), and in the second phase a person B provides evidence until both of them accept 
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that B has understood well enough for the current propose. When the two phases are 
complete, both share the mutual belief that B understood what A meant. Only then has A 
completed his or her contribution. It’s similar to joint construal. A proposes (or presents) a 
joint project, that B construes (or accepts). But the additional step is that B's construal is 
registered by A, so that B knows that A knows B understands.  
The grounding process is important because initially presented utterances are not 
always clear and sufficient for the current purpose. When participants have the floor, they 
are expected to use it. There is a time pressure to deliver. So, for instance, utterances can be 
disrupted or disfluent. If speakers don’t provide enough evidence in the presentation phase, 
then participants can engage in repairs to adjust mutual understanding in the acceptance 
phase. People can provide positive and negative evidence of understanding in the 
acceptance phase (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark, 1996). For example, people not only 
acknowledge or take up with a relevant next turn, but they can also give continuous 
attention (e.g., eye gaze, facial expressions) or perform actions (e.g., sitting on a chair after 
being invited to), as evidence of understanding. 
 Media constraints can affect the grounding process (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Clark & 
Brennan listed eight properties of different media (p. 141): 
1. Copresence:     Participant A and participant B share the same physical environment; 
2. Visibility:            A and B are visible to each other; 
3. Audibility:          A and B communicate by speaking and can hear each other; 
4. Cotemporality: B receives at the same time as A produces (e.g., B hears an utterance A is 
                            producing); 
5. Simultaneity:   A and B can send and receive at once and simultaneously (e.g., B smiles 
                            while A utters something); 
6. Sequentiality:   A’s and B’s turns cannot get out of sequence (interaction turn by turn); 
7. Reviewability:  B can review A’s messages (e.g., when artifacts like letters are produced 
                            as opposed to evanescence of speech); 
8. Revisability:      A can revise messages for B (can be done privately before it is addressed). 
The costs of mutual understanding thus depend on the medium of communication 
participants use (Clark & Brennan, 1991). The combination of these constraints has various 
effects on the cost of grounding. These constraints mostly affect evidence and timing for 
adjusting understanding. We will consider face-to-face and phone interactions. Face-to-face 
22 
 
interactions combine the first six constraints. It is the best medium when participants can 
have trouble understanding each other. Participants can see each other and rely on visible 
evidence (e.g., nods, gaze, gestures, and facial expressions). They can repair 
misunderstanding right away. In phone conversations, participants can’t see each other; 
they miss clues about each other's actions and non-verbal evidence. They are also not co-
present. They are unaware of factors in each other’s physical environment that can interfere 
with the grounding process, for instance, distractions, disruptions and interruptions (Clark, 
1996). 
3.6 Context and participants’ roles 
Participants can have different roles and have different goals (private and public 
intentions) in a given context of interactions. With participants’ roles and intentions come 
the notions of equity, face and commitment to joint projects. 
Participants’ role in context is defined in Goffman’s participation framework (1981). 
Participants are members of social gatherings where they share a space to interact. 
Participants engage or not in interactions (floor-taking), and their participation can be 
ratified or not. Footing refers to the way participants stand in the gathering (Goffman also 
uses terms like “posture” or “project”). Footing changes, as participants exchange 
utterances. Participants can adopt roles of speakers, hearers or even overhearers. These 
roles have different statuses based on their ratifications. Hearers can be primary addressees, 
when speakers address utterances to them. In this case, they are ratified hearers. Hearers 
can also be overhearers, when speakers didn’t address utterances to them, but they 
nonetheless overheard them. In this case, they are non-ratified hearers. Overhearers can be 
by-standers or eavesdroppers. By-standers’ presences are known and they are expected to 
overhear utterances, whereas it is not the case for eavesdroppers. For instance, ratified 
hearers can become by-standers when two other participants are involved in a side 
conversation. At the same time, non-ratified hearers can initiate conversations, even though 
they were not addressees (e.g., intrusions). 
3.7 Facework 
In social situations, people try to maximize outcomes to their advantage. There are 
costs and benefits involved in social interactions. These interactions are regulated by 
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systems (justice, markets). When people are in inequitable situations, they are motivated to 
restore equity. Though, there are situations where equity might depend on a participant’s 
willingness to maintain it. There are situations where people are in debt to others who 
expect a compensation for their costs (Clark, 1996).  
Equity is best understood with the notion of face (Goffman, 1967). In social 
interactions, or encounters, participants act out a “line”, or stance. A line is “a pattern of 
verbal and non-verbal acts by which [a participant] expresses his view of the situation and 
through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself.” (Goffman, 1967, p. 213). 
It shows how participants stand in a situation. Face is “defined as the positive social value a 
person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a 
particular contact.” (Goffman, 1967, p. 213). Maintaining face is based on expectations by 
society. It is loaned to people by society. For instance, people can receive honors or be 
praised, but they also can lose face, and feel embarrassed or humiliated (see also Brown & 
Levinson, 1987). Face loss happens when expectations by society are not met. People can be 
out of face or in a wrong face. Therefore, they can try to save their face, especially when face 
is threatened. The most common rules to keep face are the use of tact, savoir-faire, or 
etiquette. Goffman (1967) proposed that people engage in trying to defend their own face 
and to protect other’s face. He called this process face work (here after “facework”). 
Facework presupposes reciprocity of faces in cooperation. When someone loses face, 
compensations should occur. Lack of effort can be minimal and be noticed by any party. 
When people interact, face is constantly attended to and regulated. They share a mutual 
concern with face. For Brown and Levinson (1987), people not only constantly maintain, but 
enhance, each other’s face to avoid face loss. 
Drawing from Goffman’s seminal work (1967), Brown and Levinson (1987) further 
developed the notion of facework and strategies people can use during interactions. They 
described two types of face wants (needs): Positive face & negative face. Positive face refers 
to the desire to be appreciated as a person. Negative face refers to the desire to see 
someone’s actions not impeded by others. It relates to the need to remain autonomous and 
free to act. People, communities, societies have developed strategies for these face wants, 
and in particular to deal with threats to negative face, when acts are inevitable or desired. 
These threats are called face-threatening acts (FTA). There can be positive or negative face-
threatening acts. Positive face-threatening acts can be any acts that are insensitive to about 
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someone's feelings or needs for esteem. These can be negative appreciations or indifference 
about someone (e.g., for hearers3: insults, disagreements, belittling, talking about a sensitive 
topic, showing excessive intimacy). Negative face-threatening acts can be any acts that 
obstruct a person’s freedom of action. It often implies an imposition of some sort on the 
other person (e.g., for hearers, orders, requests, anger, also offers than someone doesn’t 
want; but also for speakers, being forced to thank, to give apologies, or to accept someone’s 
offer). To avoid threatening face, people can use face-redressive actions. The amount of 
facework depends on the assessment of the situation. There are three factors that 
determine the gravity of a face-threatening act: the power difference between the two 
parties, the social distance between the two parties, and the gravity of the imposition itself 
(social value of the threat), regardless of the parties (a request to borrow money involves 
more face threat than a request to borrow a tool). These factors add up, and their 
combination determines the risk of face-threat. There are five types of strategies to save 
face (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Strategies with Face-Threatening Acts (FTA), adapted from Brown and 
Levinson (1987, p. 60).  
The first strategy is to not perform the Face-Threatening Act (1), because the risk of 
face loss is too important. The second strategy (2) is to act “off record”, in other words 
indirectly. It allows the hearer to not follow up, since the act is not officially directed to the 
hearer and not formulated as a request. For instance, a person can say “it’s getting cold in 
here” and imply it would be desirable if it was warmer. If the hearer is the owner of the 
place, and if he picks up on it, he can decide to turn up the thermostat. But the speaker 
                                                 
3
 We use the same term Brown and Levinson used. 
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didn’t confront the owner. So no face is threatened if the owner doesn’t comply. The third 
strategy (3) is to go on record and reduce, or possibly avoid, the imposition on the hearer’s 
face (avoidance-based, negative politeness). There is a risk of embarrassment since FTA is 
addressed directly. A typical case is asking a favor. There are several ways to redress threat, 
for instance: apologize, use impersonal pronouns, indirect speech, explicitly minimize 
impinging (showing reluctance, asking for forgiveness), explicitly lessen coercion (e.g., use of 
subjunctive tense, questions), avoid presumption of compliance (adding conditional, e.g., “if 
you can”), hedging (words mitigating impact: might, perhaps, etc.). The fourth strategy (4) is 
to go on record and value the hearer’s self or interests, face wants (approach-based, positive 
politeness). That strategy can be used when people know each other. In the case of a favor, 
a speaker can, for instance, make a statement about the friendship (my friend), compliments 
(you look great), attend or address the hearer’s interest (help), share perspective or be 
inclusive (agreement, use of “we”), offer something in exchange, or make a joke. Finally, the 
fifth strategy (5) is to act baldly, without any redressive actions. This is usually done when 
hearers and speakers know each other well. These acts would normally embarrass other 
acquaintances. It can be in the interest of the hearer (your tie has a stain), or regarding other 
activities (pass me the salt), with little or no need to maintain face. Or it could be by 
minimizing threats implicitly (e.g., welcomes, offers). These strategies allow people to 
perform sensitive actions with respect to others’ feelings.  
Every joint project involves equity and facework (Clark, 1996, 2006). Participants 
commit themselves to given joint projects. They commit themselves publicly to other 
participants who do their part for joint projects. When committing to a joint project, people 
expect that equity will be maintained (Clark, 1996). Joint commitment is the driving force 
behind joint activities (Clark, 2006). Participants commit for each of their joint projects. In 
each of these activities, series of joint actions emerge sequentially and hierarchically 
(Bangerter & Clark, 2003). Each joint action is a sub-problem that needs to be solved 
piecemeal in order to move on in the projects. Some are dependent of completion of other 
joint actions. Joint actions can be decomposed in hierarchical analysis. This means that each 
participant commits themselves to a hierarchy of joint projects, until the overall purpose of 
the joint activity is reached. This means that joint commitments have several constraining 
properties for participants. Hand-in-hand with joint actions, joint commitments stack up and 
persist. Until joint actions are completed, both participants are committed to achieving 
26 
 
them. As a consequence, joint commitments make joint activities hard to part from or stop 
without threatening people’s face (Clark, 2006). Closings of encounters are good examples of 
how face and equity is preserved (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). 
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Chapter 4 – Research questions 
So far, we have seen implications of interruptions in organizations and for individuals, 
and on how people use language in interactions. Since the beginning, I have presented the 
phenomenon of interruptions as a problem of coordination. At a macro level, the problem 
comes from overlapping interdependencies. People are facing conflicting interactions, they 
have to switch activities unexpectedly, and they lose time and productivity. At a micro level, 
the problem is described as conflicts of attentions and intentions between two activities, 
with potential loss of memory and efficiency. People have to suspend what they are doing, 
and later on they have to remember suspended goals. But so far, no study has described the 
interruption processes from a collaborative point of view. So, if we want to know how 
participants deal with interruptions, we need to have a closer look how people disengage 
from and reengage in joint activities.  
4.1 Suspensions 
When participants use language for joint activities, they coordinate essentially on 
two processes: mutual actions and mutual face (facework). Based on this, we can make a 
first assumption. Suspending interactions must involve the same processes as in contributing 
to interactions.  
Now, I propose to delineate a framework for studying suspensions. To do that, we 
will now take a closer look at our first example of suspension, with Marc and Lydia, and 
describe the relevant collaborative parameters that are involved. 
Marc and Lydia are sitting at a table in Marc’s office. Lydia is a client who is 
interested in buying a car, and Marc is trying to sell it to her. They have settled on the car, 
and are negotiating the options and the price of the car. He has just mentioned the option of 
a navigation system, when all of a sudden, the phone rings. Marc notices the incoming call is 
from an important client. He needs to pick up the phone. Lydia, who sees Marc looking at 
the phone, stops talking. He then asks her if she wouldn’t mind he picked up the phone. She 
nods and he picks up the phone. Marc greets the other client and asks if he can call back 
later. In the meantime, Lydia checks her agenda. After a minute or so, Marc hangs up and 
apologizes for the inconvenience. Lydia assures no offense was made. He then resumes 
talking about the option they were negotiating. He reiterates the advantage of having a 
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navigation system and proposes a price. She asks for clarifications about the navigation 
system and they continue talking about how much it would cost. 
What are the processes involved in this joint activity? As we have seen in Clark (1996) 
and in Goffman (1981), interactive situations include participants and joint actions. 
Participants have faces, roles and goals (public and private). They perform joint actions in a 
joint project to which they both commit. Joint actions are situated here and now. So, let’s 
now look at coordination processes, consider similar phenomena, and draw some 
assumptions. First, we will look at coordination of face. Second, we will look at coordination 
of joint projects. Third, we will look at relative parameters, like participants’ role, timing of 
interruptions, and media of communication.  
First, joint activities involve the coordination of face (Clark, 1996, 2006; Brown & 
Levinson, 1987; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Goffman, 1967). Participants mutually commit to a 
joint project. By doing so, they give up part of their freedom and they thus expect equitable 
treatment from their partners. In the example, Marc and Lydia are strangers to each other. 
Marc is trying to sell a car in exchange for Lydia’s money. When Marc receives the phone 
call, he needs to disengage from their joint project. We can assume that suspension can 
threaten Lydia's face. For instance, here, Marc is forced to make Lydia wait, thus taking 
advantage of her availability and commitment. However, Marc doesn’t interrupt their 
discussion and pick up the phone straight away. Instead, he politely asks her permission to 
pick up the phone, and when he is done, he apologizes. The amount of politeness is an 
indicator how much face threat is perceived. In this case, Marc engaged in polite acts by 
extensively redressing Lydia’s negative face.  
Similar phenomena are found in closing phone conversations (Schegloff & Sacks, 
1973; Clark, 1996). Participants take leave of each other only after they have closed down 
their topic of discussion and when they both are ready to disengage. This often involves a 
series of adjacency pairs to first close the topic and then to close their interaction (Schegloff 
& Sacks, 1973). At closings, people aim at disengaging at the same time to avoid offending 
their partners (Clark & French, 1981; Clark, 1996). For instance, closings may include 
justifications and desire for continuity (Albert & Kessler, 1976). Sequences in suspensions 
might be similar to those found in closing, except that people take leave of each other only 
momentarily.  
Second, joint activities involve the negotiation of joint sub-projects (Clark 1996, 2006; 
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Bangerter & Clark, 2003). Participants enter and commit to a series of joint projects. In each 
of the project and sub-projects, participant ground their joint actions, sequentially and 
hierarchically. They take turns in contributing, and so their project emerges step-by-step. 
Each contribution is relevant to where they are in their task. Also as they further move along 
in sub-projects, commitments stack up and persist until they are discharged by the pair. In a 
task-oriented joint activity, suspended goals should remain active until they are 
accomplished. In the example, Marc and Lydia are well engrossed in their project. They have 
already agreed on the car, and they are negotiating options of that car. He mentioned a 
navigation system option, when the phone rings. It looks like Lydia wasn’t able to take up his 
proposal. It’s left out, because they agree to suspend their conversation. When they return 
to it, Marc re-iterates his previous proposal. He repeats some advantages of having the 
option and gives an offer. But Lydia doesn’t agree with his proposal. She doesn’t understand 
and asks for clarifications about the option. So, this could indicate Marc and Lydia have to 
adjust what is in common ground, before they can continue. Marc chose to repeat earlier 
utterances (about the option) and propose a new joint action (price), but Lydia hadn’t 
responded to Marc’s earlier proposal, so it caused them some problems to continue without 
grounding it.  
Similar phenomena appear in cases of repairs of utterances. People tend to repeat 
their utterances when facing problems (Levelt, 1989), and tend to prefer self-correction over 
corrections initiated by others (Clark, 1994; Clark & Wasow, 1998; Schegloff, Jefferson & 
Sacks, 1977). So with this example, we can assume that people need to share common 
ground to progress in a joint project (Clark, 1996). And to do so, pairs might need to 
reconstruct common ground after suspensions. 
Third, joint activities involve situational parameters, such as roles of participants, 
timing of actions, and communication media. These may influence the process of facework 
and grounding. Interruptions are often unforeseen. They can disrupt the participants when 
they have different roles. Participants who have to suspend can be speakers or addressees. 
We could assume it is more face-threatening for participants when they have the floor than 
when they don’t. In the example, Marc has the floor when he is interrupted by the phone 
call. So, he is in a position to initiate the suspension. But Lydia could have received a call. 
How would she have initiated the suspension? Also, interruptions can happen at any given 
moment in a course of action. Similarly to the goal activation model's predictions (Altman & 
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Trafton, 2002), stacks of goals are easier to reinstate at task boundaries. We could assume it 
is harder to reinstate when participants have to suspend in the middle of joint projects than 
at the end. Finally, communication medium influences the amount of evidence pairs are 
relying on to ground their joint actions (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Krych, 2004). In the 
example, Marc and Lydia are face-to-face. They benefit from copresence, visibility, audibility, 
and simultaneity constraints. Because she is copresent, Lydia hears the phone ringing, and 
sees Marc turning his attention onto it. This tips her off about what relevant action could be 
next. She can anticipate his actions and show evidence that she understands he needs to 
answer the phone. This diminishes face threat. They might also share a brochure about the 
car’s options. So this could provide clues about where they are in the task. This could help 
Lydia remember about their suspended goals. So when they return to their discussion, they 
may recall where on the brochure their joint attention was. So we could assume that 
copresence and visibility can influence face threat and recollection of the state of the tasks. 
4.2 Research goals 
The main goal of this project is to describe the process of suspending and reinstating, 
both at the face and the action levels. The suspension and reinstatement are different steps, 
and the latter should be dependent on the former. Both face and action levels are interlaced 
in coordinating joint projects, but they may be dealt with differently.  
How do people avoid face loss? If disengaging from an interaction is face-threatening 
(Clark, 2006), participants may use politeness to redress the situation. How do people do 
that? Face-work might change with different footing of the situation, for instance, when 
participants have different conversational roles. Also facework might be directly influenced 
by the imposition of interruption itself.  
How do people reinstate their joint actions? If people rely on common ground to 
continue tasks (Clark, 1996), then they might need to make sure they both know where they 
are in their project. How do people do that? This may depend on the state of the course of 
actions and evidence about common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991). But it could also be 
influenced by the duration of interruptions, because goals decay in people’s memory 
(Altmann & Trafton, 2002).  
We addressed these questions in a series of five studies. We looked at facework and 
grounding processes in the first three studies and we looked exclusively at grounding 
31 
 
processes in the last two studies. 
4.3 Research plan: 5 studies. 
The 5 studies were planned in the following manner. 
Study 1: We developed a model of suspension of collaborative activities. We analyzed 
transcriptions of naturally occurring interruptions in a corpus of phone calls. We derived 
factors such as duration of interruptions and conversational role as the main influence on 
collaborative costs in the suspensions. We coded variables related to facework and 
collaborative efforts to reinstate topics of conversations. We coded all cases in the corpus 
and analyzed data. Results showed significant effects of duration and conversational roles on 
facework and on topical reinstatement. Longer suspensions increased facework and the 
effort to reinstate the conversation. Also, addressees were more polite than speakers. 
Study 2: We planned to test effects found in Study 1. In an experimental setting, we 
manipulated the duration of interruptions (Long vs. short) and conversational roles (Speaker 
vs. addressee) during phone calls. We used a cover story to interrupt of the participants. We 
hypothesized same effects found in Study 1. 
Study 3: We replicated results of Study 2 in a similar setting. But we manipulated 
conversational roles differently, because the manipulation in Study 1 wasn’t reliable. We 
asked participants to narrate stories, instead of discussing topics freely. We hypothesized 
same effects found in Studies 1 & 2. 
Study 4: We focused on reinstatement of joint actions in task-oriented dialogues. In 
an experimental setting, we manipulated the duration (Long vs. short) and the timing (Mid-
task vs. end-task) of interruptions in the tasks. We also manipulated which participants were 
distracted during interruptions (Target: Instructor, partners, or both). We hypothesized that 
long interruptions, mid-task interruptions, and both targets distracted would increase the 
effort to reinstate common ground. 
Study 5: We used the same experimental design and changed 2 parameters: the 
duration of interruptions (both short vs. long were longer) and the medium of 
communication (Workspace visible vs. hidden). We hypothesized again for the same effects 
of the manipulation of the duration and the timing of interruptions on the effort to reinstate 
common ground (Study 4). And additionally, we hypothesized that workspace visibility 
would reduce the effort at reinstatement. 
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These five studies are reported in three manuscripts. Studies 1 and 2 are reported in 
the first manuscript (Chapter 5). Study 3 is in the following manuscript (Chapter 6). Studies 4 
and 5 are in the last manuscript (Chapter 7). The first two manuscripts have been accepted 
for publication, respectively in Discourse Processes (Chevalley & Bangerter, in press), and in 
the Journal of Language and Social Psychology (Bangerter, Chevalley & Derouwaux, in press). 
The last manuscript is a working paper (Chevalley & Bangerter, in prep.). 
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dialogue (Studies 1 and 2)  
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5.1 Abstract 
Interruptions are common in joint activities like conversations. Typically, interrupted 
participants suspend the activity, address the interruption, and then reinstate the activity. In 
conversation, people jointly commit to interact and to talk about a topic, establishing these 
commitments sequentially. When a commitment is suspended, face is threatened and 
grounding disrupted. We propose and test a model for suspending and reinstating joint 
activities, using evidence from naturally-occurring suspensions in the Switchboard corpus 
(Study 1) and from a laboratory experiment (Study 2). Results showed that long suspensions 
led to more politeness and more collaborative effort in reinstatement than short 
suspensions. Also, listeners were more polite than speakers in suspending. Overall, 
suspending and reinstating a joint activity was shown to be a collaborative task that requires 
coordination of both the topic and the participants' face requirements.  
5.2 Introduction 
Imagine that Bob and Camilla are talking on the phone about their work. Bob is telling 
Camilla a story when Diane enters Camilla's office to ask her a question. After waiting for an 
opportune moment, Camilla interrupts Bob to ask him to hold on, then answers Diane's 
question. She then apologizes to Bob for interrupting him and invites him to continue. In this 
example, Bob and Camilla have been interrupted in a collaborative task. Such interruptions 
are commonplace in everyday life. How can they be described, what processes do they 
involve, what factors influence them, and how do they affect collaboration? In this article, 
we present and test a model of interruptions of collaborative tasks, or, more generally, how 
people coordinate suspending and reinstating joint activities.  
Cognitive science researchers have studied parallel activities (Miyata & Norman, 
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1986) and task interruptions (e.g., McFarlane & Latorella, 2002; Trafton, Altmann, Brock, & 
Mintz, 2003), but with a focus on individuals being interrupted while performing solitary 
tasks. Hardly any work has been done on interruptions affecting individuals in collaborative 
activities (but see Swets, 2006, who used confederates to study the effects of different kinds 
of partner interruptions on resumption of speech production). Moreover, collaborative 
interruptions cannot be explained by current generic models of interruptions (e.g., 
McFarlane & Latorella, 2002) because these models lack sufficient granularity to capture the 
specific features of collaborative activities. Prominent theories of discourse structure have 
been applied to interruptions (e.g., Grosz & Sidner, 1986), but they suffer from similar 
problems. Collaborative activities are special in that they involve commitments to interact 
with another person at multiple levels. Suspending activities requires participants to suspend 
those commitments. Suspensions and reinstatements reveal the nature of collaboration 
particularly well. Thus, our results have theoretical implications for understanding dialogue 
coordination, but also practical implications (e.g., design implications for collaborative 
interruptions management in human-computer interaction (HCI) (McFarlane & Latorella, 
2002). 
In what follows, we discuss how collaborative activity is coordinated, focusing on the 
joint commitments people make during interaction (Clark, 1996; 2006). We then present an 
account of suspending and reinstating interactions, which we subsequently explore in two 
empirical studies. 
5.3 Joint projects and joint commitments 
Dialogue is a species of collaborative activity (Clark, 1996). It is sequentially organized 
because utterances are contingent on preceding contributions to the dialogue (Sacks, 
Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). It is also hierarchically organized because, like all forms of 
activity, it is constituted of nested topics and subtopics (Grosz & Sidner, 1986) connected by 
links of coherence (Reichman, 1978). 
People use dialogue to coordinate collaborative activities. They accomplish these 
activities by dividing them into parts and subparts, or joint projects and subprojects 
(Bangerter & Clark, 2003; Bangerter, Clark, & Katz, 2004). Imagine that Bob asks Camilla to 
help her move a heavy bench. This simple joint project can be divided into at least three 
subprojects: (1) picking up the bench, (2) moving it, and (3) putting it down. If Camilla agrees 
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to help, they first have to coordinate picking it up. This entails deciding who will pick up the 
left end and who will pick up the right end. It also entails exerting effort to lift it at exactly 
the same time. Thus, the subproject of picking up the bench can itself be divided into 
subprojects. Bob and Camilla coordinate the action of moving the bench through dialogue, 
and they typically do so piecemeal, by first agreeing to accomplish the joint project, then to 
enter the first subproject, and so on. 
Participants in a joint project cannot automatically know that their partners will do 
their part. Bob cannot know that Camilla will heft her end of the heavy bench at exactly the 
same time he does, and the same goes for Camilla. So they need to agree on the details of 
their performance of each joint project and subproject. In other words, they need to jointly 
commit to performing a particular project (Clark, 2006). Joint commitments typically specify 
elements such as the participants' roles in a joint project, the actions they are to perform, 
when they are to do them and where.  
There are at least three properties of joint commitments that are essential for 
understanding suspension and reinstatement of joint projects. First, joint commitments bind 
resources of participants. When committing themselves to a joint project, participants agree 
to use their resources (e.g., time, effort, money) to further those projects. They agree to 
temporarily give up part of their freedom and to allow their actions to depend on those of 
others (Goffman, 1967). In agreeing to help Bob, Camilla agrees to commit her time, but also 
to expend physical effort in lifting a heavy object. She also agrees to suspend other projects 
she may have been engaged in. Bob incurs a debt towards her that must be repaid. Lifting a 
bench is a trivial service that can be repaid symbolically with a modicum of politeness 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987), but other debts may require more compensation. Second, joint 
commitments accumulate, or stack up, in the course of a joint project (Clark, 2006; Grosz & 
Sidner, 1986). Once Camilla has agreed to help Bob lift the bench, she may agree to pick up 
the left end. In doing so, she may notice that her end is cracked and likely to break. In picking 
it up, she commits herself to apply extra care. Joint commitments at the top of a stack must 
be discharged in order to honor commitments lower down. In Figure 4, we can see three 
stacked joint commitments that Bob and Camilla might make. Third, commitments made at a 
lower level in a stack (i.e., made earlier) persist even if higher-level commitments are 
renegotiated, suspended, or aborted. Even if Camilla is not ready to pick up the left end of 
the bench when Bob is, she still remains committed to doing so until further notice. And 
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even if she notices the left end is cracked and declines to pick up that end, she still remains 
committed to helping Bob move the bench. 
 
Figure 4. Bob and Camilla's stack of joint commitments. 
These three properties are interdependent, arising from more basic features of 
interaction such as face (Goffman, 1955) and turn-taking (Sacks et al., 1974). At the same 
time, they reflect different perspectives on the suspension process and emerge at different 
moments during that process. They make joint commitments particularly hard to suspend or 
abort without costs. These costs can be understood as threats to a partner's face and can 
thus be explained in terms of Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness. According to 
politeness theory, people have two kinds of face. Positive face designates the public self-
worth and respect that people are entitled to. Negative face concerns the right that people 
have to go about their business freely, without undue restrictions on their time being 
imposed on them by others. Suspending a joint commitment constitutes a threat to the 
negative face of one's partner. Politeness explains many of the interactional costs associated 
with suspensions.  
5.4 A model of suspending and reinstating joint projects 
Prominent models of interruptions (McFarlane & Latorella, 2002) and discourse 
structure (Grosz & Sidner, 1986) do not appeal to joint commitments to explain the 
processes inherent in collaborative suspensions. As a first step in specifying our model, we 
review phenomena similar to suspensions. 
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5.4.1 Similar phenomena 
Suspending and reinstating joint projects is similar to the process of suspending and 
restarting speaking (self-suspension). This process can be decomposed into four steps (Clark 
& Wasow, 1998): (1) an initial commitment to uttering a constituent, (2) a suspension of 
speech, (3) a hiatus in speaking (sometimes marked with fillers like uh or um), and (4) a 
restart of the constituent. Self-suspensions arise in part because speakers make premature 
commitments to uttering a constituent and then have to stop to plan what they want to say. 
They make premature commitments because of the temporal imperative in conversation 
that requires them to not remain silent for too long while they have the floor (Jefferson, 
1989). Suspensions of joint projects should follow a similar sequence as self-suspensions. 
Suspending a joint project is also similar to the process of ending a social encounter 
(Albert & Kessler, 1976). Conversational endings are face-threatening events (Goffman, 
1955). They must therefore be negotiated between participants (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). 
Typical phenomena around endings include justifications, summaries of the encounter, 
continuity statements and well-wishing (Albert & Kessler, 1978; Clark & French, 1981). 
Justifications construct a socially acceptable reason to explain why an encounter must end 
(usually an external event impinging on the encounter, e.g., I really must go). Summaries of 
an encounter are selective repetitions of aspects of it that serve to better evaluate and 
remember it. Continuity statements symbolically bridge the upcoming separation by 
projecting future encounters between the participants (e.g., I'll see you next week).  
More generally, encounters can be divided into three phases: the entry phase, the 
body, and the exit phase (Clark, 1996). The entry phase arises from the need to negotiate 
the terms of an encounter, including defining relevant social identities and agreeing to 
preliminary commitments. The body arises from the participants' discussion of the main 
business of the interaction. It is what the interaction is "about". The exit phase (or ending) 
arises from the need to coordinate getting out of the encounter (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), 
including when to do so, whether and when there will be a future encounter, and so on. We 
suggest that suspending a conversation is analogous to exiting it, with the main difference 
being that one keeps a partner waiting rather than releasing him or her. 
5.4.2 Steps in suspending and reinstating joint projects 
In accordance with the above phenomena and building on previous generic models 
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(McFarlane & Latorella, 2002), our model of suspending and reinstating joint projects posits 
three steps: (1) suspending the joint project, (2) dealing with the interruption, and (3) 
reinstating the joint project. All three steps may entail sub-steps that arise from participants' 
efforts to coordinate constraints related to the stacking, persistence, and resource binding 
involved with joint commitments. To illustrate this process, we present the following excerpt 
of a naturally-occurring suspension of a telephone conversation taken from the Switchboard 
corpus (Godfrey, Holliman, & McDaniel, 1992) and describe each step as it occurs in the 
excerpt (for transcription conventions, see Study 1, Method). 
Excerpt 1: SW 4660 
19_Ann Uh, I do have my radio going most of the day though, so about every hour it 
breaks in and gives me news too, you know. 
20_Ben  Okay.  #Do you# --  
21_Ann  #But,#  
22_Ben -- get wh-, like one of the talk stations, the news stations?    
23_Ann No.  Uh-huh.  Jus-, I just have a channel that has music except for, like every 
hour, you know, say eight o'clock, #nine# --  
24_Ben #Sure.# 
25_Ann -- o'clock, they come on for just a little bit of the news. 
26_Ben Right. 
27_Ann But as far as the actual news, I get that from [call waiting signal] from the, can 
you hold on just for a second? 
28_Ben Sure. 
29_Ann Just a minute. [Pause: 2 min 9 sec] [to Ben] Hello sir.  
30_Ben Yes. 
31_Ann Yes, I'm sorry to keep you waiting #[laughter].# 
32_Ben #Okay# [laughter] 
33_Ann Uh, I was calling from work so and that was a call waiting. 
34_Ben  Right. So, it sounds like you, uh, like the news a lot more than I do. Me, I 
figure if it's something really important, somebody will tell me about it. 
[continues] 
When disengaging from a joint project, the first step is negotiating the suspension. 
Since the beginning of the conversation, Ann and Ben have been talking about how they get 
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the news. Between turns 19 and 27, Ann explains how she gets short news every hour on a 
radio music channel.  In turn 27, she starts to explain where she gets actual news when a call 
waiting4 signal sounds on her telephone.5 She interrupts herself to ask Ben to hold on for just 
a second. Ben agrees (turn 28), and Ann disengages by uttering just a minute. The sequence 
in turns 27 to 29 accomplishes the suspension. This allows Ann to part and deal with the 
interruption, the second step. During a few minutes, she talks with a third person. 
In the third step, reinstating the joint project, availability needs to be checked and 
face needs addressed before Ann and Ben can continue with topical talk. These two sub-
steps are accomplished in sequence. Ann checks Ben’s availability by uttering Hello sir (turn 
29) and Ben signals his presence, (yes, turn 30). Next, she apologizes (I'm sorry to keep you 
waiting, turn 31) and Ben expresses acceptance (okay, turn 32). Then she provides a 
justification by uttering I was calling from work so and that was a call waiting (turn 33) 
which he again accepts (turn 34). These two sub-steps (turn 29 to 33) are jointly done by 
adjacency pairs (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). They precede the continuation of the joint project, 
which is initiated by Ben (So, it sounds like you, turn 34). 
5.4.3 How the model explains the observed sequence 
 What are Ann and Ben accomplishing with these three steps? We propose that their 
actions result from the three properties of joint commitments discussed earlier: stacking, 
persistence and bound resources. As Ann and Ben's conversation proceeded, they stacked 
up layers of joint commitments. To show how they did so, it is necessary to analyze their 
conversation from the beginning onwards. Figure 5 depicts their commitments from the 
beginning of the conversation. The levels in the right-hand part are analogous to what Grosz 
and Sidner (1986) refer to as the intentional structure of the discourse (the relevant 
contrasts with previous topical focus are indicated in italics in the descriptions of the joint 
commitments). The first joint commitment they entered into is to participate in the 
Switchboard study and talk about the news, a commitment they had made prior to their 
interaction and honored by answering the phone. Let us call this a Level 1 joint commitment. 
In the opening utterance of the conversation, Ann suggests they talk about how Ben gets 
                                                 
4
 Hopper (1992) has described how call waiting has created an urgent external summons to the subscriber that 
overrides rules of conversational interaction. 
5
 We refer to the participant who is interrupted (e.g., Ann in this example) as the target because this person is 
intentionally interrupted. We refer to the third person who interrupts the target as the source. We refer to people 
affected by the interruption but not targeted by it as partners. Partners are not always included in the emerging 
secondary interaction, in which case they become bystanders to that interaction (Clark, 1996). 
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news. This is a Level 2 joint commitment (Level 2 commitments are linked to Level 1 
commitments by what Grosz and Sidner (1986) call dominance relations). Ben implicitly 
accepts her suggestion by initiating an appropriate next contribution (Clark & Schaefer, 
1989): Explaining that he gets most of his news with the radio. Later (10), Ben suggests they 
talk about how Ann gets news, thereby ending their first Level 2 commitment and beginning 
a new one. Ann replies (11) well, I can hardly wait for my morning paper to come. In doing 
so, she implicitly accepts and amends his suggestion (using well to signal this amendment; 
Schiffrin, 1987), by proposing they talk about how much she likes news. How much Ann likes 
news is a specification of the current Level 2 commitment (how Ann gets news) and thus 
constitutes a Level 3 joint commitment. In (19), she initiates another topic, how she gets her 
news on the radio. In doing so, she suggests ending their previous Level 3 joint commitment 
(talking about how much she likes news). Ben goes along with this in 20. In 27, when Ann 
starts telling Ben about how she gets actual news, she is suggesting they end their current 
Level 3 joint commitment to talk about how she gets news on the radio and begin a new 
one. But this suggestion never gets accepted because she interrupts herself to ask Ben if he 
can hold on. At this point, then, Ann and Ben have two active stacks of joint commitments. 
At Level 1, they are committed to talking to each other about the news. At Level 2, they are 
committed to talking about how Ann gets the news. And at Level 3, Ann interrupted her own 
proposal for a new joint commitment. As we will see, the two lower-level stacks persist 
despite the temporary hiatus in the conversation, whereas the self-interrupted proposal is 
abandoned.  
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Figure 5. Stacks of commitments in Ann and Ben's conversation.  
 But that is not all. In entering into these joint commitments, Ann and Ben have 
bound their resources (e.g., their time). In putting Ben on hold, Ann makes him wait on her 
and thus incurs a debt towards him. She must signal this appropriately, and we can see this 
in her initial request to suspend the conversation, can you hold on just for a second, which 
features three forms of negative politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1987): Interrogative form, 
hedging (just), and understatement (for a second). In seeking to reinstate the conversation 
after dealing with the interruption, Ann also performs two redressive acts: apologizing for 
keeping Ben waiting and justifying her suspension. This extensive politeness is warranted by 
the long duration of the suspension (over two minutes). Once these redressive acts have 
been performed, Ben continues the conversation by reinstating the suspended Level 2 
commitment (talking about how Ann gets the news), so, it sounds like you, uh, like the news 
a lot more than I do. (In doing so, he automatically reinstates Level 1 as well.) But in his next 
utterance, he suggests talking about how much he likes the news. In other words, he 
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suggests they embark on a new Level 2 joint commitment.  
 In suspending and reinstating their conversation, Ann and Ben didn't just stop talking 
to each other, or start talking again. They went through a series of coordinated acts to 
ensure that the joint commitments they had entered into were adequately discharged. We 
argue that the properties of joint commitments give rise to Ann and Ben's actions. 
5.4.4 Evidence for the model 
 As mentioned above, the model must account for possible variations in suspension 
phenomena. Suspensions could happen at any time during the performance of a joint 
project. They can be triggered by disruptive events that vary in duration, importance, 
urgency or in the amount of attention required. These situational factors affect interruptions 
of individuals (Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004; Trafton et al., 2003). They may also affect the 
coordination of the joint project and facework. We explore the model with data from two 
sources. In Study 1, we identified naturally-occurring cases of suspensions of telephone 
conversations by searching the Switchboard corpus (Godfrey et al., 1992). Our goal was to 
examine variations on the three steps outlined above and thus to derive testable hypotheses 
about factors influencing variation. We coded all cases in the corpus to test the hypotheses. 
In Study 2, we ran an experiment as an additional test. Our studies therefore combine field 
data with experimental control, which is a desirable approach to the study of language use 
(Clark & Bangerter, 2004).  
5.5 Study 1: Switchboard corpus 
5.5.1 Qualitative analyses of suspensions and reinstatements 
We searched the Switchboard corpus (Godfrey et al., 1992) for cases of suspensions 
(see below for details about methods). This corpus contains 2500 conversations between 
pairs of Texas Instruments employees discussing a pre-specified topic over the phone. 
Occasionally, the conversations feature naturally-occurring suspensions. We analyzed each 
case to explore variations in suspension phenomena. Here we present three excerpts, using 
them to illustrate hypotheses about processes affecting suspensions and reinstatements. 
Recall Excerpt 1. The speaker, Ann, suspended the conversation for a long time. 
Reinstatement was effortful, featuring an availability check and elaborate politeness. In 
contrast to this prototypical long suspension, some cases were very short. Excerpt 2 shows a 
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short suspension by the speaker that takes place entirely within her turn.  
Excerpt 2: SW 2640 
15_Cal # Uh-huh. # 
16_Diane # you # know, which they thought first offence, okay, this is, they thought that 
that was, that was a good thing. And they sentencing him to fifteen years and 
hum, after it was all over, uh, the jud-, they sit down with the judge and with 
the other two lawyers, [to someone in background] let me come over in just a 
second, okay, [to Cal] and sit down with the judge and with the other two 
lawyers and they were told that, uh, he would probably serve three, 
17_Cal # Uh-huh. # 
18_Diane # of # the fifteen, [continues] 
Here, Cal and Diane are discussing sentencing decisions during trials. Diane has the 
floor and is telling a story about her husband's experience of jury duty. She interrupts herself 
to speak to someone in her environment (let me come over in just a minute, okay). She 
resumes talking to Cal with and followed by a verbatim repetition of the last phrase before 
the interruption, followed by and before continuing (they were told that). She does not warn 
Cal of the suspension, nor does she perform any facework. In fact, the only indication that let 
me come over in just a minute, okay is addressed to a third person is through prosodic 
marking evident in the sound file.  
Excerpts 1 and 2 contrast in the duration of the suspension. This contrast coincides 
with differences in both the suspension and reinstatement processes. In Excerpt 2, contrary 
to Excerpt 1, Diane does not warn Cal in any way. For a projected short suspension, Diane 
may believe she can get away with not warning him, especially since she has the floor. 
Indeed, not explicitly marking a brief suspension may cost less collaborative effort (Clark, 
1996). There is elaborate politeness in Excerpt 1, whereas there is none in Excerpt 2. This 
seems reasonable, given that the duration of the unnecessary imposition on a person's time 
is directly related to the degree of threat to that person's face (Brown & Levinson, 1987). 
The contrast between such cases leads us to a first hypothesis: The duration of the 
suspension affects politeness in the suspension process. Longer suspensions lead to more 
politeness. The duration relevant for testing this hypothesis is the duration of the second 
step in the model, namely, dealing with the interruption. It corresponds to the amount of 
time the partner is kept waiting. 
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Now consider the differences in the reinstatement process. In Excerpt 1, Ben 
proposes continuing the conversation with a new topic (i.e., a new joint commitment). But in 
Excerpt 2, Diane resumes her suspended commitment by simply repeating the last phrase 
she uttered before the suspension. Note the use of so in Excerpt 1 and and in Excerpt 2. So is 
used to mark topic shifts, whereas and is used to mark continuation within a topic (Schiffrin, 
1987). Thus, in Excerpt 1 (a long suspension), Ben uses so to shift the topic from how Ann 
gets news to how he likes news, whereas in Excerpt 2 (a short suspension), Diane uses and 
to continue within a topic. The contrast between these two cases leads us to the second 
hypothesis: The duration of the suspension affects topic reinstatement. Longer suspensions 
lead to more collaborative effort. The duration relevant for testing this hypothesis is the 
total duration during which the topic is suspended, because during this time participants 
engage in verbal and non-verbal activities that may interfere with their memory for the topic 
and complicate topic reinstatement. This duration corresponds to the duration of the three 
steps in the model, namely, suspending, dealing with the interaction, and reinstating the 
interaction. 
 We now contrast Excerpt 2 with another short suspension in Excerpt 3 (both 
suspensions have durations identical to within a half-second). The ease with which Diane 
(the speaker) suspends and reinstates the conversation in Excerpt 2 contrasts with the effort 
expended in Excerpt 3, where Eva, the person initiating the suspension, does not have the 
floor.  
Excerpt 3: SW 3712 
6_Eva But I like classical, jazz, uh, you know, uh, contemporary. I don't know what 
you call it.  I just like rock, or easy listening or whatever. Uh, what about you? 
7_Fiona Uh, a lot the same.  I don't like hard rock at all and I, uh, don't like, uh, rap 
either. I don't care too much for jazz.  Sometimes, I do. A few things I have 
heard that I like but, 
8_Eva Hang on. Excuse me [rattling] [to dog] Rocky, no. [to Fiona] My dog is getting 
 into trash. [laughter] Okay go ahead. 
9_Fiona [laughter] and, uh, I like classical, and I like, uh, a lot of different kinds of 
contemporary, uh, folksy type -- [continues] 
 Eva and Fiona are talking about kinds of music they like. In 6, Eva is telling Fiona what 
kinds she likes. She hands the floor over to Fiona with what about you. Fiona starts listing 
45 
 
different kinds of music (7). Eva interrupts her (8, hang on) and apologizes (excuse me). She 
then attempts to cover the receiver and addresses her dog loudly. She reinstates the 
conversation with Fiona by explaining the reason for the suspension, laughs and invites 
Fiona to continue. Fiona laughs and complies. In Excerpts 2 and 3, we can see effects of 
conversational role (speaker vs. listener) on the suspension and reinstatement process. As a 
listener, Eva must signal the suspension in a more extensive manner than Diane. This is 
because Diane only interrupts herself, whereas Eva interrupts someone else. Eva asks Fiona 
to hang on, excuses herself, deals with the suspension, justifies it and signals to Fiona to 
continue, all in turn 8. The contrast between Excerpts 2 and 3 leads us to a third hypothesis: 
Conversational role affects politeness. Listeners display more politeness than speakers. 
Excerpt 4 illustrates how participants sometimes tried to defer entering into parallel 
interactions. It also illustrates politeness not apparent in previous excerpts. 
Excerpt 4: SW3045 
90_Jane Not too much.  What kind of, what kind of things do you write? 
91_Kate Well, um, I was a technical writer for many years, um, 
92_Jane Oh. 
93.1_Kate #and my husband and I actually met in a computer company.  Um, I was a 
tech writer and he was –- # 
93.2_Jane #[A child talks in the background]# 
93.3_Kate #-- an engineer. And, uh, so I did tech writing -- #  
93.4_Jane [#The child starts to cry#]  
93.5_Kate -- # for a number of years#. 
94_Jane [Talks to the child] #Go talk to # Daddy about it.  
95_Kate [Laughter].   
96_Jane Excuse me.    
97_Kate Oh, #sure#. 
98_Jane [Talks to the child] #Go on# and talk to Daddy about it [The child stops crying]. 
Tell Daddy I unplugged it for you.  But you don't need to drag it down the hall 
[The child cries again] [sigh].  
99_Kate [Laughter] Got a problem, huh?  [Laughter] Um,   
100_Jane [noise] Daddy, Daddy came home and found her playing with the telephone 
that I had unplugged [Laughter]. 
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101_Kate Oh.  Trying to figure out what all that was about, huh?  [Laughter]. 
102_Jane Yeah.    
103_Kate But, um, I have, um, that, that was the majority of my writing although, um, I 
have also done oh, free lance magazine writing and some educational writing. 
[continues]  
 In turn 91, Kate has started telling Jane about her activities as a technical writer. 
Jane's daughter starts soliciting Jane (93.2) and finally starts to cry (93.4). Only then does 
Jane take the floor to interact with her. Kate stops talking and laughs. Jane officially 
suspends the conversation (excuse me) and deals with her daughter.  
 In this excerpt, the participants do not return to the suspended topic immediately. 
Rather, they embark on a side topic (turns 99 to 102) focused on Jane's daughter. This topic 
is initiated and ended by Kate, who was the speaker at the moment of the suspension. Such 
side topics occurred occasionally in the database and were often initiated by the person 
interrupted. They are a way for the interrupted participant to show interest for the situation 
leading to the interruption, and thus to display concern for the partner's predicament. In 
other words, they are a way of symbolically excusing or legitimizing the imposition (by 
acknowledging its importance to the person suspending) and thus, a particularly elaborate 
form of politeness. We can see this in the sympathetic language used by Kate in 99 and 101. 
By this process, the interruption itself can become a topic of conversation, thereby deferring 
and potentially complicating efforts to reinstate the original topic. 
5.5.2 Hypotheses 
The examples above suggest that people deal with interruptions according to the 
model we proposed: They are sensitive to both coordination requirements and interpersonal 
concerns such as avoiding face threat to their partner. So in performing the three steps we 
describe, they are indeed trying to accommodate the properties of joint commitments, i.e., 
stacking, persistence and bound resources. However, it is desirable to obtain quantitative 
evidence for these observations. Our analyses were guided by the three hypotheses derived 
from theoretical considerations, the excerpts above, as well as analyses of similar cases.  
First, we propose that duration of the suspension, in terms of waiting time for the 
partner, is positively related to the amount of politeness displayed (Hypothesis 1). This is 
expected because longer waiting times directly increase threat to negative face. This 
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hypothesis follows from the fact that joint commitments bind resources of participants. 
Second, we propose that the duration of the suspension, in terms of the suspension of 
topical talk, is positively related to collaborative effort in reinstating the topic (Hypothesis 2). 
Longer suspensions allow both participants to get into potentially complex secondary tasks. 
Research on cognitive processes involved in interruptions suggests that engaging in such 
tasks may interfere with memory for goals related to the primary task (Altmann & Trafton, 
2002; Hodgetts & Jones, 2006). If participants are unable to reconstruct where they left off 
exactly, they may abandon the current stack of commitments and revert to a previously 
grounded stack. We expect that they signal this transition with specific discourse markers. In 
contrast, with shorter suspensions, memory for goals should be less taxed. Thus, shorter 
suspensions should exhibit more coherent topic reinstatement, especially characterized by 
more verbatim repetition (Clark & Wasow, 1998) and more fluent discourse. The second 
hypothesis follows from all three properties of the model. Third, we propose that politeness 
varies according to conversational role (Hypothesis 3). Speakers have more control over the 
moment to initiate a suspension than listeners. And speakers who initiate a suspension are 
interrupting themselves, which is less face-threatening than interrupting one's partner. Thus, 
they do not need to exhibit as much politeness in suspending as listeners.  
5.5.3 Method 
Identifying suspensions. Suspensions were located by searching for typical key words: 
hold on (and variations, e.g., hold on a sec), just a minute (and variations, e.g., just a 
moment), and apologies, e.g., excuse me. We also searched for transcript annotations 
indicating that a third person is being addressed. In order to be sure that our search 
procedure was not biased by the key words used, we compared it to manual identification of 
suspensions in a sample of 220 conversations. Twenty-three cases were found by both 
manual coding and the search procedure; there was disagreement on 1 case. This 
corresponds to a Cohen's kappa value of .98, indicating excellent agreement (Fleiss, 1981). 
The search of the whole corpus returned 140 cases. After excluding some cases where it was 
not clear that the conversation was suspended, we were left with a final sample of 107 
cases.6  
Data preparation. We corrected transcripts using the sound files. This was necessary 
                                                 
6
 In the sample, the 107 suspensions come from 96 conversations. Thus, although there were 11 conversations 
that featured two suspensions each, we consider the potential inflation of degrees of freedom to be negligible. 
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because the corpus was not originally created to study suspensions, and transcription 
accuracy around suspensions was often approximate. We retained several transcription 
conventions from the Switchboard corpus. Speakers are identified by arbitrary first names. 
Speaker turns correspond to those in the original transcripts. Corrections sometimes 
required inserting speaker turns. To preserve the original numbering, we indicate these with 
decimals (e.g., turn 20.1 is inserted after turn 20 in the original transcript). Onset and offset 
of simultaneous speech is indicated by "#". Continuing speech is indicated by "--". Comments 
are bracketed. 
Coding. Interrater agreement was assessed for variables involving subjective 
assessments by double-coding 22 cases (21 % of the database). For ordinal variables, we 
computed Cohen's kappa (Fleiss, 1981), assessing whether it was acceptable (> .70) and 
significantly different from zero. Kappa values are reported below for each variable. For 
numerical variables, we computed correlation coefficients. 
We used Praat 4.3.01 (Boersma & Weenink, 2007) to measure the duration of 
suspensions with a precision of one tenth of a second. We report two measures of duration: 
The suspension of the interaction (SI) and the suspension of the topic of conversation (ST). SI 
represents the duration of the second step in our generic model, i.e., dealing with the 
interruption. It begins with the offset of the last word when the person suspending stops 
talking with the partner. It ends with the onset of the first word when the suspender 
resumes talking with the partner. ST is a measure of how long the topic is suspended. It 
represents the duration of all three steps in our model. In other words, it begins with the 
offset of the last word of topical conversation and ends with the onset of the first word of 
reinstated topical conversation. Typically, ST encompasses SI. In other words, the difference 
between ST and SI is equal to the duration of negotiation of topic suspension and 
reinstatement. The relationship between ST and SI is shown in Figure 6, using the example of 
Excerpt 1. As discussed above, we distinguish between these measures because they may be 
differentially related to our dependent variables. SI, which directly translates into idle 
waiting time for the partner, is probably directly related to face threat. However, ST, which 
includes SI plus any interactional work done to get out of and back into the interaction (e.g., 
facework), may be a better predictor of collaborative effort in reinstating the topic, because 
this additional work may make it more difficult for participants to remember where they 
were in the conversation. 
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Figure 6. Onsets and offsets of suspension of interaction (SI) and suspension of topic 
(ST). 
We coded conversational role, distinguishing between speakers and listeners, 
depending on who owned the floor at the onset of the suspension. Interrater agreement 
was perfect (kappa = 1.00, p < .0001). 
We coded the number of politeness acts in the entire suspension process by both 
participants before and after the suspension. Politeness acts were defined according to 
Brown and Levinson (1987). The basic feature is a deviation from maximally efficient (i.e., 
minimal) communication in the sense of Grice's maxims (1975). Of course, these acts may 
also serve other purposes rather than face management. However, we did not count 
utterances whose main function is information-giving or seeking (e.g., "where were we?") as 
politeness acts. In the current corpus, politeness acts included hold on, interrogative form 
(can I ask you to), please, expressions of time (just a sec, just a minute), justifications and 
apologies. For each suspension, we coded whether or not each act was present (1 or 0) and 
tallied them, thus creating an interval-scaled measure of the amount of politeness. Interrater 
agreement was high for coding presence or absence of each act (all kappas > .75, all ps < 
.0001). As another indicator of politeness, we also computed the number of turns involved in 
50 
 
politeness acts before and after suspension. Number of turns is a meaningful indicator 
because it measures the extent of exchanges between participants, and thus corresponds to 
Goffman's (1955) original perspective on facework (see also turns 31-34 in Excerpt 1). 
Interrater agreement was high, r(22) = .87, p < .001. We also counted the number of words 
used for politeness acts. Interrater agreement was excellent, r(22) = .98, p < .001.  
We assessed reinstatement by analyzing the first topical utterance after the 
reinstatement of the interaction. We coded three variables. First, we coded each utterance 
as either globally or locally coherent (Crow, 1983) with the last topical utterance preceding 
the suspension. "Local" was coded when the utterance was directly related to the last 
utterance, and "global" was coded when it was not, i.e., when participants reverted to a 
lower-stacked commitment (kappa = .82, p < .0001). This variable captures whether or not a 
joint commitment is continued (local) or abandoned in order to revert to a previous one 
(global). Second, we coded whether or not utterances were verbatim repetitions of the last 
topical utterance preceding suspension. Our criterion for verbatim repetition was at least 
two consecutive identical words in both utterances (kappa = .65, p < .001). Third, we coded 
for the use of horizontal (yeah, and) and vertical (okay, well, so, but, anyway) markers 
according to Bangerter and Clark's (2003) classification. Horizontal markers are used to 
signal horizontal transitions, i.e., within a particular joint project. Vertical markers signal 
vertical transitions, i.e., starting or ending joint projects. Horizontal markers should be used 
more frequently with short suspensions than long ones, because participants will tend to 
continue where they left off rather than revert to a previous joint commitment. When more 
than one marker was produced (e.g., but, and) we coded the last one (all kappas between 
.65 and 1.00, all ps < .001).7 
As an example of how we coded reinstatement variables, consider, in Excerpt 1, the 
initial topic-reinstating utterance: So, it sounds like you, uh, like the news a lot more than I 
do. It is globally coherent with the last topical utterance before the suspension, does not 
feature verbatim repetition and features use of a vertical marker (so). 
5.5.4 Results 
Descriptive analyses are shown in Table 3. In what follows, we present analyses of 
                                                 
7
 Prior research (Clark & Wasow, 1998) suggested that the cognitive effort of reinstating a topical utterance 
could be indicated by variations in disfluencies. We analyzed this in both studies, but did not find any significant 
differences according to the main independent variables. 
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the relationship between duration, conversational role and our dependent variables, 
politeness and collaborative effort to reinstate the topic. 
Table 3. 
Descriptive data for main study variables (N = 107) 
  % M SD 
Source of interruption (total = 100%)    
 Children 43   
 Unknown third person 20   
 Incoming call 20   
 Self-interruption 10   
 Other (e.g., technical problem) 7   
Duration (seconds)    
 Suspension of topic (ST)  10.3 10.8 
 Suspension of interaction (SI)  6.0 8.1 
Conversational role of initiator    
 Speaker (Listener) 58 (42)   
Politeness 1    
 Hold on 39   
 Interrogative form 16   
 Please 2   
 Just a [sec, minute, etc.] 45   
 Justification 49   
 Apology 24   
Reinstatement     
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 Local coherence (global) 41(59)   
 Horizontal marker (vertical) 34(66)   
1 Values indicate the percentage of cases where the feature was present. 
Hypotheses 1-3. Because Hypotheses 1-3 are directional, we report one-tailed p 
values in what follows, accompanied by measures of effect size ( coefficients for chi-square 
tests and Cohen's d for t-tests). For Hypothesis 1, the duration of SI correlated with the 
amount of politeness acts, r(107) = .47, p < .0001, as well as the number of turns of 
politeness, r(107) = .46, p < .0001, and  the number of words of politeness, r(107) = .24, p = 
.007.  
As predicted in Hypothesis 2, the duration of ST affected topic reinstatement. We 
dichotomized duration of ST into short (M = 3.5 sec) and long suspensions (M = 17.2 sec) 
using a median split (7.1 sec). Locally coherent utterances at reinstatement followed short 
suspensions 59% of the time, but followed long suspensions only 23% of the time,  χ2(1, N = 
107) = 14.81, p < .0001,  = .37. Use of vertical and horizontal markers also varied with 
duration. Topical reinstatement after short suspensions featured horizontal markers 44% of 
the time, compared with only 26% of the time after long suspensions. However, this 
difference was only marginally significant, χ2(1, N = 67) = 2.54, p = .092,   = .20. Verbatim 
repetition followed long suspensions 4% of the time, but followed short suspensions 22% of 
the time, χ2(1, N = 107) = 8.0, p = .004,  = .27.  
For Hypothesis 3, we found that suspensions by listeners featured more politeness 
acts (M = 2.1, SD = 1.6) than those by speakers (M = 1.5, SD = 1.5), t(105) = 1.81, p = .037, d = 
.39, as well as more turns involving politeness (Ms 3.8 vs. 2.2 turns, SDs 3.2 and 2.7 
respectively), t(105) = 2.73, p = .004, d = .54, and more words involving politeness (Ms 20.7 
vs. 11.2 words, SDs 26.1 and 13.5 respectively), t(61.1) = 2.2, p = .015, d = .46. 
5.5.5 Discussion 
We found (Hypothesis 1) that the longer the suspension was, the more elaborate was 
the politeness. This was established by computing SI, i.e., the amount of time the other 
participant is kept waiting. This supports the proposition in our model that entering into 
joint commitments binds resources of participants and that suspending them creates an 
obligation that must be compensated in direct proportion to the degree of face threat. We 
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also found (Hypothesis 2) that the longer the suspension, the more collaborative effort is 
required to reinstate the topic. This was established by computing duration as ST, i.e. the 
amount of time the other participant is kept waiting plus the amount of time expended in 
politeness before reinstating the topic. Thus, longer suspensions lead to more politeness, 
which itself constitutes a supplementary interactional task that may further complicate 
participants' efforts to reinstate the topic, especially if they discuss the cause of the 
interruption, as in Excerpt 4. Finally, we found (Hypothesis 3) that the conversational role of 
the person initiating the suspension affected the process. It was more effortful for listeners 
to suspend than speakers, because they have to deal with the delicate issue of interrupting 
the speaker, which constitutes a face threat in itself. This was evident in the number of 
politeness acts, but also in the number of turns. In other words, when listeners suspend, 
they tend to ask for permission, apologize and so on. These acts get acknowledged by the 
other participant and emerge as adjacency pairs, thereby, increasing, for example, the 
number of turns taken to suspend. 
Although the evidence for our model is suggestive, in a field study, it is difficult to 
exclude extraneous variables that may be confounded with the independent variables of 
interest. For example, it is evident from Table 1 that several different kinds of interruptions 
occurred. It is desirable to obtain experimental evidence for our findings. In Study 2, we 
recreated the Switchboard corpus phenomena in a controlled laboratory setting. 
5.6 Study 2: Experimental manipulation of Duration and 
Conversational Role 
In Study 2, we brought our phenomenon into the laboratory. Unacquainted pairs 
talked about a prespecified topic over the phone. We interrupted one participant, the target, 
twice. We manipulated duration (short versus long; within-subjects) and conversational role 
(speaker versus listener; between-subjects) to test effects on politeness and reinstatement 
processes. We tested Hypotheses 1-3 from Study 1. 
A problem we had to solve was how to create natural, serendipitous interruptions. In 
an experiment, targets may not feel responsible for suspending the interaction. They might 
thus perceive less face threat and make less effort to be polite, or even explicitly attribute 
the responsibility for the interruption to the experimenter. So we made up a cover story to 
lead targets to believe they were at fault because they did not adequately complete a task 
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that preceded the conversation. The cover story provided a reason for the experimenter to 
disturb targets during their conversation and a reason for targets to attribute the cause of 
disruption to themselves and not to the experimenter. To avoid "cancelling out" the face 
threat, we interrupted the same person twice. We set up the cover story by asking 
participants to fill out two ostensibly unrelated questionnaires before the conversation. 
During the conversation, the experimenter entered the target's room and pretended that it 
was impossible to code some answers in one of the questionnaires because of omissions or 
lack of clarity in the target's responses. To answer the experimenter, targets had to suspend 
their conversation, address the matter and then reinstate their conversation. This way, we 
interrupted targets at a specified point (when they were speaking or when they were 
listening) and for a specific duration (short or long). 
5.6.1 Hypotheses 
We tested Hypotheses 1-3 again: Longer suspensions should lead to more politeness 
(Hypothesis 1) and more collaborative effort in reinstating the topic (Hypothesis 2). 
Conversational role should affect politeness (Hypothesis 3): Listeners should be more polite 
than speakers. 
5.6.2 Method  
Design. The design was a 2 X 2 mixed factorial plan with duration (short vs. long) as a 
within-subjects factor and conversational role when interrupted (speaker vs. listener) as a 
between-subjects factor. Thus, for all pairs, the target was interrupted twice during the 
conversation, once for a long time and once for a short time (order was counterbalanced). 
And for half the pairs, the targets were to be interrupted only while they were speaking, and 
for the other half, only while they were listening.  
We found out after the experiment had been completed that the procedure (see 
below) for interrupting targets in a particular conversational role was not reliable. Between 
the time when the experimenter had determined the speaker role and the time he entered 
the room, the floor had often changed. Inspection of videotapes revealed that some targets 
in a speaker role stopped talking when the experimenter entered the room, but before he 
interrupted them. This apparently was perceived by their partners as an invitation to take 
the floor. We take this problem as evidence of the subtlety of conversational interruptions 
and the difficulty of studying them in a controlled setting. As a result, then, conversational 
55 
 
role was excluded from analyses, and we were not able to test Hypothesis 3. 
Participants. Forty-eight unacquainted native French speakers participated in pairs in 
exchange for 10 Swiss Francs. Allocation to condition and to the target role was random. 
Procedure and materials. We brought participants to separate rooms upon their 
arrival. They filled out consent forms and then were informed about the (bogus) 
questionnaire and the phone conversation task. For the questionnaire task, participants 
responded to two separate forms. First, they judged a list of 39 adjectives on a three-point 
scale. Then, they described an ambiguous picture from the Thematic Apperception Test in a 
one-page story. After these tasks were completed, the experimenter told participants that 
their answers would be coded during the telephone conversation. As an aside, he said he 
would inform them in case of a problem. This set the stage for a credible interruption later 
on.  
For the conversation task, participants were asked to talk about avian influenza (a 
salient media topic at the time) for at least 12 minutes. The topic was ostensibly drawn from 
a selection of current news topics. Participants conversed using hand-held USB phones and 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) software, which automatically recorded the 
conversation. We also installed a video camera with a wide-angle lens in the target's room. 
Participants knew they were audio and video recorded but not that they were monitored in 
real time. After participants had reinstated topical talk after the second interruption, the 
experimenter stopped the experiment and debriefed the participants. None of the 
participants suspected that the interruptions had been staged. 
We interrupted participants twice, after approximately 4 and 10 minutes of the 
conversation. To interrupt a participant in a particular conversational role, the experimenter 
monitored the conversations, timing his entry into the targets' room to disrupt them while 
they were either speaking or listening. We manipulated the duration of the suspension by 
bringing up a problem related to one of the bogus questionnaires. The short interruption 
was based on the adjective checklist. The long interruption was based on the picture 
description. We pre-tested these interruptions so that they would last approximately 10 and 
30 seconds, respectively. The cover story followed the same script in all conditions. The 
experimenter opened the door, entered the target’s room, and walked up to them saying I'm 
sorry, I'm coding your answers and there is a problem with followed by either the items 
(short condition) or the description (long condition). For the short condition, while the 
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participants were conversing, the experimenter copied responses from the target’s checklist 
onto a new list that included an additional item. This led the targets to believe they had 
inadvertently missed that item while responding. When interrupting, the experimenter 
followed the above script and then added you missed an item, here. For the long condition, 
while the participants were conversing, the experimenter searched the targets' stories for an 
ambiguous statement. When interrupting, he followed the above script and then added 
there is a sentence I don’t understand. Can you explain what you mean by and repeated the 
specific phrase. The targets typically complied. The experimenter acknowledged the 
explanation. Once sufficient time had elapsed, the experimenter said all right I see and 
repeated what he understood. In both cases, once answers had been given, the 
experimenter said okay thank you, and left the room. 
Manipulation and data checks. We computed the time of each suspension by 
indexing the same SI and ST durations as in Study 1. For SI, short suspensions were 
significantly shorter (M = 12.1 seconds, SD = 5.7) than long suspensions (M = 35.7, SD = 
13.3), t(1,20) = 9.0, p < .0001, d = 2.31. The same was found for ST (short: M = 25.2, SD = 6.9; 
long: M = 56.3, SD = 23.6), t(1,20) = 5.9, p < .0001, d = 1.79.  
There were four occurrences where targets did not suspend. Three persons in the 
short condition managed to handle the interruption without suspending. One person in the 
long condition included the partner into the discussion of the interruption and never came 
back to the topic of avian flu (see the similar case in Excerpt 4 where participants digressed 
at length before reinstating the topic). These behaviors can in fact be interpreted as 
politeness and will be addressed in the discussion. In the end, the sample was composed of 
20 interruptions in the short condition and 23 interruptions in the long condition. 
Measures. As in Study 1, we coded variables related to politeness and reinstatement. 
All variables involving subjective assessments were coded by two judges for all cases.  
For politeness, we counted the number of acts, turns and words as in Study 1. 
Interrater agreement was high (all rs between .80 and .98, all ps < .001).  
For topic reinstatement, as in Study 1, we coded the first topical utterance after 
reinstatement of the conversation. First, we coded whether or not it featured meta-
communication about where participants were in the conversation (e.g., where was I, you 
were saying), kappa = .94, p < .0001. Meta-communication has a coordination purpose. It 
reveals uncertainty in recalling a suspended topic, but at the same time it explicitly signals 
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the intent to continue the joint task and solicits help from the partner (Goodwin, 1987).8 
Second, as in Study 1, we coded the coherence (local or global) of the first utterance with 
the last one uttered before the suspension (kappa = .79, p < .0001). Third, to measure 
verbatim repetition, we coded the proportion of unique words that were repeated in the 
first topical speaking turn compared to the last topical speaking turn preceding the 
suspension. This yields a ratio-level measure of verbatim repetition that is more sensitive 
than the dichotomic measure we used in Study 1. This additional precision is necessary 
because the sample size in Study 2 is smaller. We did not code discourse markers as in Study 
1, because we are not aware of any systematic classification of their vertical or horizontal 
use for French. 
5.6.3 Results 
Again, because Hypotheses 1-3 are directional, we report one-tailed p values in what 
follows. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, long suspensions featured more turns involving 
politeness (M = 7.8, SD = 5.9) than short ones (M = 4.2, SD = 2.0), t(19) = 2.8, p = .006, d = 
.82. Long suspensions also featured more words expended for politeness (M = 43.6, SD = 
39.1) than short ones (M = 21.4, SD = 11.4), t(19) = 2.6, p = .010, d = .77. Finally, long 
suspensions did not feature more polite acts (M = 2.4, SD = 1.0) than short ones (M = 2.1, SD 
= 1.4), t(19) = 1.13, p = .137, d = .25. 
As predicted in Hypothesis 2, longer suspensions led to more collaborative effort in 
topical reinstatement. Meta-communication occurred more often after long than short 
suspensions, 79% vs. 47%, McNemar (1, N = 19) = 3.13, p = .035,  = .41. Verbatim repetition 
was more pronounced in shorter suspensions than longer ones: A larger proportion of words 
from the last topical turn preceding the suspension were repeated in the first topical turn for 
short suspensions (M = 36%, SD = 23%) than for long ones (M = 16%, SD = 15%), t(19) = 3.04, 
p = .004, d = 1.03. Topic-reinstating utterances following short suspensions were locally 
coherent 47% of the time, compared with 21% for long suspensions, McNemar (1, N = 19) = 
1.78, p = .09,  = .31.  
5.6.4 Discussion 
In this study, we tested results from Study 1 in an experimental setting. Hypotheses 1 
                                                 
8
 We had planned to analyze metacommunication for the Switchboard corpus as well but there were only 5 cases 
in the data. 
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and 2 were supported: The duration of the suspension influenced both politeness and 
collaborative effort in reinstatement.  
Long suspensions increased verbal effort for politeness in terms of turns, and words 
(Hypothesis 1). However, contrary to Study 1, we did not find a difference in terms of the 
number of acts. This may be because of the within-subjects design where the same 
participant was interrupted twice within a few minutes. Some kind of lexical entrainment 
(Brennan & Clark, 1996) may have occurred, causing targets to re-use similar forms of 
politeness between the first interruption and the second, and therefore counteracting 
potential effects of duration. 
Longer suspensions decreased the proportion of repeated words and increased the 
frequency of meta-communication when the topic was reinstated (Hypothesis 2). They also 
led to more globally coherent topic continuations, i.e., reverting to an earlier joint 
commitment. 
We were unable to reliably manipulate conversational role. It was difficult to 
interrupt speakers because they often relinquished the floor between the moment the 
experimenter entered the room and the moment they were explicitly solicited. This is an 
indication of the subtlety of the suspension phenomenon. Thus, we were not able to 
replicate results relative to Hypothesis 3. The results found in Study 1 are therefore 
provisional. 
A handful of targets managed to complete the interrupting tasks without suspending 
the conversation. This indicates that targets perceived the interruptions as bona fide, and, 
more importantly, that they took the conversation with their partner seriously enough to 
refuse to suspend it. In fact, refusing to suspend corresponds to a politeness strategy that is 
employed when the face threat is considered too high, namely simply not to execute the act 
in question (Brown & Levinson, 1987).  
5.7 General discussion 
Interruptions of joint activities are commonplace, but their processes and effects are 
not well understood. We proposed a model that describes the contingencies involved in the 
suspension and reinstatement of joint activities. Our model is based on the notion that when 
people converse, they create joint commitments. Joint commitments have three properties, 
binding resources, stacking, and persistence (Clark 2006). These properties explain why joint 
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commitments are hard to suspend without costly adjustments: Face is threatened and the 
grounding process is disrupted. These adjustments require polite acts and collaborative 
efforts to reinstate the joint activity. Our model accounts for these processes at suspension 
and reinstatement. 
In Study 1, we described qualitative variations in the suspension and reinstatement 
processes, and derived three hypotheses about factors influencing politeness and 
reinstatement. Hypothesis 1 posited that waiting time of the partner (SI) would predict face 
threat and therefore politeness. Hypothesis 2 posited that the total duration of topic 
suspension (ST), i.e. the three steps in the model, would predict collaborative effort in 
reinstating the topic (Hypothesis 2). We further explored facework processes by examining 
effects of the conversational role of the initiator of the suspension. Hypothesis 3 posited that 
self-interruption would be less face-threatening then having to interrupt while the partner 
has the floor (Hypothesis 3). Results showed that duration of the suspension increased 
politeness and the effort to reinstate the task. We also found that conversational role 
affected politeness: it was more difficult for listeners to suspend than speakers. In Study 2, 
results showed again that longer suspensions led to more politeness and effort at 
reinstatement. These results support the coordination costs portrayed in our model for 
suspending joint activities.  
A strength of our model is that it is built on studies that combined both natural and 
experimental data, a desirable combination for discovery and testing of linguistic 
phenomena (Clark & Bangerter, 2004). On the other hand, a limitation of the experiment is 
that we failed to systematically interrupt targets in the speaker and listener roles. That 
parameter was dropped from our analyses; thus we were not able to replicate Hypothesis 3. 
Also, we had a small sample in Study 2; this may have resulted in insufficient power to test 
some hypotheses. Nevertheless, our overall results supported the model. 
Although our model integrates important variables affecting suspensions, there are 
several other factors that we were not able to take into account. We discuss these in what 
follows. Future research might explore how they affect joint commitments and variables like 
politeness and topic reinstatement. 
First, it is worth exploring how targets compute face threat to their partners in real 
time. Given enough time, targets may be able to prevent face threat by anticipating the 
duration of a suspension. By this view, they would roughly estimate the duration of their 
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partners’ waiting time and perform appropriate politeness acts in advance. Alternatively, 
time pressure to switch from the primary activity to the second activity might prevent them 
from properly anticipating face threat (or they may underestimate waiting time). In such 
cases, partners may compensate for face threat after the suspension. All other things being 
equal, it seems that people would prefer anticipation to compensation (Clark, 1994).  
Second, it is worth exploring how partners on hold may engage in other activities 
depending on the waiting time of the suspension. The suspensions we studied were brief, 
ranging from a few seconds to a few minutes. What would happen with longer suspensions? 
If the suspension remains brief, partners may simply wait. If so, they may have idle mental 
capacity, and thus be able to keep in mind the active stack of the conversation, thereby 
acting as a kind of placeholder. With longer suspensions, partners may themselves engage in 
other activities (Miyata & Norman, 1987) and therefore be less able to support 
reinstatement. Also, with longer suspensions, at some point, initiators of the suspension 
may feel obliged to check back with their partners, and eventually provide them with more 
redressive acts. Companies are sensitive to this phenomenon, and so when callers are 
waiting to get through help lines, they regularly get automatic messages that feature polite 
acts, such as apologies, justifications, and information about the approximate remaining 
waiting time. Finally, with even longer suspensions, initiators may feel obliged to release 
their partners from the interaction, allowing them to return to their own business. 
Third, it is worth exploring the strength of a joint commitment and its effect on 
reinstatement of the primary task. The strength of a commitment may depend on the 
amount of time accumulated in the joint activity, which could decrease partners’ initial 
commitment level and hence decrease the need for reinstatement. For example, 
participants might use the opportunity afforded by an interruption to exit a conversation 
that has been going on for a while (Albert & Kessler, 1976). There were cases in the 
Switchboard corpus where partners did not resume the topic, but ended the conversation 
after the interruption had been dealt with. They did not reinstate the topic, but 
nevertheless, they still had to commit together to ending the conversation (Schegloff & 
Sacks, 1973). The strength of a joint commitment to interact may also be low from the 
outset. Imagine two strangers chatting with each other while waiting in line at a checkout 
counter. When it is one participant’s turn to be served, it is unlikely that the conversation 
will resume afterwards (we thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point). In this case, 
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the commitment level is low because both participants are actually passing time while 
waiting for committing to a more important purpose. 
Fourth, it is worth investigating how varying levels of co-presence between the 
target, the partner and the source of the interruption affect the suspension and 
reinstatement processes. We suggest that co-presence affects the participants’ mutual 
awareness of the primary and secondary interactions. This in turn affects how responsibility 
for attending face wants is distributed among the participants. Our data are derived from 
phone conversations, where target and partner lack co-presence and mutual visibility (Clark 
& Brennan, 1991). In this situation, mutual awareness is limited and prevents partners from 
knowing about the source of an interruption in the target’s environment. Thus, it is likely 
that the responsibility for attending to face wants will lie with the target. But, in situations 
where target, source and partner are co-present, mutual awareness is not limited. 
Therefore, it is likely that less explicit facework and justifications are needed. Though, in this 
case, the responsibility for facework may probably lie with the source, who is directly 
accountable to the target, but also to the partner. Other configurations of co-presence (e.g., 
a co-present target and partner with a remote source or a co-present source and target with 
a remote partner) will likely lead to a different distribution of responsibility for managing 
face wants. 
Our findings have implications for theory on interruption management. McFarlane 
and Latorella (2002) have developed a detailed and yet general model of interruptions in 
HCI, but it does not deal specifically with human-human interruptions of collaborative tasks. 
One of our findings is that, for interruptions of joint activities, facework constitutes a 
supplementary task in addition to the primary and secondary tasks that have been studied in 
previous work. As an additional interactional sequence that must be managed by 
participants, it consumes time and cognitive resources and may further complicate 
reinstatement of the task. Our results also have implications for research on how people 
manage multiple collaborations. In everyday work situations, people flexibly interact with 
multiple partners, both in sequence and in parallel (Fussell, Kiesler, Setlock, Scupelli, & 
Weisband, 2004, Su & Mark 2008). This makes interruptions of collaborative tasks, and thus 
suspensions and reinstatements, a commonplace but underestimated phenomenon (Perlow, 
1999). As of yet, little is known about how these processes impact collaborative work. 
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6.1 Abstract 
Participants manage interruptions in joint activities by suspending the activity, 
addressing the interruption, and reinstating the activity. This involves two important 
processes: managing the face of one’s partners and collaboratively reconstructing the topic. 
We hypothesized that the duration of the interruption affects both facework (politeness) 
and topic reinstatement, and that the conversational role of the person interrupted (the 
target) affects facework. In an experiment, we interrupted pairs of participants engaged in 
narrating personal stories. One person narrated a story while the other listened. Participants 
then switched roles. We manipulated the duration of the interruption (short versus long 
interruptions). We also manipulated the conversational role of the target (narrator versus 
listener). Listeners were more polite than narrators. Longer suspensions caused more effort 
in reinstatement than short suspensions. But participants were not more polite when 
suspensions were long. Results highlight the complexity of interpersonal processes involved 
in suspending and reinstating collaborative activity.  
6.2 Introduction 
Interruptions of conversations by third parties are commonplace in everyday life. For 
example, two persons conversing in a restaurant might be interrupted by the waiter arriving 
to take their order. Or a doctor counselling a patient during a medical visit might be 
interrupted by a phone call from another patient. In such situations, the participants in the 
conversation have to manage both their original conversation and the interrupting event. 
They typically do so by suspending the original conversation (hereafter the primary 
conversation), dealing with the interrupting party (thereby initiating a secondary 
conversation), and then reinstating the primary conversation. Chevalley and Bangerter (in 
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press) described the complex issues involved in the suspension and reinstatement of 
conversations. One issue is the impact of the interruption on the primary conversation, 
especially on the reconstruction of the topic that was interrupted. Another is how 
participants manage each others' face (Brown & Levinson, 1987) when suspending the 
interaction. Here, we report a study that further explored these issues. 
Research on task interruptions of individuals has documented their cognitive and 
behavioral consequences for ongoing task performance. Interruptions decrease performance 
due to the costs of task switching (e.g., errors, lost time; Monsell, 2003). Switching costs 
often increase with the duration of the interruption (Hodgetts & Jones, 2006a, but see Gillie 
& Broadbent, 1983). This is due to time-dependent decay of memory for task goals (Altmann 
& Trafton, 2002). Another factor affecting how disruptive an interruption is concerns the 
point in a task where the interruption occurs, with mid-task interruptions being more 
disruptive than end-task interruptions (Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004; Monk, Boehm-Davis, & 
Trafton, 2002). To a certain extent, individuals are able to defer interruptions to minimize 
their disruptive impact. In other words, they decide whether and when to interrupt a task 
based on considerations of the relative costs and benefits involved (McFarlane & Latorella, 
2002). For example, participants in a computerized planning task used an eight-second 
interval between the onset of a task interruption and the onset of the secondary task to 
memorize the current state of the task in order to facilitate resumption (Trafton, Altmann, 
Brock and Mintz, 2003). 
Conversations are partly similar and partly different to individual tasks. Like individual 
tasks, participants' memory for where they were in the conversation may suffer from long 
interruptions. But unlike individual tasks, participants in interrupted conversations not only 
need to reconstruct their individual memories of the topic of the conversation, but they also 
need to coordinate those memories by reconstructing common ground about the topic 
(Horton & Gerrig, 2005). They may be able to rely on the help of other participants to do this 
(Goodwin, 1987). Another difference between conversations and individual tasks is that 
suspending a conversation with another person is potentially insulting to that person. 
Typically, only some participants in a conversation are solicited by a third party (we refer to 
them as targets in what follows). Thus, targets need to manage potential face threats 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987) to their partners when suspending conversations. Suspending a 
conversation implies keeping partners waiting, which threatens their negative face, i.e., their 
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right to freely dispose of their time. This leads targets to perform redressive behaviors 
(politeness), such as asking permission, apologizing for the interruption, or explaining why 
they need to suspend (Chevalley & Bangerter, in press). 
Chevalley and Bangerter (in press) proposed a model of conversational suspensions 
and reinstatements. It was based on the assumption that participants in conversation 
establish a series of joint commitments (Clark, 2006). Joint commitments are agreements 
among participants that specify what they will do in a particular interaction, including 
aspects like the participants' roles, the actions they are to perform, when and where they 
are to do them. They arise because participants need to coordinate these aspects to interact 
successfully. They may be agreed upon explicitly (as when two people agree to meet for 
lunch) or tacitly (as when one participant starts telling a story and the other tacitly accepts 
by adopting the role of listener). Joint commitments have three important properties. First, 
they are established sequentially (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), but because 
conversation is also hierarchically organized (Clark, 1996, Bangerter & Clark, 2003), each 
successive joint commitment is stacked up on the previous one. For example, in the 
restaurant conversation example above, the participants previously committed themselves 
to meeting for lunch at a restaurant. While waiting to order, they committed themselves to 
talk about a particular topic. Thus, this commitment was established after the commitment 
to meet for lunch, and is stacked up on it. Second, joint commitments at a lower-level persist 
even if higher-level commitments are interrupted or abandoned. For example, the 
commitment to lunch persists even if the commitment to discuss a particular topic is 
abandoned. Third, joint commitments bind resources of participants. In committing 
themselves to meeting for lunch, participants agree to invest resources (e.g., time, money, 
attention) to make the meeting a success. In doing so, they temporarily renounce part of 
their autonomy and their ability to engage in other activities (Goffman, 1967). 
These properties of joint commitments explain why conversational suspensions and 
reinstatements constitute complex and often effortful activities. They suggest that 
participants will try to reconstruct the topic that was interrupted (because their 
commitment to talk about that topic persists). If they are unable to do so, they may revert to 
a lower-level (i.e., more encompassing) topic they had previously initiated. And the fact that 
participants bind their resources suggests that suspending a conversation requires targets to 
compensate their partners for keeping them waiting while they engage in another 
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interaction. This compensation is typically accomplished by means of politeness acts 
designed to mitigate face threat. As an illustration of how these processes actually get 
accomplished in conversation, consider the following excerpt from the Switchboard Corpus 
(Godfrey, Holliman, & McDaniel, 1992). In this corpus, pairs of participants were recorded 
while they talked on the telephone about a predefined topic. Because these conversations 
occurred in the homes and workplaces of the participants, they sometimes featured 
naturally-occurring interruptions. The excerpt involves a conversation between Ann and Bob 
on the topic of “lawn and garden” that is interrupted by a third party (Carl) located in Ann’s 
environment (for transcription conventions, see the Method section). 
Excerpt 1: Conversation 2984 Switchboard corpus 
15_Bob And, uh, but grew up in, uh, Iowa on a farm with a considerably different 
philosophy in terms of [laughter] lawn and garden --   
16_Ann Hi [to Carl].   
17_Bob  -- work.  Uh, and uh,    
18_Ann Can you hang on just a minute?   
19_Bob Yeah.   
20_Ann Thank you  
20.1_Carl Has shoebox called me back 
20.2_Ann [To Carl] I have no idea.  He didn't broadcast. 
20.3_Carl No right, we did it again 
20.4_Ann [To Carl] Thank you.  Uh-huh. [To Bob] I'm sorry.   
21_Bob No.   
22_Ann Go ahead.   
23_Bob So, uh, [pause 1.60 s lipsmack] uh, not, not growing up familiar with here, uh, 
uh, when I get a chance I listen to that Neil #Sperry and do that [laughter].#   
At the beginning of the excerpt (Turn 15), Bob has the floor, and is talking about 
where he grew up. In Turn 16, Ann starts a secondary conversation with Carl (it is not clear 
whether Ann or Carl is the actual initiator). This obviously disrupts Bob’s Turn 17 (uh, and 
uh). Ann asks permission to suspend the primary conversation (18), Bob accepts (19), and 
Ann thanks him (20) before fully engaging in the secondary conversation (20.1 to 20.4) with 
Carl. In 20.4, Ann reinstates the primary conversation by apologizing to Bob (I’m sorry). Bob 
indicates the apology was not necessary (21, no). Ann invites Bob to continue (go ahead, 22). 
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He takes up the topic in turn 23 after some disfluent speech (So, uh, {pause 1.60 s lipsmack} 
uh, not) by producing a summary (not growing up familiar with here) of his last topical turn 
before the suspension.  
In this excerpt, it is clear that Ann and Bob do not just stop talking with each other. 
Rather, they need to coordinate suspending and reinstating the conversation. First, they 
need to ensure that Bob’s face needs are adequately respected. This follows from the fact 
that in putting Bob on hold, Ann incurs a debt towards him, a debt that is symbolically repaid 
by Ann’s acts of politeness (as expressed by her asking permission and apologizing). Also, 
Ann and Bob need to coordinate the topic reinstatement. This is accomplished by Ann’s 
invitation that Bob continue, and Bob’s subsequent reformulation of the utterance he was 
producing when interrupted. These two issues of managing face threat and managing topic 
reinstatement follow from the properties of joint commitments described above. 
At the same time, the question arises whether variations in the situation might lead 
participants to coordinate these issues differently than in Excerpt 1. A variable that may 
affect both facework and topic reinstatement is the duration of the interruption. Chevalley 
and Bangerter (in press) found that longer interruptions made topic reinstatement more 
difficult, leading participants to abandon interrupted topics more often and revert to prior 
topics. Longer interruptions also led to more politeness in suspending and reinstating. This 
supports an interpretation of face threat as increasing in direct proportion to the duration of 
time the partner is kept waiting. Another variable is the conversational role of the target. In 
Excerpt 1, the target was in the role of listener when the interruption occurred. It is more 
effortful for a listener to suspend a conversation than a narrator, because listeners have to 
interrupt the narrator (an additional face threat), while narrators need only self-interrupt (a 
process similar to suspending conversation; Clark & Wasow, 1998). Also, the conversational 
role of the target may impact the responsibilities of conversational partners for topic 
reinstatement. For example, depending on the topic at hand, narrators may have privileged 
access to topical content (e.g., when narrating a story). They may thus tacitly be held 
responsible for its continuation. On the other hand, the listener may sometimes support 
topic reconstruction (e.g., you were saying…). Chevalley and Bangerter (in press) found field 
evidence that listeners were more polite than narrators in suspending, but were not able to 
test this conjecture in an experimental setting.  
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6.3 Hypotheses and setup 
In this study, we experimentally manipulated the duration of interruptions of 
telephone conversations as well as the conversational role of the person targeted by the 
interruption to test their effects on politeness and topic reconstruction at reinstatement. We 
predicted that duration would affect politeness, such that longer suspensions should lead to 
more politeness (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, we expected this effect to reveal itself in 
politeness at reinstatement, because at suspension, targets cannot know for how long they 
will be interrupted. Thus, they should compensate for a longer interruption by more 
politeness at reinstatement. We also predicted that duration would affect topic 
reinstatement, such that longer interruptions should lead to more collaborative effort in 
reinstating the topic, because prior commitments may be abandoned and have to be 
negotiated anew (Hypothesis 2). We also predicted that conversational role would affect 
politeness, such that suspensions by listeners would feature more politeness than those by 
narrators (Hypothesis 3).  
It is not a trivial task to study politeness in suspending and reinstating conversations 
in the laboratory. Politeness is produced as compensation for a debt incurred towards one’s 
partner by keeping them waiting. For participants to perceive that a debt has indeed been 
incurred, they need to construe the target as being responsible for the interruption. If the 
experimenter is perceived as the source of the interruption, they may not hold the target 
responsible for suspending the interaction, and therefore feel less obliged to be polite. Thus, 
to create seemingly natural interruptions, we used a similar setup as Chevalley and 
Bangerter (in press), involving a cover story that led targets to believe they were at fault 
because they did not adequately complete a task that preceded the conversation. This 
provided a reason for the experimenter to disturb targets and a reason for targets to 
attribute the cause of disruption to themselves and not to the experimenter. The prior task 
consisted in writing descriptions of two pictures. During the subsequent conversation, the 
experimenter entered the target's room on two occasions and pretended that it was 
impossible to code some answers from the descriptions because the target's descriptions 
were unclear. He then asked the target to clarify either the spelling of a word or the meaning 
of a phrase. To answer the experimenter, targets had to suspend their conversation with 
their partner. We also interrupted the same person twice, once as a listener and once as a 
narrator, to avoid "cancelling out" face threat. Thus, conversational role was a within-
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subjects factor, while duration (short versus long interruptions) was a between-subjects 
factor. 
The conversational task used by Chevalley and Bangerter (in press) consisted of 
asking partipants to talk about a prespecified topic for 12 minutes. It was not well-adapted 
to manipulation of interruptions according to conversational role, because turns at talk were 
short. Thus, the floor changed rapidly and it was impossible to time interruptions to 
correspond to the precise moment the target was speaking or listening. In this study, we 
adopted a close-call-story paradigm (Chovil, 1989, 1991; Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2000). 
Participants in a dyadic conversation take turns telling each other a story where something 
bad (e.g., an accident) almost occurred, but where everything finally turned out all right. 
Participants are asked to describe the story in detail, and thus this paradigm has the effect of 
having participants firmly adopt the roles of narrator and listener for several minutes. We 
asked unacquainted pairs to tell, in turns, a close call story to each other, interrupting the 
target twice, once as a listener and once as a narrator.  
6.4 Method 
6.4.1 Design 
The design was a 2 X 2 mixed factorial with duration (short vs. long) as a between-
subjects factor and conversational role when interrupted (narrator vs. listener) as a within-
subjects factor. Thus, for all pairs, the target was interrupted twice during the conversation, 
once as a narrator and once as a listener (order was counterbalanced). Half the sample was 
interrupted for a short duration and the other half for a long duration. 
Participants. Eighty-four unacquainted native French speakers participated in 42 pairs 
in exchange for 10 Swiss Francs. 
Procedure and materials. Participants arrived in separate rooms to keep them from 
meeting each other before the study. They filled out consent forms. Then they were 
instructed about how to complete the first (bogus) task and the subsequent phone 
conversation task. In the first task, participants wrote a one-page story describing each of 
two pictures. When they were finished, the experimenter collected the descriptions. 
Participants were told the descriptions would be coded during their phone conversation, and 
that they would be informed in case of a problem. This set the stage for the interruption 
later on. 
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For the conversation task, participants talked about a close-call event they had 
experienced. They were given examples of such events and instructed to narrate the event 
in detail, as if they were talking to a close friend.  Participants were invited to converse freely 
with the narrator when in the listening role. They each recalled such an event before the 
conversation was initiated. They discussed using USB phones and Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) software. We recorded their conversation on a third computer and filmed 
the target’s room with a video camera mounted with a wide angle lens. Participants knew 
they being recorded but not that they were monitored in real time. After 6 minutes of the 
first story, the experimenter asked participants to switch narrators, and after 6 minutes of 
the second story, the experimenter stopped the experiment. Participants were debriefed 
and asked if they suspected that the interruptions had been staged. None did. 
The target (determined randomly) was interrupted twice, once as narrator and once 
as listener. The interruptions took place about 90 seconds after the beginning of each story. 
To interrupt the target, the experimenter monitored the conversations, timing his entry into 
the targets' room to disrupt them while they were either speaking or listening. We 
manipulated the duration of the suspension by bringing up a problem related to one of the 
targets’ descriptions. In both duration conditions, the experimenter opened the door of the 
target’s room, entered, approached the target and said excuse me. For the short 
interruption, the experimenter then asked the target a yes/no question about one of the 
target’s descriptions. For the long interruption, the experimenter asked the target an open-
ended question about one of the descriptions. The experimenter acknowledged the targets’ 
explanation, thanked them, and left the room. We pre-tested these procedures to produce 
interruptions of approximately 10-15 seconds in the short condition and approximately 45 
seconds in the long condition. 
6.4.2 Data preparation 
Recordings were transcribed in full (both primary and secondary conversations) and 
checked by a third party, using Praat 4.3.01 (Boersma & Weenink, 2007). Onset and offset of 
simultaneous speech was underlined. Continuing speech was indicated by "--". Disfluencies 
were also transcribed (e.g., fillers like uh or um). Comments were inserted in brackets. 
6.4.3 Dependent measures 
We coded variables related to politeness (Hypotheses 1 and 3) and reinstatement 
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(Hypothesis 2). All variables involving subjective assessments were coded by two judges for 
at least two-thirds of the data set. For dichotomous assessments, we report Cohen's kappa 
as a measure of agreement. For interval-scaled assessements, we report correlation 
coefficients as a measure of agreement. 
Politeness. We followed Brown and Levinson's (1987) definition of politeness acts, 
their basic feature being an indirect or less than maximally efficient (Grice, 1975) way of 
requesting suspension. In the current corpus, such acts included hold on, interrogative form 
(can I ask you to), please, expressions of time (a sec, a minute), mitigations (just), 
justifications, thanks, and apologies. For example, Excerpt 1 features the following acts of 
politeness on Ann’s part: Can you hang on just a minute (Turn 18; coded as interrogative 
form, hang on, mitigation and expression of time), thank you (Turn 20), and I’m sorry (Turn 
20.4). 
We coded for the presence or absence of each type of act for each interruption, both 
at suspension and reinstatement. Interrater agreement was high for coding presence or 
absence of each act (Cohen's kappa values between .70 and .94, all ps < .001). We then 
tallied these acts to create an interval-scaled measure of the amount of politeness. We also 
computed the number of words used for polite acts before and after suspension. Interrater 
agreement was high, r(28) = .85, p < .001.  
Reinstatement. We measured verbal effort of reinstatement in three different ways. 
First, we coded the number of words devoted to meta-communication, defined as explicit 
signalling of problems in reconstructing the topic (e.g., Where was I?). By these acts, 
participants can solicit help from their partner (Goodwin, 1987). By Hypothesis 2, longer 
interruptions should lead to more meta-communication than shorter interruptions. 
Interrater agreement was high, r(28) = .95, p < .001. Second, we coded how far back in the 
conversation partners repeated utterances when reinstating (rank of repeated utterances). 
To do this, we segmented and numbered utterances before the interruption. This created a 
ranking of previous utterances (i.e., the last utterance before the interruption, the second 
last one, and so on). The higher the rank, the more remote the previous utterance is from 
the point of interruption. We computed the rank of the utterance partners referred to at 
topical reinstatement. This measures how far back in the narration the partners have to go 
to be able to continue their story (and, indirectly, how they abandon current commitments 
and revert to prior commitments). If partners continued without repeating what they had 
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previously narrated, then this rank was zero. In Excerpt 1, the rank of repeated utterances is 
2, because the utterance reinstating topical talk So, uh, {pause 1.60 s lipsmack} uh, not, not 
growing up familiar with here (Turn 23), repeats the next-to-last utterance before the 
interruption And, uh, but grew up in, uh, Iowa on a farm (Turn 15).  Interrater agreement 
was high (r = .97, p < .001). By Hypothesis 2, longer interruptions should increase the rank of 
repeated utterances. Third, we coded the degree of verbatim repetition, defined as the 
number of consecutive words (at least two) in the first topical utterance at reinstatement 
that are repetitions of utterances preceding the suspension. Interrater agreement was 
satisfactory (r = .71, p < .001). By Hypothesis 2, longer interruptions should lead to less 
verbatim repetition, as it is less likely that the verbatim structure of a prior utterance is kept 
in memory (Altmann & Trafton, 2002). 
6.4.4 Manipulation check  
We checked whether the manipulation of duration was successful by computing the 
duration of each suspension, not including steps to suspend and reinstate the primary 
conversation. This was defined as the interval between the offset of the last word by the 
target before the suspension of the primary conversation and the onset of the first word by 
the target reinstating the primary conversation. For example, in Excerpt 1, this duration is 
defined by the offset of you in Turn 20 and the onset of I’m in Turn 20.4. As expected, short 
suspensions (M = 5.8 s, SD = 2.6 s) were significantly shorter than long suspensions (M = 34.3 
s, SD = 10.3 s), F(1,40) = 204.6, p < .0001, p
2  = .84.  
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Politeness (Hypotheses 1 and 3) 
Over all 84 interruptions, the most frequent acts of politeness were apologies (88% of 
interruptions), followed by justifications (87%), just a second/moment (48%), wait (45%), and 
mitigations (38%). To test Hypotheses 1 and 3, we ran 2 (Duration: Long vs. Short) X 2 (Role: 
Narrator vs. Listener) X 2 (Moment: Suspension vs. Reinstatement) mixed ANOVAs on each 
of the two dependent variables (number of politeness acts and number of words).  
There was a significant main effect of role on politeness acts, F(1,40) = 20.5, p < .001, 
p
2
  = .34, as well as a significant main effect of moment, F(1,40) = 120.8, p < .001, p
2
  = .75, 
and a marginally significant interaction between role and moment, F(1,40) = 3.17, p = .082, 
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p
2
  = .074. There was no main effect of duration on politeness, F(1,40) = 0.005, ns, nor were 
any other interactions significant. Means are shown in Figure 7. Thus, supporting Hypothesis 
3, listeners were more polite than speakers, especially at suspension. Contrary to Hypothesis 
1, however, duration did not affect politeness. Interestingly, more politeness acts were 
produced at suspension than at reinstatement, as indicated by the main effect of moment 
described above. 
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Figure 7. Mean number of politeness acts at suspension and reinstatement for short 
and long interruptions of narrators and listeners. 
Analysis of the number of words devoted to politeness revealed similar results. There 
was a significant main effect of role on politeness acts, F(1,40) = 14, p = .001, p
2
  = .26. 
Listener used more words (M = 24.1 words, SD = 17.4) than narrators (M = 12.5 words, SD = 
9.4). And there was a significant main effect of moment, F(1,40) = 7.23, p = .01, p
2
  = .15. 
Pairs used more words at suspension (M = 10.8, SD = 6.4) than at reinstatement (M = 7.5, 
SD). The marginally significant interaction between role and moment reported above was 
not found, F(1,40) = .14, ns. There was no main effect of duration on politeness, F(1,40) = 
0.05, ns, nor were any other interactions significant. Thus, again, Hypothesis 3 was 
supported, but Hypothesis 1 was not. 
6.5.2 Reinstatement of the primary conversation (Hypothesis 2) 
To test Hypothesis 2, we ran 2 (Duration: Long vs. Short) X 2 (Role: Narrator vs. 
Listener) ANOVAs on the three dependent variables.  
There was a significant main effect of duration on meta-communication (expected 
according to Hypothesis 2), with more words devoted to meta-communication after long 
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interruptions (M = 2.12 words, SD = 3.02) than short ones (M = .95 words, SD = 2.16), F(1,40) 
= 4.93, p = .032, p
2
  = .11. There was also an unpredicted marginally significant main effect 
of role, with more words devoted to meta-communication when narrators were interrupted 
(M = 2.14 words, SD = 3.07) than when listeners were (M = .93 words, SD = 2.27), F(1,40) = 
3.72, p = .061, p
2
  = .09. There was no interaction between the two variables. 
There was also a significant main effect of duration on the rank of repeated 
utterances, which was higher for long interruptions (M = 3.5 utterances, SD = 3.5) than for 
short ones (M = 2.1 utterances, SD = 1.8), F(1,40) = 5.9, p = .02, p
2
  = .13. Thus, for longer 
interruptions, partners repeated utterances from earlier in the narrative than for shorter 
interruptions. This supports Hypothesis 2. There was no significant effect of role, nor was 
there an interaction. 
Finally, there was a significant main effect of duration on the number of consecutive 
words repeated (verbatim repetition), with more words repeated for short interruptions (M 
= 2.2 words, SD = 2.6) than long ones (M = 1.2 words, SD = 2.1), F(1,40) = 5.5, p = .024,  p
2
  = 
.12). This supports Hypothesis 2. There was no significant effect of role, nor was there an 
interaction. 
6.6 Discussion 
In this study, we explored how variables like duration and conversational role affect 
politeness and effort to reinstate telephone conversations. We expected (Hypothesis 1) that 
longer interruptions would lead to more politeness, particularly at reinstatement. We also 
expected (Hypothesis 2) that longer interruptions would lead to more effort at 
reinstatement. Finally, we expected (Hypothesis 3) that narrators would be more polite in 
suspending than listeners. 
Results do not support Hypothesis 1. We found no evidence that the duration of the 
suspension affected the amount of politeness produced. What we did find is that the most 
frequent politeness acts are apologies and justifications. This corresponds to the nature of 
the face threat that interruptions pose. We also found that participants were more polite at 
suspension than at reinstatement. The unexpected absence of an effect of duration on 
politeness partly contradicts findings from the field study and experiment reported by 
Chevalley and Bangerter (in press). They found that long interruptions were related to 
politeness in a field study. In an experiment, they also found that long interruptions led to 
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more politeness words but not to more politeness acts. The present result may be due to 
differences in the conversational tasks. Here, participants were interrupted during the 
narration of close-call stories. These stories are often rather personal and vivid. Participants 
may have preferred applying politeness at suspension and moving on with the story after the 
interruption. Another, substantive interpretation of the results is that the differences in 
duration we studied (under a minute) may have been too small to cause participants to 
show differential politeness behavior. Chevalley and Bangerter’s (in press) proposition that 
face threat increases in direct proportion to the duration of a suspension may not hold for 
short durations. Indeed, for short durations, participants may find it more cumbersome to 
engage in extensive politeness than to simply proceed with reinstating the task. In any case, 
we recommend further exploration of the relationship between the duration of 
interruptions and politeness, as this is a central feature of how suspension and 
reinstatement of collaborative tasks is coordinated. 
Results support Hypothesis 2. We found that collaborative effort to reinstate the 
conversational topic was higher after long interruptions than after short ones. This was 
shown by more meta-communication, by an earlier point in the narrative to which pairs 
returned to at reinstatement, and by less verbatim repetition. These results support 
previous findings by Chevalley and Bangerter (in press), suggesting that for longer 
interruptions, joint commitments to talk about a particular topic must be renegotiated. This 
increased effort seems to result from both demands on individual memory (measured by 
verbatim repetition) and from coordination of common ground (measured here by meta-
communication).  
Additionally, we unexpectedly found that interruptions of narrators led to more 
meta-communication, although this effect was marginally significant. It may be that 
interrupting the narrator is more disruptive for topic reinstatement than interrupting the 
listener. Interestingly, narrators and listeners recurrently collaborated in reinstating the 
topic. This can change the course of the narrative, as illustrated by the two following 
excerpts. 
Excerpt 2: Pair 51 (Long interruption of narrator) 
23 Narrator Okay so uh right uh where was I 
24 Listener Um you were saying that that your father was screaming when uh  
   when the rescuers tried to put him on the stretcher 
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25 Narrator And then afterwards well they put him on the stretcher [continues] 
In this Excerpt, in Turn 23, the narrator reinstates the conversation. He exhibits 
diffluent speech (so uh right uh) before explicitly asking the listener for help in 
reconstructing the topic. The listener obliges in Turn 24 by summarizing the gist of what the 
narrator had been telling when the experimenter entered the room, whereupon the 
narrator continues with the story. Thus, listeners have the possibility to influence the way 
speakers continue by highlighting or glossing a particular aspect through their summaries. In 
the next excerpt, both listener and narrator contribute parallel versions to the reinstated 
topic. 
Excerpt 3: Pair 11 (Long interruption of narrator) 
28 Narrator I resume [laughs] 
29 Listener [laughs] 
30 Narrator And so they passed where was I they passed themselves off as the 
police 
31 Listener Yeah we were there 
32 Narrator Right and then they said we had a – 
33 Listener [inaudible] Called his girlfriend 
34 Narrator The guy who 
35 Listener actually 
36 Narrator Right they he called in fact it was three sisters [continues] 
Here, in 30, the narrator starts to continue the story, then self-interrupts to ask 
himself where was I before continuing. In 31, the listener answers the narrator’s query (yeah 
we were there). The narrator acknowledges this answer (32, right) and continues. But the 
listener offers his own version summarizing the talk before the interruption (33 and 35; 
called his girlfriend actually). Listener and narrator speak simultaneously before the narrator 
continues with the story in 36. Excerpts 2 and 3 thus illustrate how participants must jointly 
commit anew to a particular perspective on the narrative. During this process, listeners can 
become, for a short time, co-narrators of an event they have themselves not witnessed 
(Goodwin, 1987). These results complement and extend previous findings on the role of 
listeners as co-narrators (Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson, 2000) by showing that listeners can 
participate in a more active way than previously demonstrated.  
Finally, our results support Hypothesis 3. We found that listeners were more polite in 
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suspending than narrators. This is because listeners need to interrupt the narrator and take 
over the floor before proposing the suspension, whereas narrators already have the floor 
and just need to interrupt themselves. Listeners differed in the strategies by which they took 
the floor. One strategy is to wait for a potential point of utterance completion, (i.e., a 
transition-relevance place; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), acknowledge the narrator’s 
utterance, and then suggest suspending. This strategy is illustrated in Excerpt 4. 
Excerpt 4: Pair 53 (Long interruption of listener) 
101 Narrator Th- the teacher wasn’t there because he said put up the goals then he 
went away uh I don’t know where 
102 Listener Oh yeah right. Hold on t- t- two 
103 Narrator yeah yeah go ahead 
104 Listener seconds there’s she just uh has a question uh 
Here, the listener waits till the narrator completes an utterance, acknowledges (oh 
yeah right) and then uses the floor to request suspension (hold on t- t- two seconds). A 
second, less polite strategy is to directly interrupt the narrator, as in the following Excerpt. 
Excerpt 5: Pair 3 (Long interruption of listener) 
65 Narrator there’s a road uh paved where cars pass and we know that if we follow 
this road we’ll come 
65.1 Listener Sorry but there’s 
65.2 Narrator to the chalet 
66 Listener I have to interrupt you sorry but here’s Sylvie *the experimenter+ who’s 
asking me something wait just 
67 Narrator Yeah 
 Here, the listener interrupts the narrator in the middle of an utterance. This strategy 
is quite disruptive, as suggested by the overlapping speech in 65 and 65.1. It also requires 
the narrator to engage in extensive politeness. For example, the listener apologizes twice, 
once for interrupting the narrator, and once before justifying the suspension. Thus, these 
excerpts illustrate the dilemma of listeners: They can either defer the interruption of the 
primary conversation to an opportune moment (thus keeping the interrupter waiting) or 
accommodate the interrupter, which entails directly cutting into the narrator’s turn at talk. 
Part of this predicament is due to the particularities of telephone conversation. Since the 
physically remote narrator cannot witness the solicitation of the listener by the 
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experimenter, it is the listener’s responsibility as target to alert the narrator. If the narrator, 
experimenter and listener/target were co-present, interrupting the listener would have 
probably been easier. Thus, situational aspects may moderate the relation between 
conversational role and politeness; it seems we have only scratched the surface in exploring 
these factors. 
This study has some limitations. One is the restricted range of the manipulation of 
interruption duration. As discussed above for the case of politeness, the observed 
phenomena may change for longer durations. For example, as duration increases, non-
targeted participants may themselves engage in other activities. As a result, they may be 
unable to aid narrators to reconstruct the topic. Or targets may feel obliged to release their 
partners from waiting on them (e.g., can I call you back?). Such large-scale activity-switching 
behavior is difficult to observe in an experimental setting because it requires breaking the 
frame that implicitly constrains participants' behavior. Another potential limitation of the 
study is also linked to its experimental nature. In spite of our cover story, participants may 
not have attributed as much responsibility for the interruption to the target as they might 
have in real life. This may have affected their behavior, and highlights the difficulty of 
manipulating participants' attributions in experimental settings. 
Despite these limitations, our study makes an important contribution to the as yet 
understudied topic of how collaborative activities are suspended and reinstated. The study 
of collaborative suspension and reinstatement is important because many real-life 
interruptions concern collaborative tasks. For example, in modern work contexts, the 
increasing involvement of workers in multiple parallel projects leads to more and more 
interruptions (Fussell, Kiesler, Setlock, Scupelli, & Weisband, 2004; Gonzalez & Mark, 2005). 
The micro-processes involved in managing these interruptions are still poorly understood.  
Based on our results, we recommend more research on factors related to politeness 
in collaborative suspensions and reinstatements. Politeness is an important factor in 
suspending collaborative tasks in work settings because of ubiquitous status differences. 
Aside from a study in a simulated work setting (Morand, 1996), little is known about how 
politeness interacts with status differences in managing suspensions. Furthermore, in some 
organizational situations, interruptions attain a legitimacy that makes politeness 
unnecessary. For example, the waiter interrupting diners to take their order does not usually 
apologize for interrupting, because doing so is part of his job. But in many organizations, 
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situations are not as clear-cut. Understanding when and how participants jointly construe 
task interruptions as either legitimate or warranting justification could further understanding 
of many work-related processes, from organizational culture or time management (Perlow, 
1999) to stress (Semmer, Jacobshagen, & Meier, 2009). 
Based on our results, we also recommend more research on collaborative topic 
reinstatement. We found that, like individual interruptions, interruptions of collaborative 
tasks are more effortful when duration increases. But this surface similarity of effects implies 
some very different processes. In collaborative suspensions, cognitive and interpersonal 
processes interact. For example, we showed that narrators can enlist listeners' help in topic 
reconstruction. At a first glance, this could be likened to the effect of a contextual cue that 
aids goal retrieval (Hodgetts & Jones, 2006b): narrators use listeners as cues to retrieve the 
topic. But analysis of the actual dialogue reveals that listeners can become co-narrators that 
actively influence topic reconstruction, especially since they may pursue their own 
conversational goals that are only partly aligned with narrators’ (Russell & Schober, 1999). In 
general, then, collaborative suspensions add a supplementary degree of complexity to 
interruption phenomena in individual tasks. Factors that moderate the disruptiveness of 
interruptions in individual situations (e.g., location in the task, interruption lag) should also 
be tested in collaborative situations to better understand how participants manage them. 
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7.1 Abstract 
People can be interrupted in joint activities. Not much is known about collaborative 
process when pairs are interrupted. We propose that pairs don’t resume tasks, they 
reinstate them. Pairs need to reconstruct common ground before they continue their tasks. 
We investigated the process of reinstating joint tasks in two experiments. Pairs of 
participants performed map tasks without seeing each other. In both experiments, they 
were interrupted several times, at different moments in the task, and for different durations. 
Also, in the first experiment, not all participants were distracted during interruptions, and in 
the second experiment, participants shared their workspace. Our results show that 
reinstating is a collaborative activity. Pairs were opportunistic and used evidence to continue 
with the least cost. In particular, collaborative costs were less important when interruptions 
were short, at the end of sub-tasks, and when pairs could see the state of the task. 
7.2 Introduction 
How do two people manage to resume a collaborative task after they have been 
interrupted? We provide an account for the collaborative process of reinstating joint 
activities. We show how common ground is incrementally reconstructed based on evidence 
of mutual assumptions of states of joint tasks. Current literature doesn’t account for 
collaborative process in joint task reinstatement. We present evidence of how people 
reconstruct common ground in two experimental studies. 
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7.2.1 Interrupting individual activities 
Interruptions of activities are commonplace. These interruptions can be beneficial for 
exchanging information, but also they can cost time, productivity and create errors (Jett & 
George, 2003; Eyrolle & Cellier, 2000; McFarlane & Latorella, 2002). People can be engrossed 
in professional activities when they are disrupted by other’s solicitations, electronic mail, 
phone calls, or presence (Gonzales & Mark, 2005; Perlow, 1999). When they are interrupted, 
people have to transit from their primary activity to secondary activities and later return to 
their primary activity (Miyata & Norman, 1986; Altmann & Trafton, 2002). These transitions 
are called interruption and resumption lags. During those, people suspend their goals, 
change their focus of attention, perform new actions, and later, change their focus of 
attention and reactivate suspended goals (Miyata & Norman, 1986, Altman & Trafton, 2002; 
Hodgetts & Jones, 2006a, 2006b). In discourse, individuals can also change their focus of 
attention on different topics, and later reactivate previous intentions (Grosz & Sidner, 1986, 
Levelt, 1989). These accounts assume people can retrieve goals that have not been 
accomplished (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Altmann and Trafton (2002) have 
proposed a goal activation model which predicts decay of goals over time. Costs of switching 
activities and reactivating suspended goals apply to individuals involved in joint activities, 
but these processes alone cannot explain the coordination taking place during interruptions 
of collaborative activities. 
7.2.2 Suspending joint activities  
Interruptions of joint activities are commonplace too. People can be interrupted by a 
third party, when they are interacting with other people. Despite the commonality of such 
situations, little is known as to how two people cope with interruptions. Interruptions 
require partners to stop their primary activity, so one of the two can address the 
interrupting matter (second activity), before they can continue with their activity again. The 
person who is solicited by the interruption can’t merely interrupt and resume the joint 
activity, alone. Partners who are involved in joint activities need to coordinate their joint 
actions (Clark, 1996). They need to jointly suspend and later jointly reinstate their activity 
(Chevalley & Bangerter, in press). Suspension and reinstatement phases are collaborative 
processes. 
Suspending and reinstating joint activities are negotiated by partners (Chevalley & 
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Bangerter, in press). When partners collaborate together, they commit to a common 
purpose (Clark, 2006). They do so and expect the same from their partners. They commit 
jointly. Because of that, their resources are bound. They rely on each other’s presence, time 
and actions to accomplish their common purpose. Partners cannot act and succeed alone. 
They need to coordinate their joint actions. Partners commit for the purpose of 
accomplishing joint projects. To do so, they commit to a series of related joint projects. So 
projects and sub-projects stack up and persist until the joint activity is successfully 
completed (Clark, 2006).  
Suspending joint commitments has collaborative costs (Chevalley & Bangerter, in 
press; Bangerter, Chevalley & Derouwaux, in press). People’s bound resources, persistence 
and stacking up of joint projects are properties of joint commitments (Clark, 2006). These 
constraints make joint activities harder to break than individual activities.  
When partners need to suspend their joint commitments, they have to solve face and 
grounding problems.  
When partners have to suspend, they need to assess face threat, and possibly 
redress face. By definition, interruptions happen unexpectedly. They put a time pressure on 
partners to suspend their current joint commitment. Partners expect equitable treatment in 
their joint activity (Clark, 1996). They also have negative face and positive face (Brown & 
Levinson, 1987). They don’t like to have their freedom constrained and they don’t like to 
have their self-worth neglected. These two faces are threatened when partners give up their 
commitments (Clark, 2006). Chevalley and Bangerter (in press) found that partners engage in 
negative face threat strategies, such as minimizing imposition, apologizing, or providing 
justifications. These strategies can take place at suspension and reinstatement. Polite acts 
seem to depend on situational factors. They found that partners were proportionally more 
polite with longer suspensions, and also, listeners had more trouble initiating suspensions. 
Listeners were more polite than speakers. This effect of role was also found between 
listeners and narrators (Bangerter, Chevalley & Derouwaux, in press).  
When partners have to suspend, they also need to stop their contributions to joint 
projects. Then later on, because their joint commitments persisted during interruption, they 
need to reactivate their stack of joint project and reinstate their common ground (Chevalley 
& Bangerter, in press; Bangerter et al., in press). In Chevalley and Bangerter (in press), pairs 
used a great deal of collaborative effort to repeat information that was previously uttered. 
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Duration of suspension had detrimental effect on the collaborative effort. In the following 
studies, we aim to find more evidence about the process of reinstatement of joint projects. 
7.2.3 Collaborating with joint activities 
We argue that reinstating joint activities is a collaborative process. When partners 
reinstate, they reactivate a stack of joint projects. And then they need to reconstruct 
common ground to be able to continue with a new relevant contribution. But before we get 
to the reinstatement process, we need to take a look at how partners negotiate joint 
projects. 
Pairs commit to contribute to a joint purpose. To do that they take part of a series of 
projects and sub-projects that are nested within each other. These stack up and form an 
emerging structure. To go through it, pairs move hierarchically and sequentially by entering, 
negotiating and exiting each project (Clark, 2006; Bangerter & Clark, 2003). Let’s look at this 
example. 
A and B make plans to go out and have dinner. First, the two agree to plan a rendez-
vous for dinner (level 1 project). To do that, they need to agree on a place and a time to 
meet (level 1.1). These sub-projects are nested in a lower level. Then for each sub-project, 
they may have to agree on related parameters, thus creating lower level sub-projects (level 
1.1.1). For instance, they may need to agree on the type of cuisine and the places they know 
about. These lower level-projects are all joint projects that are negotiated by the partners. 
At this level of the projects, new joint projects can emerge, depending on how partners 
agree on each contribution. All these projects stack up and persist until partners agree on 
each of the joint projects at all levels. When partners complete sub-level projects they also 
fulfill higher up levels. For instance, partners can discuss two different places they know. But 
once they settle on the place they prefer, this level satisfies the higher level of agreeing on 
the place. Higher levels of joint projects are more predictable than lower levels. But this 
depends on the partners’ ability to ground their contributions, in other words, how they 
coordinate the course of their joint actions.  
How do partners coordinate the progress of joint projects? They ground their 
contributions. They collaborate in contributing (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; Sacks, Schegloff, & 
Jefferson, 1974), so that each joint action is interpreted as it is meant to be (Clark, 1996). 
When both know that each knows they have performed a given action, they have 
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established common ground over the course of actions. Common ground provides evidence 
they understand each other for the given purpose of their joint project. And with this 
assumption, they can propose new contributions for their joint projects.  
Partners are following the principle of least collaborative effort (Clark & Brennan, 
1991). Relevant contributions should be produced in a timely manner and carry enough 
information so the partners believe current actions are performed (Clark, 1996). This mutual 
belief, or common ground, depends on evidence that joint actions take place. This depends 
on joint closure of joint actions (Clark, 1996, see Norman, 1988 for the notion of closure). 
When partners reach joint closure, they mutually believe “they have succeeded well enough 
for current purposes” (Clark, 1996, p. 226). This mutual belief about the state of the joint 
actions is the result of successful grounding. Without joint closure, partners cannot progress 
in the task and cannot propose a relevant new contribution.  
7.2.4 Process of reinstating a joint activity 
When partners reinstate, we argue that pairs first need to mutually believe they 
share joint closure over the course of actions. Then, they can propose a relevant 
contribution. In cases of suspensions, each partner may have a different belief about the 
state of their joint project. But partners need to have a common ground to continue. So 
partners may need to clarify each other’s positions in the joint project. 
Let’s look at an example taken from an exchange from our experiments. Here, pairs 
are collaborating on an adaptation of the map task (Anderson et al., 1991), a goal-oriented 
task. An instructor explains to a partner, the path of a segment around dots and pictures on 
a map (see Experiment 1, Method for a detailed description of the procedure): 
Excerpt 1 (translated from French) 
1 I You go down under the word prison 
2 P M-hm  
3 I You go back up uh on the point that’s above on the left of prison 
4 E Stop! [60-second interruption] 
5 E Resume! 
6 I Okay so tell me where you are  
7 P So:  
8 I Where you are located 
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9 P Uh I’m still under prison 
10 I Under prison okay. So you are going uh above the point that’s on the left of 
prison 
11 P  Yeah 
12 I You go… 
 
This exchange refers to the segment in figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Segment of a map. 
In this example, line 1, the instructor proposes a move You go down under the word 
prison, and the partner takes it up M-hm, line 2. This is a complete adjacency pair and thus a 
grounded step. Then, the instructor proposes the next move You go back up uh on the point 
that’s above on the left of prison, line 3. He finishes his proposal, but it doesn’t get taken up 
by the partner. They are interrupted by the experimenter who says Stop! After 60 seconds of 
undertaking a secondary task, the experimenter says Resume! This signals the pairs to 
continue with the primary task. Here, the instructor initiates reinstatement, Okay so tell me 
where you are, line 6, which overlaps with the partner’s attempt to reinstate So, line 7. Then, 
the instructor repeats his question, line 8. The partner answers Uh I’m still under prison, line 
9. Then, the instructor acknowledges the partner’s position Under prison okay. Up to this 
point what is repeated was already in common ground before the interruption. This 
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repetition refers to lines 1 and 2. Then the instructor continues and repeats the move at line 
3 that did not get construed and mutually understood. He repeats almost the same 
contribution So you are going uh above the point that’s on the left of prison. But now, the 
partner takes it up Yeah, line 10, and so it is now mutually understood and belongs now in 
common ground. In this example, pairs needed several turns to reinstate. They clarified and 
repeated information that was in common ground prior to the interruption. 
As introduced earlier, pairs jointly commit to a series of joint projects and negotiate 
the course of their actions by grounding each contribution. Joint projects and sub-projects 
stack up and persist until commitments are fulfilled. In our example, the task can be 
decomposed into maps, and then paths and segments of paths. In the excerpt, the instructor 
and the partner negotiate a sub-part of a segment. They are deeply engrossed in their 
commitments. They have stacked up several levels of commitments. They are negotiating 
moves around landmarks (drawings and dots). Before the interruption, both agreed to move 
to a position near a landmark (Under the word prison followed by M-hm). But then the next 
move gets disrupted by the experimenter. The partner can’t take up the proposal to move 
above the point. They are in the middle of an adjacency pair, and the first part is left open. 
At reinstatement, the partner can’t take up on the instructor’s proposal. This suggests that 
joint closure is lost. The instructor then tries to figure out where his partner is. The partner 
indicates he is still positioned where the previous grounded exchange led him to be. The 
instructor agrees with the partner’s position. This creates closure on the completed actions 
and then provides the opportunity for a relevant new contribution. The reposition to a joint 
action completed earlier in the task provides the opportunity to repeat the contribution that 
the partner could not take up earlier. The repetition of the utterance becomes now salient 
and appropriate, for the current purpose of actions. In previous studies, we found that 
speakers (Chevalley & Bangerter, in press) and narrators (Bangerter et al., in press) tried to 
repeat earlier utterances after interruptions. 
Joint closure is only given when both partners assume they share the same state of 
the task and understand which next relevant action needs to be performed. We suggest that 
when a proposition can’t be grounded, it’s likely to be repeated. Moreover, if the last action 
can’t be grounded, pairs will likely repeat information in common ground to regain closure 
on previous actions. We propose the following principle: when partners need closure on 
previous actions, they will likely revert to earlier actions that are in common ground. 
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People may repeat previously uttered information when they assume their partner 
will make sense of it. Speakers prefer to prevent problems of understanding (Clark, 1994), to 
minimize cost of grounding. Likewise, speakers prefer to restart their utterances than having 
to repair them with others (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977; Levelt, 1989, Clark & Wasow, 
1998). These repetitions can also depend on conceptual pacts pairs have come up with. 
These pacts set precedents for using referents in the history of joint projects (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996). They constrain and provide evidence for the process of grounding. We presume 
this phenomenon should apply to reinstatements of previous contributions. 
Available evidence of common ground should help in regaining joint closure. Some 
evidence comes from the state of the task. At each moment, pairs can refer to the current 
course of actions and rely on evidence about where they are in the task. Completing sub-
tasks provides perceptual evidence about the progress of the task. Evidence can also be 
provided by utterances. But since speech is evanescent, salience might rapidly decrease. 
Maintaining closure on speech acts is hard.  
Pairs coordinate their actions as they enter into each new joint commitment. These 
are incremental and hierarchical (Clark, 2006). They stack up and provide evidence of the 
state of the task. In early commitments, evidence of completion comes from completions of 
sub-tasks. But as pairs enter in sub-tasks, course of actions become more fine grained and 
complex. Units of actions become shorter and evolve constantly. At this stage, evidence of 
the state of the task may be scarce.  
Different sets of evidence are available at different moment of completion of a task. 
For instance, when pairs are in the midst of coordinating a joint action (e.g., a move before 
drawing a segment of a path), they may take few turns before any action is taken. During 
these moments, evidence then comes from what the pairs have uttered. But when pairs 
have completed a task, they have completed related actions (e.g., the end of a path, with 
visible landmarks and location). Representations of tasks are more salient when tasks are 
completed (Zacks & Tversky, 2001). In the map task, completions of moves are salient and 
visible. The path and landmarks are cues of what has been done and what is currently 
undertaken. 
7.2.5 Hypotheses 
At reinstatement, joint closure of course of actions should be more given when joint 
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actions and joint projects are completed, than when joint actions have not yet been taken 
up. In the latter case, pairs may not remember previous utterances. They might then revert 
to an earlier state of the task where common ground is assumed. 
Similarly, in the task interruption literature, interruptions are more detrimental 
within tasks than at task boundaries (Hodgetts & Jones, 2006a; Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004; 
Miyata & Norman, 1986), because fewer suspended goals need to be reactivated. Then, 
when pairs are interrupted mid-way in a task, there should be more goals to reactivate than 
at the end of a task. Likewise, pairs should share less evidence about the state of the task at 
mid-task than at the end of a task. Thus, we hypothesize that reinstatements should be more 
effortful at mid-task than end-task (Hypothesis 1, Timing).  
Common ground is also likely to decay over time. Speech is evanescent and pairs may 
not remember what they have uttered last or what they have agreed upon. In the task 
interruption literature, individuals recall less well previous intentions, because activated 
goals decay over time (Altmann & Trafton, 2002). In Chevalley and Bangerter (in press), pairs 
continued with new utterances that were locally less relevant after long suspensions (23%), 
than short ones (59%) and expressed more coordination loss. In another experiment, 
Bangerter et al. (in press) found similar effects of duration on coordination loss. In that 
experiment, pairs seemed to revert to earlier utterances in the discussions more often after 
long interruptions than short ones. Thus, we hypothesize that reinstatements should be 
more effortful after long interruptions than short ones (Hypothesis 2, Duration). 
Now, Timing of interruptions and their Duration may well interact. It might be harder 
to reinstate at Mid-task and when interruptions last longer, as in Hodgetts and Jones 
(2006a).  
In Bangerter et al. (in press), partners acted as co-narrators when narrators showed 
trouble to reinstate their stories (Goodwin, 1987). This was particularly the case at 
reinstatement. Partners acted as placeholders. So, partners who are not distracted during 
the interruptions might help reconstruct the state of the task. In task interruption literature, 
cues provide opportunities to prepare for interruptions. They allow participants to rehearse 
task goals and decrease resumptions lags (Trafton, Altmann, Brock and Mintz, 2003; 
Hodgetts & Jones, 2006b). Thus, we hypothesize that reinstatement should be more effortful 
when both participants are distracted than when only one of them is (Hypothesis 3, Target). 
Also, sharing a workspace provides evidence of the state of the task and helps 
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collaboration (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Krych, 2004). Visual cues and seeing partners 
provide the advantage of multimodal communication, via actions, gesture and pointing (e.g., 
Bavelas & Chovil, 2000; Bangerter 2004; Clark & Krych, 2004). When participants share a 
workspace, evidence of each other’s actions should be more prominent. Thus, common 
ground should be more intact, and reinstatements should be less extensive, than when 
participants don’t share a workspace. In task interruption literature, contextual cues provide 
opportunities to rehearse and later retrieve goals. When participants can rehearse task 
goals, resumption lags are shorter (Trafton, Altmann, Brock & Mintz, 2003; Hodgetts & 
Jones, 2006b). So we predict that visual evidence will help participants figure out the state of 
the task. Thus, we hypothesize that reinstatement is more effortful when partners cannot 
see each other, than when they share a workspace (Hypothesis 4, Workspace visibility). 
7.3 Experiment 1 
We studied the effect of Timing, Duration and Target of interruptions on 
collaborative effort at reinstatement. We interrupted pairs collaborating on an adaptation of 
the map task (Anderson et al., 1991). We segmented this task into series of sub-tasks, so we 
could precisely manipulate the Timing and the Duration of interruptions. The task was 
divided into 5 maps and 20 path segments. Timing, Duration and Target were manipulated 
the following way: Interruptions occurred either in the middle of a segment or at the end of 
a segment (Timing); interruptions lasted either 3 seconds or 30 seconds (Duration); and the 
instructor, or the partner or both participants (Target) performed a secondary task during 
interruptions. 
Our design was a 2x2x3 full factorial plan. Two factors, Timing (Mid- vs. End-task 
interruption) and Duration (3-second vs. 30-second interruption), were fully crossed and 
repeated 4 times for each pair of participants. Then another factor, Target (instructor, 
partner or both doing secondary task) was treated in separate groups of pairs. 
7.3.1 Method  
Participants. Thirty pairs of unacquainted French-speaking students participated in 
exchange for 10 Swiss francs. They were close in age (age 19-25). There were as many men 
as women. Participants were randomly assigned to pairs and pairs were randomly assigned 
to each of the 3 target conditions (10 pairs per condition).  
Task. We used the material of the map task (Anderson et al., 1991), and made some 
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new images. We created 5 maps (A3 size) containing 4 path segments each (see Appendix 1). 
Each segment started and ended at a black point. Segments followed each other, so that the 
end point of a first segment was the beginning point of the second segment. Between 
beginning and end points, segments passed by two drawings and 3 other similar points. No 
segment looked the same. The segments constituted sub-tasks of the map task, and were 
explicitly delimited by the points. This allowed us to manipulate the Timing of interruptions.  
Setting. Pairs of participants sat across from each other at a large table (2 by 1 
meter). They were separated by a large screen across the table. This prevented them from 
seeing each other. Partners had in front of them empty maps and a large pen. Instructors 
had identical maps except that segments were already drawn. Depending on the Target 
condition, the person who had to perform a secondary task during interruptions had also a 
printed text on the side of the table and a pen. 
Adjacent to the table, behind a large screen, the experimenter monitored the 
experiment and videotaped the pairs. On the side of the table, two cameras were pointing 
down on both maps, from a bird’s eye view. The two pictures were integrated on a split 
screen and recorded on digital tapes.  
Procedure. Pairs filled out consent forms and were instructed about the task. They 
were told to collaborate on the task to reproduce identical path segments on their partner’s 
map. They were shown an example of how the segments looked and how they had to 
complete the task. Then they were told they would be interrupted by the experimenter. 
They were asked to stop immediately when they heard “stop”, and to resume their joint 
task, when they heard “resume”. They were told not to talk to each other during the 
interruptions. Targets were asked to perform the secondary task as fast as they could. They 
were told to cross out all instances of the letter “e” in a printed text, with a pen. After the 
experiment, participants were debriefed about the experiment objectives and questions 
were answered. 
Manipulation of timing and duration. The experimenter monitored utterances to 
time interruptions. End-task interruptions took place right after pairs agreed they had 
finished a segment, in other words when they had closed the joint action. Here’s an 
example: The instructor utters: “and that’s your end-point, okay?” to which the partner 
replies: “um yeah, okay”. Then the experimenter says: “Stop”. Mid-task interruptions took 
place during a path-segment. Pairs were stopped right at the end of an utterance referring 
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to the second point near the segment. Here is another example: The instructor utters: “All 
right and then you go between the water pump and the point on the right.” Then the 
experimenter says: “stop”. So at end-segment, pairs had completed a segment. At mid-
segment pairs were in the middle of an ongoing action. In terms of level of actions, End-task 
interruptions are located at a closed and grounded action at an upper level. Mid-task 
interruptions are located mid-way through an adjacency pair and therefore in the midst of 
grounding a joint action. Finally manipulation of Duration was straightforward. The 
experimenter timed the interruption and asked pairs to resume after 3 (Short) or 30 (Long) 
seconds.  
Timing and duration were completely crossed, forming 4 conditions: Mid-task & Long 
interruptions, Mid-task & Short interruptions, End-task & Long interruptions, End-task & 
Short interruptions. The 4 conditions were repeated 4 times each, totaling 16 interruptions 
for each pair of participants. The order of the interruptions was counterbalanced so that 16 
segments of the 20 segments would be interrupted as often in each condition. The order 
was different for each pair. 
Measures. We transcribed videotapes word–for-word for each pair, including 
disfluencies (pauses, auto-corrections and repetitions of syllables). Overlapping speech was 
underlined, and continuing speech was indicated by “-”. We checked interrater agreements 
by double-coding 128 cases (27 % of all cases). We computed Cohen's kappa (Fleiss, 1981) 
coefficients to assess interrater agreement for ordinal variables (acceptance level above > 
.70).  We computed correlation coefficients to assess interrater agreements for numerical 
variables. 
We used the transcriptions for coding 6 measures: number of speaking turns, 
number of instructions repeated, percentage of grounded steps repeated, percentage of 
deictic references, percentage of partners initiating reinstatement, and percentage of 
participants explicitly signaling coordination loss.  
First, we computed the number of speaking turns participants used to come up with 
a new contribution (Interrater agreement: r(128) = .96). We deducted the first turn where 
pairs started reinstating from the turn where a new contribution was made. Typically pairs 
exchanged utterances to find out where they were in the task and/or repeated instructions. 
These exchanges measured directly the extent of collaborative effort to reinstate (Clark & 
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Schober, 1998). We expected pairs to spend more turns at Mid-task and 
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after long interruptions, and when both of them were distracted during interruptions.  
Second, we coded the number of instructions participants repeated (moves and 
positions) to continue the task (Interrater agreements: r(128) = .98 and .96, respectively). 
During the task, pairs spent most turns at identifying landmarks, and then at defining how 
the path is spatially related to landmarks. This two-step sequence occurred through the 
whole task. It was similar to the pattern found in Clark and Krych (2004), where pairs first 
identified a piece and then its position on a Lego construction. We counted each utterance 
referring to previous steps. The repetitions of instructions measured how many previous 
actions need to be reinstated to continue the task. This described the effort of reinstating 
task wise. We expected a pattern similar to speaking turns. 
Third, we computed the percentage of interrupted trials for which previously 
grounded contributions were repeated. A contribution was grounded when it was validated 
explicitly or tacitly by the other person. Referring to information already in common ground 
indicated the need to reconstruct joint closure in common ground (Interrater agreement: 
kappa = .70). By repeating a step already in common ground, a person explicitly refers to a 
state of the task where joint closure could be assumed. We also expected a pattern similar 
to previous measures. 
Fourth, we computed the percentage of repetitions that included deictic reference. 
Deictic expressions refer to contextual information. Their meaning cannot be understood 
without context. They are thus a measure of using shared evidence in common ground. For 
instance, if someone says it’s broken to an interlocutor, it will refer to an object (e.g., a pen) 
that the interlocutor can understand, because it is presumably part of the context 
participants share. Here, we coded cases when a pronoun (it, this, that, there) was used to 
refer to a landmark, or when the landmark was assumed to be known without added 
contextual information (eg. the point only), (Interrater agreement: kappa = .73). We 
expected partners to use deictic reference more frequently when joint closure was still 
available, at End-task and after short interruptions.  
Fifth, we computed the percentage of times partners initiated reinstatement. We 
coded who contributed first, instructors or partners, and computed the number of times 
partners took the floor. In our task, instructors knew the paths and had to instruct their 
partners. This created an asymmetry among pairs. Of course, participants played a crucial 
role as well. They indicated they had understood instructions to instructors (Bavelas, 2000). 
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But generally, instructors initiated moves and identified new goals. When these acts come 
from partners, it indicates a change of role. This happened in Bangerter et al. (in press) and 
we suspected this would be the case again in these experiments. Partners offered help by 
stating where they were or by repeating the instructor’s utterance. We expected these 
initiations more often when both partners were distracted and at End-task and after long 
interruptions. Interrater agreement was not computed for this variable because no 
subjective assessment took place. 
Finally, we computed the percentage of the times either of the participants explicitly 
indicated a coordination loss, for instance, “Where were we” or “where are you”. The 
interrater agreement was low: kappa = .55. These utterances signal uncertainties about what 
is in common ground. It is an explicit measure of loss of closure. It is also a collaborative act, 
because it requires help from partners (Goodwin, 1987). We were expecting this to happen 
particularly at Mid-tasks and after long interruptions. 
7.3.2 Results  
Thirty pairs produced 480 cases of interruptions, 16 per pair (4 conditions repeated 4 
times). The 4 repeated scores were averaged at pair level, creating 1 cell for each condition 
per dependent variable. We then tested all dependent variables with ANOVA. Timing and 
Duration were repeated factors, and Target sub-samples were treated as between subjects. 
As expected, pairs needed more speaking turns to reinstate at Mid-task interruptions 
than at End-task ones and after longer interruptions than shorter ones (Hypotheses 1 and 2). 
There was a significant main effect of Timing, F(1,27) = 24.5, p < .001, a significant main 
effect of Duration, F(1, 27) = 39.1, p > .001, and a significant interaction between the two, 
F(1,27) = 7.9, p > .01. Means are presented in Table 4. Pairs used twice as many turns at Mid-
task than at End-task, and twice as many turns after 30-second interruptions than after 3-
second ones. These results indicate that the effort to reinstate is more important when pairs 
are in the midst of negotiating a sub-task than when a sub-task is closed, and more so when 
interruptions last longer. 
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Table 4. Mean no. of turns (SD) to reinstate as a function of Duration and Timing. 
 Timing 
  Mid-task End-task 
Duration   
 Long (30 s) 2.9 (0.4) 1.2 (0.2) 
 Short (3 s) 1.4 (0.2) 0.5 (0.1) 
 
Timing and Duration affected the mean number of repeated instructions in a similar 
way, consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. There was a significant main effect of Timing, 
F(1,27) = 67.4, p < .0001, a significant main effect of Duration, F(1,27) = 42.8, p < .0001, and a 
significant interaction between the two, F(1,27) = 12.4, p < .01. Means are presented in 
Table 5. Pairs repeated three times more repetitions at Mid-task than at End-task, and twice 
as many repetitions after 30-second interruptions than after 3-second ones. These results 
indicate that pairs spend time repeating topical information as a strategy to reconstruct 
common ground. They do that more often when they are in the midst of negotiating a sub-
task than when a sub-task is closed, and more so when interruptions last longer. 
Table 5. Mean no. of instructions repeated (SD) to reinstate as a function of Timing 
and Duration. 
 Timing 
  Mid-task End-task 
Duration   
 Long (30 s) 2.4 (0.2) 0.9 (0.1) 
 Short (3 s) 1.3 (0.1) 0.5 (0.1) 
 
An additional interaction between Duration and Target was significant. More 
instructions were repeated after long interruptions (M = 2.1, SD = 0.23) than after short ones 
(M = 0.9, SD = 0.13) when both participants were distracted, and likewise when instructors 
were distracted (Long (M = 1.4, SD = 0.24) vs. Short (M = 0.7, SD = 0.14)), but not when 
partners were distracted (Long (M = 1.4, SD = 0.22) vs. Short (M = 1.1, SD = 0.12)), F(1,27) = 
5.5, p = .01 (See Figure 9). Following Hypothesis 3, this result suggests that reinstatement is 
more effortful for both partners than one. It was harder for pairs to reinstate when 
instructors were distracted rather than when partners were. Instructors led exchanges and 
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proposed new goals. They anticipated and coordinated each move, based on evidence of 
partners’ progress. One could assume then that they were more likely to lose joint closure 
than their partners. When partners were distracted, instructors could focus on the course of 
action and their task goals didn’t decay (Hypothesis 3). 
 
Figure 9. Mean number of repeated instructions as a function of Target roles and 
Duration. 
Duration affected the repetition of previously grounded information, according to 
Hypothesis 2. Pairs repeated grounded information more often after 30-second 
interruptions (M = 74%, SD = 4 %) than after 3-second interruptions (M = 50%, SD = 4%), 
F(1,27) = 31.7, p < .0001. There was no main effect of Timing, or any interactions. This 
indicates joint closure about the state of the task decay and needs to be reactivated more 
frequently after long suspensions. 
Timing influenced the use of deictic reference, according to Hypothesis 1. Deixis was 
used more often at End-task interruptions (M = 31%, SD = 5%) than at Mid-task interruptions 
(M = 7%, SD = 2%), F(1,27) = 22.3, p < .0001. There was no main effect of Duration, nor any 
interactions. This indicates that at End-task, participants were more confident that 
information was in common ground. 
Timing and Duration affected signals of coordination loss (e.g., "where were we?") 
according to Hypotheses 1 and 2.  There was a main effect for Duration. Coordination loss 
was more frequently (M = 10%, SD = 2%) after 30-second interruptions than after 3-second 
interruptions (M = 2%, SD = 0.1%), F(1,27) = 14.0, p = .001. An interaction between Timing 
and Duration showed a higher frequency for the Mid-Long interruptions (M = 14%, SD = 4%), 
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compared to End-Long ones (M= 5%, SD = 2%), and both short locations (End-Short & Mid-
Short, both M = 2%, SD = 1%), F(1,27) = 5.1, p < .05. This indicates an added effect of Timing 
over Duration. Long interruptions are more detrimental to joint closure about the state of 
the task, and even more so when interruptions occur in the middle of an ongoing task.  
7.3.3 Discussion 
Results provided support for all hypotheses. We hypothesized that Mid-task 
interruptions were more costly to reinstate, than End-task ones (Hypothesis 1). Indeed, pairs 
needed more turns and repeated more information when they were in the middle of joint 
actions (Mid-task), then where they had closed joint actions (End-task). They also signaled 
more problems to continue after a Mid-task interruption when it was long. They relied more 
on common ground at End-task than at Mid-task. Pairs repeated more grounded information 
at End-task than Mid-task. This was unexpected. Reverting to an earlier step seems to be a 
cost-efficient strategy for pairs to continue the task. Similarly to Clark (1994), participants 
opted for preventing rather than repairing. Participants didn’t take the risk of assuming 
information was in common ground. This seems to apply in particular at the end of the task. 
By referring to the end-point to continue the new task, instructors reactivate joint closure 
over the past joint actions. Pairs seem to use any evidence to maintain common ground 
accuracy. 
We hypothesized that long (30-second) interruptions were more costly to reinstate 
than short (3-second) interruptions (Hypothesis 2). Again, pairs needed more turns, 
repeated more instructions, referred more frequently to information common ground, and 
signaled more often loss of coordination after 30-second interruptions than 3-second ones. 
This suggests that joint closure is still active in partners’ mind after brief interruptions. 
Partners can rely more on mutual assumptions during short distractions and try to continue 
with minimal adjustments. 
Interactions between Timing and Duration showed cumulative effects for the 
collaborative cost. By far, the most difficult condition was interruptions taking place at Mid-
task and for 30 seconds. There, pairs were in the midst of grounding a joint action in a sub-
task. Lasting interruptions seemingly challenged pairs’ unreliable common ground. Then, the 
easiest conditions were End-task interruptions. Duration seemingly had less effect at that 
location of the task. We suggest that more obvious evidence about common ground might 
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compensate for the possible decay of the state of the task and its goals. 
Lastly, only one result supported the assumption of more collaborative costs when 
both partners were distracted than only one (Hypothesis 3). Distracting both participants, or 
the instructors, increased the effort to repeat previous information, but only when 
interruptions lasted 30 seconds. The collaborative effort did not seem to be influenced by 
the target of the interruptions. This suggests that possible asymmetries among participant 
don’t account for the need to reconstruct common ground. Because partners need to 
reconstruct a common ground to continue, the effort remains collaborative, whether 
partners or the instructors are distracted. 
Our results show that reinstating a joint task requires collaborative acts. The 
manipulation of Duration provided contrasting results. The decay of the state of the task 
seemed critical for pairs to continue with a lesser cost. Likewise, the manipulation of Timing 
of interruptions provided contrasting results. Common ground at Mid-task was more difficult 
to reconstruct than End-task.  
7.4 Experiment 2 
The goal of our second experiment was to further test Hypotheses 1 and 2 and 
combine these effects with another contextual parameter. To do that, we manipulated the 
kind of evidence pairs could use to reinstate. Instead of interrupting partners or instructors, 
half the pairs shared workspaces and saw where their partners were in the task (Workspace 
visibility). With this manipulation, we tested Hypothesis 4: Visual evidence should help 
participants reconstruct the state of the task. Thus, we hypothesize that reinstatement is 
more effortful when partners cannot see each other than when they can.  
Timing of interruptions and Hypothesis 1 remained unchanged, but we increased 
Duration of interruptions, to 30 and 60 seconds. In Chevalley and Bangerter (in press), long 
interruptions averaged around 35 seconds. These created more cost for reinstating topics of 
discussions. But it’s not clear whether comparatively longer interruptions would increase 
collaborative costs. Would the relative effect still hold? So, we hypothesize again that with 
longer durations, reinstatements should still be more effortful after long interruptions (60 
seconds) than short ones (30 seconds) (Hypothesis 2). 
7.4.1 Method 
Three parameters were manipulated in a 2x2x2 factorial design: Duration and Timing 
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of interruptions, and Workspace visibility. We kept the same 2x2 configuration for Timing 
and Duration factors: Timing (Mid- vs. End-task) x Duration (30-second vs. 60-second), fully 
crossed and repeated 4 times for each pair. For Workspace visibility, half of the sample could 
not see each other (hidden condition), like in Experiment 1, and the other half could see the 
partners’ map (visible condition). Lastly, we controlled Target factor. In all cases, both 
participants had to perform the secondary task. 
We used the same procedure as in Experiment 1. Noteworthy modifications are 
indicated hereafter. 
Participants. Thirty-two (16 in each of the workspace conditions) unacquainted 
French-speaking pairs of students took part in the experiment.  
Task. We created additional orders of interruptions for additional pairs. 
Setting. The setting was identical, except for pairs in the visible workspace condition. 
In the visible condition, the screen (used for the hidden condition) was removed, allowing 
both partners to see each other. The maps of the experimenter were hidden behind a small 
screen (H:20 x W:40 cm). So partners could only see the instructors’ faces, arms and the top 
of their chest. However, nothing was blocking the instructors’ sight. They could see the 
partners and their maps. 
Procedure and manipulation of timing and duration. The same procedure and 
manipulation took place, except that short interruptions lasted 30 seconds and long 
interruptions lasted 60 seconds. 
Measures. For the purpose of comparing results with Experiment 1, we coded the 
same set of variables, on similar transcriptions, and assumed unchanged interrater 
agreement. 
7.4.2 Results 
Thirty-two pairs produced 512 cases of interruptions. Repeated scores were 
averaged at the pair level. We ran the same analyses as in Experiment 1. Timing and 
Duration were repeated factors, and Workspace visibility was a separate factor.  
Again, according to our hypotheses, pairs needed more speaking turns to reinstate at 
Mid-task interruptions than at End-task ones (Hypothesis 1), and after long interruptions 
than after short ones (Hypothesis 2), but also in the hidden condition than in the visible one 
(Hypothesis 4). There were significant main effects of Timing (F(1,30) = 76.1, p < .001), 
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Duration (F(1,30) = 6.7, p < .02), and Workspace visibility (F(1,30) = 31.5, p < .001). There was 
a significant interaction between Workspace visibility and Timing, F(1,30) = 14.4, p = .001, 
but not for Workspace visibility and Duration (p = .09). Means are reported in Figure 10. 
  
Figure 10. Mean no. of turns to reinstate joint tasks as a function of Workspace 
visibility, Timing and Duration. 
Pairs needed most turns when they were interrupted Mid-task and were in the 
hidden condition. They needed the least turns in the visible condition. On average, they 
needed three times more turns in the hidden condition than in the visible one, and twice 
more turns at Mid-task than at the end. Finally, they needed more turns after 60-second 
interruptions than 30-second ones. This last effect is smaller than the other two, but is 
nevertheless significant. We can see the accumulation of constraints of conditions from the 
right to the left hand side, the hardest condition (Hidden, Mid-task, and Long) standing on 
the left, and the easiest standing on the right (Visibility, End-task, and Short). 
We obtained the same effects for repeated instructions (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4). 
There were significant main effects of Timing, F(1,30) = 93.1, p < .0001, Workspace visibility, 
F(1,30) = 217.4, p < .0001, and a marginal effect of Duration, F(1,30) = 3.9, p = .056. 
Workspace visibility and Timing interaction was significant, F(1,30) = 15.6, p < .0001. The 
means are displayed in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Mean no. of instructions repeated to reinstate joint tasks as a function of 
Workspace visibility, Timing and Duration. 
Patterns are similar between repetitions of instructions and speaking turns, though 
the contrasts are not as important. Pairs repeated more instructions when they were 
interrupted Mid-task and were in the hidden condition. And they repeated less in the visible 
condition. On average, they did that twice more often in the hidden condition than in the 
visible one, and at Mid-task than at End-task. Here again results suggest the collaborative 
effort to reinstate the joint task accumulates through the conditions as they share less 
evidence of where they are in the task. 
Results for repetition of grounded information produced a mixed outcome. As we 
predicted in Hypothesis 4, pairs did repeat grounded information more often in the hidden 
condition (M = 81%, SD =22%) than in the visible one (M = 50%, SD =30%), F(1,30) = 23.2, p < 
.000. But once again Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Timing produced a significant result 
but opposite to the hypothesis. Pairs did not repeat more often at Mid-tasks (M = 57%, SD = 
26%), but rather at End-tasks (M = 74%, SD = 26%), F(1,30) = 16.6, p < .001. Also, the 
Duration manipulation did not produce significant differences for this variable (Hypothesis 2) 
either. Nevertheless, Workspace visibility and Timing produce a significant interaction, 
F(1,30)= 7.5, p = .01. Means are showed in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Mean percentage of repetition of grounded steps (SD) to reinstate as a 
function of Workspace visibility and Timing. 
 Location 
  Mid-task End-task 
Workspace visibility   
 Hidden 72 (26) 90 (19) 
 Visible 42 (25) 58 (34) 
 
These results indicate that pairs needed to reconstruct common ground when they 
were lacking visual cues. The lowest mean score (42%) is in the visible condition. However, 
this is a relatively high “baseline” frequency. This suggests that to reinstate tasks, pairs often 
need to actively reconstruct common ground, in spite of the available evidence about the 
state of the task. 
Timing and Workspace visibility also affected the use of deixis. There was a main 
effect for Workpsace visibility (F(1,30)= 13.7, p < .0001), and a significant interaction 
between Workspace visibility and Timing (F(1,30)= 7.0, p < .02). See Table 7 for means. The 
Duration effect was non-significant (p = .075), though in each cell, there was slightly more 
deictic use after 30-second than 60-second interruptions. In the visible condition, pairs often 
used deictic reference irrespective of whether interruptions were at End- or at Mid-task. But 
then in the hidden condition, the use of deixis dropped considerably, and particularly at Mid-
task. Here, we see the advantage of shared evidence. At End-task, pairs shared a landmark, 
the end point, and they referred to it frequently to coordinate their next move. But at Mid-
task such a placeholder was lacking. 
Table 7. Mean percentage of deictic reference (SD) to reinstate as a function of 
Workspace visibility and Timing. 
 Location 
  Mid-task End-task 
Workspace visibility   
 Hidden 14 (17) 34 (32) 
 Visible 49 (27) 45 (31) 
 
Timing also affected loss of coordination. There were more explicit utterances 
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expressing loss at Mid-task (M = 17%, SD = 21%) than at End-task (M = 0.6%, SD = 13%), 
F(1,30)= 13.8, p = .001). No effect was found for Workspace visibility, nor for Duration. Again, 
lack of evidence of last utterances before interruptions at Mid-task prevents accurate 
representations of states of the task. So when in trouble, interlocutors explicitly ask for help. 
7.4.3 Discussion 
Results replicated findings of our first experiment and provided further support for 
our hypotheses. According to Hypothesis 1, it was more costly for pairs to reinstate at Mid-
task interruptions than at End-task interruptions (Timing). Pairs needed more turns, 
repeated more information, and signaled more problems in midst of a course of joint actions 
(Mid-task), than at the end of a sub-task (End-task). But contrary to our expectations, 
participants repeated information in common ground more often at End-task rather than at 
Mid-task. Also they did not use deictic reference differently at End-task or Mid-task. These 
unexpected results suggest that reverting to a point in common ground or referring to 
information in common ground is a cost-efficient strategy independently of the task state. It 
prevents costly repair afterwards if mutual assumption of common ground was wrong. 
The Duration manipulation provided limited support for Hypothesis 2. There was one 
significant effect with speaking turns, and a marginal one with the repetition of instructions. 
All the other variables did not vary significantly. Scores were often higher in the 60-second 
conditions than in the 30-second one. But differences were too small to produce significant 
differences. These results suggest an added effect of duration over Timing and Workspace 
visibility. The lack of interaction with Workspace visibility and Timing, also indicates that loss 
of goals in memory were not compensated by visual evidence or by easier location in the 
task (End-task). 
According to Hypothesis 4, pairs needed more turns, repeated more instructions, 
repeated more often grounded information, and use less deictic reference when the 
workspace was hidden than when it was visible (Workspace visibility). Pairs did not signal 
fewer loss of coordination in the visible condition. This could indicate that despite visible 
evidence, participants, mostly instructors, needed to be explicit about their intent to 
reinstate the task. For instance, when instructors utter “so where are you”, while looking at 
the partners’ map, they signal collaborative intentions. 
The interactions between Workspace visibility and Timing suggest that pairs use a 
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cost-efficient approach to reinstate. Pairs seem to be opportunistic about the use of 
evidence to assess common ground accuracy. Collaborative effort differences between Mid- 
and End-task were small in the visible condition, but were larger in the hidden condition. In 
the visible condition, visual evidence of the state of the task may compensate for the lack of 
verbal evidence at Mid-task, and even out the advantage of End-task evidences (the end 
point). In contrast, in the hidden condition, only utterances provided evidence. In this 
condition, the End-task positions provided a more confident state of the task than Mid-task 
ones. 
The above results show again that reinstating a joint task requires collaborative acts. 
This time, longer duration didn’t affect as much memory loss about task goals. Instead, 
visibility of the workspace provided a dramatic advantage to the process of collaborative 
reinstatement. Moreover, this advantage was more pronounced at End-task than Mid-task. 
The accumulation of evidence seems crucial for the pair to regain joint closure and 
reconstruct common ground. 
7.4.4 Comparison of Experiment 1 and 2 
A comparison of the two experiments is revealing of influences on collaborative 
effort at reinstatement. In Experiment 1, Timing effects interacted significantly with 
Duration effects. But in our second Experiment, this wasn’t the case anymore. Instead 
Timing effects interacted significantly with Visibility effects. Duration effects were significant 
for speaking turns only. Let’s look at the number of speaking turns in all the conditions (see 
Figure 5).  
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Figure 12. No of speaking turns as a function of Duration, Timing and Workspace 
visibility from Experiment 1 and 2. 
Overall, we can see the added constraints from our manipulations on the effort to 
reinstate. Hidden workspace, Mid-task interruptions, and longer interruptions increased 
turns to reinstate the joint task. But further observations can be made. Consider the 
Duration score in the hidden conditions. There, we can see pairs needed less turns as 
duration decreased. Relatively speaking, duration mattered in each of the Timing conditions. 
But then, the Timing of the interruptions had a significant impact on the collaborative effort, 
irrespective of the durations of interruptions. The same contrast can be made between 
visible and hidden workspaces with the Timing of interruptions. There is no doubt that 
visibility decreased the effort both Mid- and End-task. 
It is worth noting that at End-task, 3-second interruptions cost the same amount of 
turns in the hidden condition (0.5 turns), than the 30-second (0.6 turns) or 60-second (0.8 
turns) interruptions in the visible condition. The same similarity appears at Mid-task. Three-
second interruptions cost the same amount of turns (1.4) in the hidden condition, than 30-
second (1.4) or (1.5) 60-second interruptions in the visible condition. This suggests that 
decay of goals was compensated by visibility of the state of the task. This compensation 
doesn’t hold for longer interruptions in the hidden condition. Hidden constraints added up 
and overcame duration differences. 
7.5 General discussion 
Reinstating a joint activity requires a collaborative effort. It was more effortful for 
pairs to reinstate at Mid-task, rather than at End-task. It was more effortful when pairs 
didn’t see each other, than when they did. And it was more effortful and after 30- and 60-
second interruptions, than after 3-second interruptions. These results support our main 
hypotheses. 
Both results suggest that Timing of interruptions predominantly influenced the effort 
of reinstating joint tasks. The moment of interruption is absolutely constraining. It affects 
the state of the task and thus the related evidence pairs can rely on to reconstruct common 
ground. But then our results indicate two other conditions where participants regain joint 
closure faster. Workspace visibility provides the opportunity to gather visible evidence of the 
task. And short Duration of interruptions prevents decay of task goals. In our experiments, 3-
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second interruptions were as advantageous as seeing workspace with longer interruptions. 
Keeping common ground active relates to time and can be compensated with visible 
evidence. Similarly to other findings (Adamczyk & Bailey, 2004; Altmann & Trafton, 2002; 
Clark & Krych, 2004; Hodgetts & Jones 2006a, 2006b), our results show advantages of visual 
cues, of short interruptions, and of End-task interruptions on collaborative effort at 
reinstatement.  
Participants didn’t merely resume their activities. They needed to reinstate common 
ground, so they could continue their tasks. We proposed that when partners lose common 
ground on their last actions, they would revert to earlier actions to attain joint closure. We 
also suggested that available evidence of the task state helps that process. Our findings 
support this account. Pairs’ actions were opportunistic. They tried to minimize the cost of 
reinstating common ground. When interruptions were brief or when they could see their 
partners’ map, they referred to information in common ground half the time and didn’t need 
to repeat more information. When they lost joint closure, they relied on shared evidence of 
the state of the task. Pairs rarely took the risk to assume information was in common 
ground, when they had no evidence it was the case. They opted for preventing rather than 
repairing errors of understanding (Clark, 1994; Clark & Wasow, 1998). These strategies are 
collaborative acts. They facilitate joint closure and consequently create conditions for new 
relevant contributions. Brennan and Clark (1996) have proposed that earlier pacts serve as 
evidence and constraints to continue the task. In essence, common ground is an up-to-date 
accumulation of mutual understanding. When pairs need to resume joint actions, they will 
rely on what pairs have accomplished and have in common ground to find out how to 
continue. 
More research is needed to find out about the effect of duration on the need to 
reconstruct common ground. Our results show that participants are minimizing their effort 
to reinstate. When interruptions last 3 seconds or when participants are reinstating at the 
end of a task, participants refer to common ground using more deixis. They assume common 
ground is intact. When interruptions last longer, they tend to repeat information that was 
already in common ground. So it would be interesting to find out the maximum duration for 
which participants can afford not to refer to common ground to continue. This duration is 
probably very brief (under 3 seconds). Then, it would be interesting to know the maximum 
duration for which participants can afford to refer to common ground, without repeating 
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information that was already shared. This duration should be also brief (a few seconds?). 
Then, it would be interesting to know the maximum duration for which participants can 
afford to repeat information that was already shared, without having to repeat previous 
steps in the joint project. This duration should be less than a minute. Then, we could imagine 
that with longer durations, participants would have to agree on reinstating more goals in the 
stack. 
Also, it would be interesting to replicate these findings with another structured goal-
oriented task, but one that relies on verbal evidence only. In other words, participants would 
be involved in a dialogue to solve a given problem, and would not have visual evidence 
about the progress of their task. The effort to reinstate should be more important, than 
when participants share visual evidence. Also, participants may help each other more if both 
know they are lacking evidence about where they are in their task. 
Also, the cost of reinstatement could be more important when participants are not 
co-present. In Chevalley and Bangerter (in press), we found that participants needed to 
restore commitment before continuing their joint project. In this step, joint attention was 
also achieved. But it’s not clear how this would happen when participants don’t need to 
address face loss. In an experiment where participants would know they would be 
interrupted, face threat issues would be controlled. So we could observe the phenomenon 
of reinstating joint attention and joint projects only. It’s possible that participants keep 
reinstatement effort to a minimum when they re-establish contact. 
Interruptions in joint activities create collaborative costs. More research is needed to 
understand how people deal with costs of interruptions, and reinstate common ground. 
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Chapter 8 – General discussion 
In this discussion, I present a brief summary of the results, draw some implications, 
review our model of suspensions, address the limitations of the studies, and finally propose 
some leads for further studies. 
8.1 Summary of results 
In Study 1, we started by proposing a process model for suspensions, based on 
properties of joint commitments. Suspensions have three phases: suspending a joint project, 
dealing with interruption, and reinstating a joint project. Because suspensions create 
impositions and threaten people’s face, we expected a sub-step of facework to occur at 
suspension and reinstatement. Qualitative observations in naturally-occurring suspensions in 
phone conversations indicated that duration of interruptions and conversational roles 
influenced the collaborative cost of coordinating suspensions. In quantitative analyses, we 
measured the effect of the duration of an interruption and the effect of the conversational 
role (speaker or addressee) on facework and topic reinstatement. Results showed that 
longer suspensions increased facework and the effort to reinstate the conversation. Also, 
addressees were more polite than speakers. 
In Study 2, we set up an experiment where participants engaged in phone 
conversations and were interrupted with a cover story. We replicated results of Study 1. 
Participants were more polite and spent more time reinstating their conversations when 
suspensions were long (M = 35 sec) than short (M = 12 sec). But we couldn’t test the effect 
of conversational role, due to unpredictable changes of floor between participants when 
interruptions occurred. 
In Study 3, we used a similar experimental setting, and we controlled conversational 
roles by asking participants to narrate close-call stories to their partners. There, again, 
participants spent more time reinstating conversational topics after long suspensions (M = 
34 sec vs. M = 6 sec), but contrary to our expectations, participants were not more polite. 
Instead, they were more polite as addressees rather than narrators. They were more polite 
at suspensions than at reinstatements. Addressees waited for appropriate times to initiate 
suspensions (when they could take the floor), and then quickly handed the floor back to 
narrators. 
In Study 4, we focused on the reinstatement process in a goal oriented-task. We 
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measured the effects of duration and timing of interruptions, and the effects of distraction 
of participants during secondary tasks, in an experiment where participants could not see 
each other. Participants spent more time reinstating their task after long (30sec) 
interruptions, than after short (3sec). Likewise, participants spent more time reinstating 
when they were interrupted Mid-task rather than End-task. They also referred to 
information in common ground as often at Mid-task than at End-task. Interactions of timing 
and duration factors also indicated cumulative effects for reinstating tasks. Lastly, 
distractions of both participants during interruptions did not show consistent effect on 
reinstatement. 
In Study 5, we used same the design as in Study 4. We increased durations of 
interruptions and allowed half of the participants to share their workspace. This time, results 
showed partial support for the effect of duration. However, participants used more turns to 
reinstate after long (60sec) than short (30sec) interruptions. Moreover, participants spent 
more time reinstating at Mid-task than End task again. This effect was significant only when 
workspace was shared (interactions between timing and workspace visibility). Comparisons 
with previous studies also suggest cumulative effects of duration and timing of interruptions 
and workspace visibility on the effort to reinstate. 
8.2 Implications 
Let’s go back to our model of suspension and review it in light of our findings. 
Suspending a joint activity is a collaborative process. When one or both partners are 
interrupted by a third party, they usually can’t afford to continue their joint activity, 
because, at least, one of the partners needs to deal with the interrupting matter. Joint 
activities involve the coordination of mutual actions. So they need to jointly suspend and 
later, jointly reinstate their activity. Suspensions have collaborative phases and costs.  
First, suspensions have three phases: suspending a joint project, dealing with an 
interruption, and reinstating a joint project. At the project level, these phases are similar to 
the Entry-Body-Exit phases of joint projects (Clark, 1996), except that participants agree on 
an Exit first, and then on an Entry. Each of these steps has Entry-Body-Exit phases as well, 
because they also need to be negotiated. Participants need to agree on suspending and then 
agree on reinstating their joint project.   
Second, suspensions have collaborative costs. When partners are involved in joint 
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projects, they commit to them. They bind their resources to achieve a common purpose. 
They expect their partners to do the same. Their commitments unfold in a series of joint 
projects and sub-projects. So when they have to part unexpectedly and momentarily, they 
deal with a potential face threat, and with the risk of losing common ground. 
8.2.1 Collaborative cost of suspensions 
Suspending joint commitment threatens face. To avoid that, participants have to 
jointly agree on the suspension. Face threat depends on the imposition of the threat and the 
willingness, or expectation, of people to accommodate to the threat (Brown & Levinson, 
1967). These two aspects depend on the two partners. Imposition is controlled by the 
persons who are initiating suspensions. The willingness to accommodate depends on the 
persons who are left out. So partners assess face threat based on situational factors. 
Situational factors can facilitate or aggravate face threat. Suspending can be dealt with little 
or no redressive acts or with a lot of compensation. Situational factors depend mostly on 
interruptions and on the media of communication.  
First, interruptions can last for a few seconds or they can last for a long time 
(between less than 3 seconds and up to a minute in Study 1). If partners have to suspend for 
a long time, they will provide more compensation for their partners. Also, the timing of an 
interruption can also be unfortunate. It could happen when partners are in the middle of an 
utterance. In Studies 1 and 3, listeners were more polite when they didn’t have the floor, 
because they had to cut in on their partners’ contributions. Analysis of audio recordings in 
Study 1 and transcriptions in Study 3 reveals that partners try to wait for the least imposing 
moment to initiate suspensions. Initiating a suspension is easier when partners have the 
floor. In Study 3, listeners minimized the imposition of suspension at reinstatement, by 
giving the floor back to narrators. 
Second, the medium can be quite constraining too (Clark & Brennan, 1991). Similarly 
to their costs for grounding, media have costs for facework. Co-presence and visibility can 
greatly influence the compensations people have to offer. In Studies 1, 2 and 3, partners 
were not co-present, nor could they see each others. They only relied on audibility. Partners 
who were put on hold had no clue about the situation their other partners were in. As 
discussed in Study 1, we could expect that in co-presence, partners might be more willing to 
accommodate. By noticing the potential embarrassment of having to suspend, partners may 
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minimize the suspension in return. Also, if all parties are co-present, the person interrupting 
the pairs might take responsibility for the compensation for face threat. It seems that a third 
person could be easily ratified as a legitimate participant in the exchange. In our cases, 
interruptions have an external origin, so if partners share evidence about it, it should reduce 
the cost of facework. 
Suspending joint commitment puts common ground at risk. The point of suspension 
affects the reinstatement of common ground. Often people are constrained to suspend. So 
they have little time to choose where to stop in their joint actions.  They seem to prefer to 
initiate suspension at the end of joint actions. Some partners waited to have the floor in 
Studies 1 and 3, and in Studies 4 and 5, there were some cases where some partners took up 
the instructor’s proposals, after the experimenter had uttered stop. At reinstatement, 
partners have to reactivate their joint projects. In joint projects, partners not only reiterate 
their goals, they also recreate joint closure of the course of actions. They need to share the 
belief they both know that they know they are at a given stage in common ground. If they 
can’t assume it is true, they need to reconstruct common ground. 
 Thus, because common ground is an accumulation of joint projects, participants can 
refer to earlier shared information that was grounded. In Studies 4 and 5, participants 
referred to common ground to reinstate unfinished contributions, or to propose the next 
relevant contribution. These strategies depend on the state of common ground at 
suspension (in the middle of joint project or in between), on the decay of suspended goals, 
and on the availability of shared evidence. In Studies 4 and 5, Mid-task interruptions were 
more difficult to reinstate, because evidence of common ground was not shared. This was 
more the case at End-task, because joint projects were closed. Also in all our studies, long 
interruptions required more repetitions of earlier contributions, than when interruptions 
were very short. Finally, reinstatements depend on the communication medium and the 
evidence partners share about the progress of their joint project. In Study 5, visual cues 
allowed participants to reactivate common ground faster. They didn’t rely on their mental 
representation of their partners and verbal evidence, when they couldn’t see each other. For 
instance, they were able to use more deictic references to refer to information in common 
ground.  
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8.2.2 Suspension model 
Here is now a description of the steps of a collaborative suspension based on our 
findings.  
1) Suspension phase: 
a) Participants notice a disruptive event and assess the need to suspend and potential 
face threat (Studies 1 to 3) 
b) If they can, participants try to initiate the suspension at an opportune moment in the 
course of actions (e.g., partners waiting for narrators to finish their utterance in 
Study 3). 
c) If needed, participants use negative face threat strategies to avoid face loss (e.g., 
minimize imposition, show reluctance, apologize in Study 1 to 3).  
d) Participants agree on taking leave of each other momentarily (Studies 1 to 3) 
2) Interruption phase: The partners don’t interact. Depending on the communication 
medium, they may or may not be able to monitor the secondary activity in the 
background (Study 1). 
3) Reinstatement phase: 
a) Participants re-establish joint attention by signalling their readiness and willingness 
to continue (Studies 1 to 3). 
b) Participants engage in facework if necessary (Studies 1 to 3). 
c) Participants update common ground (Studies 1 to 5): 
i) Participants reactivate the last suspended joint project (Studies 1 to 5). 
ii) Participants regain common ground on current joint project, by (Studies 4 & 5): 
(a) Repeating contributions in common ground. 
(b) Referring deictically to what is in common ground. 
d) Participants present the next relevant contribution to joint project (Studies 1 to 5)  
As we discussed above, we studied situational parameters that influence the 
collaborative efforts, namely: participants’ conversational role (Studies 1 & 3), timing of the 
events (Studies 4 & 5), and communication medium (Studies 1 to 5).  
8.2.3 The cooperative principle in suspensions 
Suspensions are not expected, and relatively speaking, they create additional costs in 
the collaborative process. There is little doubt about that. But overall, it seems that given the 
circumstances, partners in our studies kept collaborative costs at a minimum through the 
whole process. They contributed well enough to succeed in negotiating each of the 
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unexpected changes of purpose. 
I suggest that in suspensions, partners follow a cooperative principle in a broad 
sense. It stems from Grice’s cooperative principle, and how people ground joint projects: 
‘*Participants+ make their conversational contribution*s+ such as required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [they] 
are engaged.” (Clark, 1996, p. 140). We could look at the direction of the talk exchange as a 
“mutually accepted direction” (Clark, 1996, p. 140), or an accepted joint purpose. My point is 
that people contribute in regards to the current stage of the exchange. I broaden the context 
of exchange to the situation participants are in. I propose that they contribute in light of the 
circumstances. By expanding the stage to the situation, I assume participants are able to 
recognise changes of purpose in the “here and now” situation. That allows for participants to 
adapt to unexpected changes, such as dealing with suspensions. Each new project redefines 
the direction and the purpose of the exchange in an opportune way. This is similar to how 
participants ground their contributions. They update the mutual direction or joint purpose of 
the exchange. They recognize and take up on new proposals and change of purpose. 
Otherwise, they wouldn’t be able to progress and navigate in negotiate joint projects. We 
also assume people contribute just enough for the current purpose, following the principle 
of least collaborative effort (Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). These considerations, I 
believe, support the collaborative nature of how people negotiate with each new step in 
interactions.  
Now how do these considerations apply to the suspension process? Participants 
agree upon each new purpose or change of direction in the process. It means that they 
agree on suspending and later reinstating. The suspensions are unfortunate, but participants 
still are committed to continuing the joint project, the joint purpose of the exchange. So they 
jointly negotiate each step in the suspending and reinstating phase. They also contribute 
enough for the current purpose (suspend project, redress face, check availability, redress 
face, reinstate project), given that these steps are relevant for the given stage of the 
exchange. Globally, participants moved on quite rapidly through the steps, and tried to keep 
costs at a minimum. 
When engaged in facework, participants provide enough politeness to suspend. They 
were less polite when interruptions were short (Study 1). Though, it seems that participants 
took time in redressing face at reinstatement. This was the case in tasks that were less goal-
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oriented, like in Studies 1 and 2. It is possible that the urgency of the situation required 
participants to be more Gricean than in another situation. Without time pressure, it is 
possible that people would use more indirect strategies. Consequently, these strategies 
would not be considered as efficient in terms of effort. 
When reinstating joint projects, people also used evidence to contribute as little as 
needed (Study 5). They often seemed to provide enough information to reinstate common 
ground so they wouldn’t have to engage in repairs (Studies 4 & 5). Rarely did pairs have 
different beliefs about what was in common ground. They were opportunistic in referring to 
information in common ground. They repeated more information at Mid-task than at End-
task (Studies 4 & 5). They repeated less information after short interruptions than long 
interruptions in studies 4 and 5. They preferred repeating the last contributions, after short 
interruptions, rather than having to refer to earlier contributions, in Study 1. These seemed 
to be right strategies to continue with joint projects. Once participants reached closure, they 
moved on right away with new contributions.  
8.2.4 Implications for collaborations in organizations 
We can generalize the implications of our results to other situations, in particular in 
organisational settings. At work, many collaborative activities take place in dyads or groups 
and via different communication media. In global organizations, interactions are often 
mediated via audio and visual devices. These can be for instance, telephone calls, video-
conferences, or even computer-mediated surgical operations. When interruptions occur, the 
amount of shared evidence may be limited and cost for face and reinstatement of common 
ground may be important. Cockpit crews, for instance, have numerous artefacts to support 
their joint activity. They have visual evidence that can help them remember where they are 
in their task (Hutchins, 1995). But they don’t have evidence for what has been uttered.  
Also, status and role of participants can be different in collaborative activities at 
work. These add more constraints to facework during interruptions. Face threat is related to 
illegitimate actions imposing on negative face or neglecting positive face. Legitimacy of tasks 
has a significant effect on stress (Semmer, Jacobshagen, & Meier, 2009). In field studies, 
interruptions often appear as legitimate (Perlow, 1999; Gonzalez & Mark, 2004). So there, 
face threat is expected to be minimal. But this might not always be the case. Certain tasks 
and actions are expected for different roles and status. Perception of imposition is different 
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for different status (Brown & Levinson, 1987). For instance, secretaries should expect 
interruptions from colleagues and supervisors. On the other hand, subalterns may be 
reluctant to interrupt their supervisor. When partners are interacting and are interrupted by 
a third party, then status of the party and the legitimacy of the interruption may have a 
different impact on the pair and on the person who has to deal with the third party.  
Moreover, more microanalyses of interactions will help understand the impact of 
interruptions on multitasking, team work, and use of artefacts (e.g., Fussell et al., 2004; 
Grosjean, 2004). 
8.3 Limitations 
Studying conversation is not an easy task, particularly when researchers try to infer 
common patterns among populations of participants. It requires compromises between 
studying naturally-occurring phenomena and controlling parameters. Of course, ideal data 
comes from naturally-occurring phenomena. It provides opportunities to observe authentic 
and various parameters. But then, when researchers need to test hypotheses, experimental 
designs provide control over variables and allow for statistical analyses. Both methods are 
recommended (Clark & Bangerter, 2004). Of course, one of the disadvantages of 
experimental studies is the limited parameters that can be studied. But then, at the same 
time, their effects are easier to interpret. 
We started with naturally-occurring suspensions, and derived hypotheses for 
facework and grounding processes. We tested them and came up with significant results in a 
correlational study (Study 1) and in an experimental design (Study 2). There, conversations 
where only constrained by a given topic. Then, we needed to replicate our findings, and have 
better control over participants’ role, so we imposed on them to narrate stories. Then, we 
further tested grounding process and further controlled other contextual parameters. We 
controlled the activity and the participants’ role in the interactions. We also further 
controlled the timing off the interruptions. The focus on grounding process and the need for 
precision required to avoid facework. So, as we further progressed on analyzing specific 
effects, we also had to give up on crossing other interesting parameters. For instance, we 
could have manipulated the collocation of participants (co-present or not) with duration of 
interruptions and measured differences in facework. We could have used another structured 
task with no visual evidence and see how this could have influenced reinstatements. There 
121 
 
are even more parameters we could have included. What else we could have done is 
addressed in the following section. 
8.4 Further studies 
8.4.1 Facework 
As our studies suggest, participants are acting in a cost-effective way regarding the 
effort to reinstate. At times, participants don’t use much politeness, seemingly to favour the 
reinstatement of the joint actions, even after long suspensions (see Study 3). Participants 
reinstate faster when suspensions are shorter. So it’s possible that participants might refrain 
from extensive politeness to facilitate the reinstatement of the activity. There were cases in 
Study 1, in the corpus analysis where speakers “allow” themselves to skip redressive actions 
in favour of continuing the discussion and avoid repairs, when suspensions lasted only few 
seconds. If participants try to minimize collaborative costs, in which configuration of role, 
status and interruptions, do participants have to redress face? As I pointed out in the 
implication for organizations (8.2.4), it is not clear when people can afford or not to not be 
polite. 
Also, we suggested that sharing evidence about the source of interruptions may 
facilitate facework. When participants are co-present, they may notice the disruption, may 
anticipate the suspension, be less offended, and facilitate the cost for the person who has to 
deal with the interrupting matter. Casual observations suggest that solicited participants 
may engage in less redressive acts to compensate other partner’s face loss when a co-
present third party initiates interruptions. The third party bears responsibility for threatening 
the pair’s face. So we would expect the third party to use polite strategies and redress faces. 
8.4.2 Common ground 
Finally, as noted in our above discussions of cost-efficient reinstatement, participants 
seem to know how much information to provide to allow them to re-establish common 
ground. In Study 4 and 5, participants rarely didn't remember where they were. They at least 
remembered their last joint action, because it had been completed and they had some 
evidence of it. Most of turns were spent at reinstating uncompleted actions. But if we had 
pairs working with less evidence and longer duration, we could expect further effort to 
reconstruct common ground. In a goal-oriented task without visual evidence, pairs would 
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rely only on speech. It would then be interesting to see how they reinstate their stack of 
joint commitments. Also, it seems that past a few seconds, pairs have to repeat previous 
contributions. So it would also be interesting to find how long pairs can stop talking before 
having to reinstate their contributions. We could expect no repetition up to 1 or 2 seconds, 
and then verbatim repetition, until 3 or 4 seconds, and then more elaborate reinstatements. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
We analyzed cases of people suspending joint activities. This phenomenon brought to 
light two important coordination processes: facework and grounding. Our results show that 
long interruptions had a negative impact on both processes. Participants in an audience role 
were also more polite. Also, participants took longer to reinstate when they could not 
complete their joint actions at interruptions. But this effect was not as important when 
participants shared evidence about the state of their task. Our results show the collaborative 
nature of suspending joint activities.  
Suspensions have a drastic impact on interactive processes, and have the advantage 
of being manipulable. In particular, suspensions give opportunities to study facework. It is an 
important aspect of collaborative processes that is often left out of language studies. 
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